Occasional Papers/
Reprints Series
in Contemporary
Asian Studies

NUMBER 6 — 1995 (131)



AN ENTREPRENEURIAL ANALYSIS OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS

Ching-Chane Hwang

School of Law
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of
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Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

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Tel.: (410) 706-3870
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Price for single copy of this issue: US $18.00.

ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-925153-43-5

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*Ching-Chane Hwang**

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Teachers, friends, and family members have offered their advice and support for me for many years. Professor Joe A. Oppenheimer, my advisor and mentor, opened my eyes to the essence of politics and to a new approach to the study of political science. I thank him greatly for his encouragement and guidance in my research. I also express my deepest gratitude to Professor Hungdah Chiu for his generous support. For valuable advice and criticism, I thank Professors Marcus Franda, Barbara Meeker, Karol E. Soltan, and David Lalman.

For friendship and support, I thank Ming-jer Chen, Feng Lee Lin, Lilien Lu, Hui-wan Cho, Bih-Jau Sheu, Paul Gani, and Melissa Fang-yuan Yao, most notably Chih-Yu Wu, Moh-jiun Hu, and Frances Lee. I also thank Su Yun Chang and Karin Krchnak for editing the entire manuscript.

My gratitude also goes to my parents, my brother, and my parents-in-law. Without them, this research would have been impossible. My husband, Wenjia You, taught me how to think logically and write clearly. I sincerely thank him.

Ching-Chane Hwang
National Chung Cheng University
December 20, 1995

PREFACE

This book is a revised version of my dissertation, "Entrepreneurial Theory of Opposition Movements in One-Party Dominant Quasi-Democratic Countries." It treats opposition movements as collective action problems and puts opposition leaders at the center in its examination of opposition movements. In addition, it uses political rights and civil liberties indices (1973-1993) and the number of consecutive elections to national legislatures (1972-1992) to set up an ideal type of a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system to discuss opposition movements.

Chapter 1 is a literature review of the research on opposition movements. Chapter 2 presents the concept of entrepreneurial leadership in leading opposition movements. Chapter 3 proposes a new typology of political systems to investigate opposition movements in greater depth. Chapter 4 uses the concepts developed in the previous chapters to examine opposition movements in different political systems. Chapter 5 discusses Taiwan as a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system, and Taiwan's opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs. The Conclusion summarizes the whole study and makes suggestions for further research into this phenomenon of world politics.

An opposition movement is not only a pursuit of moral ideals or democracy, but also an enterprise involving costs and benefits. Opposition leaders, as political entrepreneurs, would not emerge without prospective gains in the offing—the expected value of leading an opposition movement must be positive.

In general, opposition leaders have little incentive to play the role of mobilizing agents when the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome and the costs of the opposition losing the political contest are extremely high and when the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome are almost nil. Therefore, organized opposition movements are almost non-existent in many of "the least democratic countries." Only when the opportunity for establishing permanent organizations and for amassing resources by different methods exist can we anticipate relatively successful opposition movements. The Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) and the Solidarity movement in Poland, the guerrilla operation of the Shining Path in Peru, and the under-

ground operation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and its splintered militant factions in Algeria are good examples.

Electoral politics distinguishes one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries from other less democratic countries. It offers opposition leaders many incentives to emerge and assume the role of mobilizing agents; therefore, organized opposition movements can become a reality in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries.

The case study of Taiwan amply illustrates: 1) the inadequacy of the overgeneralized category of authoritarian regimes; 2) the importance of elections (however imperfect they may be); and, 3) the entrepreneurial explanation of the emergence and development of opposition movements.

It is hoped that this book brings together the rational choice approach and the research on opposition movements. By applying the concept of entrepreneurial leadership to opposition movements, this study intends to add a new dimension to the research on opposition movements in developing countries, especially in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries.

Ching-Chane Hwang
National Chung Cheng University
December 20, 1995

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> No government can be long secure without a formidable opposition.
>
> —Disraeli[1]

It is a natural tendency for human beings to identify with the causes of political oppositions around the world. When the 4 June 1989 Chinese democracy movement was crushed by the communist regime in a bloody confrontation at Tiananmen Square, it was immediately followed by an expression of world-wide outrage. When the opposition movement led by Mrs. Corazon Aquino triumphed over President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986, the world cheered for the victory of "people power." Most people admire the courage and faith of every David who fights against the Goliath of every repressive regime. They also glorify the noble goals of pursuing freedom and democracy by opposition groups under oppressive regimes. However, behind this romanticization of political oppositions, there are practical concerns and actions involving all opposition movements.

While we may be somewhat emotional about heroism and martyrdom, in order to understand an opposition movement, we cannot ignore the fact that opposition leaders are also human and have their bread-and-butter concerns. Meanwhile, we need to deal with some basic questions. What is an opposition movement? Do all opposition movements strive for democracy? How important is the role of the leader(s) in any opposition movement? Why do some such movements succeed while others fail? How do these movements operate in different political systems in the world? These questions must be addressed before we can understand any opposition movement with any degree of insight.

The scholarship on opposition movements in developing countries can be largely divided into several groups. The first group, influenced by the early studies of conditions for democratic sys-

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1. W. H. Auden, ed., *The Viking Book of Aphorisms*, a Personal Selection by W.H. Auden and Louis Kronenberger (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 301.

tems,[2] puts opposition movements under a broader heading of democratization or political modernization.[3] Because these scholars focus on factors or conditions congenial to democratization, they generally play down the role of opposition movements and even consider them insignificant or nonexistent. For example, Samuel P. Huntington lists five major factors which led to the third wave of the democratization process in the 1970s and 1980s: (1) legitimacy crises in authoritarian regimes; (2) an increasing middle class population due to rapid economic growth in the 1960s; (3) the changing attitude of the Catholic Church from defending the status quo to opposing authoritarianism; (4) changes in the policies of the United States, the former Soviet Union and the European Community; and, (5) the "snowball effect" of some earlier cases of transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones, thereby encouraging other cases of democratization in other parts of the world.[4] Huntington's arguments imply that once some of the factors favorable to democratization appear, an "invisible hand" will take care of the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones. Such arguments fail to account for the individual actors who actually bring about or obstruct the realization of democracy. Important as they are, these individual actors, namely the opposition leaders and their followers, cannot be dismissed in any serious discussion of an opposition movement.

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2. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" in Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer eds., *Empirical Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 151-92; Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis" in Cnudde and Neubauer, pp. 193-209; Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy" in Cnudde and Neubauer, pp. 224-35; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2 (1970), pp. 337-63. These scholars mainly focus on the conditions for democratic systems. Their studies imply that certain conditions are necessary for democratization. Following this line of thinking, many other scholars discuss the democratization process in the developing world. They check the absence or appearance of the conditions developed by the above-mentioned scholars to explain why certain developing countries do not have democratic systems and why others do.

3. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 193-218.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 4. In this article, Huntington casually mentions the word "opposition" three times (p. 8, p. 19 and p. 20). He cares more about the general process of democratization than the narrow topic of opposition movements.

Other scholars also focus on democratization, while building up typologies or models to explain transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones.[5] For example, Donald Share proposes four types of transition to democracy: incremental democratization, transition through transaction, transition through protracted revolutionary struggle, and transition through rupture.[6] Share suggests transition through transaction as the most promising model of democratization.[7] In this model, opposition leaders can contribute to successful democratization by conditionally accepting the initiative and the terms of democratization set up by the authoritarian regime and by acting responsibly.[8] Along this line of thinking, opposition leaders play an important yet auxiliary role in the process of democratization, while the leaders of the authoritarian coalition make the transition to democracy possible. Such studies, therefore, limit an opposition movement to its function of fulfilling a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime; they do not concern themselves with the complex operations within an opposition movement. In other words, opposition movements and their leaders are not subject to in-depth analysis, but rather are treated as necessary yet secondary factors to bring about regime changes.[9]

In summary, scholars who focus on conditions or factors favorable to democratization base their level of analysis on state and international actors. When certain conditions are fulfilled in a developing country, their research implies that a democratization process will follow automatically, with the authoritarian regime suc-

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5. See Donald Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 19 (1987), pp. 525-48; Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 64-84; Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 23 (October 1990), pp. 1-21.

6. Share, *supra* note 5, pp. 528-33. Actually, Share's four types of democratization from authoritarian rule are four types of regime change. He doesn't distinguish between a regime change and a democratic transition. For example, the collapse of the preceding authoritarian regime and a coup, two subtypes of transition through rupture, should not be deemed as types of democratic transition, because they do not necessarily lead to democracy.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 533.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 540-41.

9. Although some scholars correctly indicate the absence of studies of political oppositions in democratization literature, they still view opposition movements in the context of democratic transitions. See Jean Grugel, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Lessons from Latin America," *Political Studies*, Vol. 39 (1991), pp. 363-68.

cessfully transformed into a democratic one. Methodologically, they take opposition factors for granted in the democratization process and give little space to discussing the individuals who are significant participants in a regime transformation.

Still, there are scholars who develop models or strategies to analyze democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes. These scholars recognize the important roles played by individual actors (both regime leaders and opposition leaders) in effecting democratic transitions. They also agree that some structural constraints (socioeconomic and cultural factors) shape the preferences and choices of political players, but they emphasize the strategic interactions between the contending players in guiding democratic transitions.[10] Even though they pay attention to individual actors, these scholars do not really study, in depth, opposition movements and the opposition leaders themselves. They are more interested in the pact-making processes between opposition groups and regime leaders and how certain types of opposition groups (from right to left) will achieve pact-making more easily, thereby leading to a successful democratic transition.[11]

Larry Diamond correctly describes the problems in research on democratization as follows:

> Democracy is not achieved simply by the hidden process of socioeconomic development bringing a country to a point where it has the necessary "prerequisites" for it. It is not delivered by the grace of some sociological *deus ex machina*. And neither is it simply the result of the divisions, strategies, tactics, negotiations and settlements of contending elites. Political scientists who conceive of democratic transitions simply in this way miss an important element. That element is struggle, personal risk-taking, mobilization and sustained, imaginative organization on the part of a large number of citizens.[12]

Indeed, granted that research on the conditions for democracy or for the demise of authoritarian regimes is of some value, the condi-

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10. Karl, *supra* note 5, p. 7. Terry Lynn Karl indicates that the functional pacts agreed on between contending players are crucial for democratic transitions. However, she does not explain why contending players agree to make a functional pact in the first place. Moreover, she ignores the interactions between leaders and followers.

11. See Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 22 (April 1990), pp. 370-71.

12. Larry Diamond, ed., *The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World* (New York: Freedom House, 1992), p. 5.

tions themselves cannot automatically bring about a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime.[13] If there is no pressure as a result of popular agitation, very few, if any, authoritarian regimes would bother to make a democratic transition. If democratic moves take place without the initiative of an authoritarian regime, then there must be an effective opposition group or a revolutionary organization that makes such moves happen.

Therefore, opposition movements and opposition leaders are crucial for any kind of regime change, including a democratic transition from an authoritarian regime, regardless of whether the change is initiated by the authoritarian regime or whether the external socioeconomic conditions are met. The conditions favorable to democratization actually are those favorable to the rise of an effective opposition that can force the authoritarian regime to respond accordingly. For example, high literacy rates, high degrees of urbanization, and high per capita incomes make it easier for opposition groups to recruit both material and moral support from the general public and to form powerful coalitions in numbers.[14] Also, the loss of legitimacy, an economic crisis, and a succession crisis make an authoritarian regime more vulnerable to attack from opposition groups and to pressures from the general public. Similarly, when an authoritarian regime faces a formidable political opposition, even though the end result may not necessarily be a democracy, it greatly raises the possibility of a democratic transition.[15]

Although opposition movements and opposition leaders definitely play an important role in democratic transitions, not all opposition groups opt for democratization. For example, most ethnic separation movements and guerrilla warfare leaders pursue other

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13. Terry Lynn Karl lists many problems of research on conditions for democracy. See Karl, *supra* note 5, pp. 2-5; Terry Lynn Karl, "Getting to Democracy: Plenary Session II, a Research Perspective" in National Research Council, *The Transition to Democracy: Proceeding of a Workshop/Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council*, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 29-32.

14. The premise is that a high literacy rate, a high degree of urbanization, and a high per capita income are indicators of the emergence of the middle class. The emergence of a middle class offers a broader resource base for opposition groups.

15. There can be many possible outcomes of this situation. The authoritarian regime can relentlessly suppress the opposition group if it has sufficient coercive power and can bear the high cost of repression. Then, the result will be a more coercive authoritarian rule for a period of time. If the opposition group has enough firearms or it can successfully make an alliance with some important military actors in the regime, they may overthrow the government with force and establish a new regime which is not a democracy.

goals. If we study opposition movements merely in the context of democratization, we will not have a clear view of opposition movements because, in so doing, we inevitably bypass many important forms of opposition movements with non-democratic goals. Therefore, this book does not focus on the democratization process or how opposition factors contribute to democratic transitions. Rather, this study analyzes opposition movements and leaders for what they are—their rise and fall, their existence and operation—and deals with the following questions. How do potential opposition leaders emerge? How do they organize and maintain an opposition movement? How do they coordinate and gain full cooperation among members in an opposition group? What costs do they have to bear in leading an opposition movement, and what rewards do they get? What are the political consequences of leading an opposition movement in the Third World in different political systems?

Unlike the scholars mentioned earlier who largely ignore opposition factors, there are also many who take these factors into account. Some of them deal mainly with theories of revolution or guerrilla insurgency. Revolution is the most fascinating form of an opposition movement promising large-scale consequences. The most crucial question for such studies is: Which forces make a revolution possible—the structural plus historical forces, or the revolutionaries' maneuvers designed as mobilizing agents?[16] On the one hand, the structural-historical approach maintains that social structures and historical situations produce revolutions.[17] For example, capitalist imperialism weakened the internal structure and coercive power of the regimes and promoted peasant-based revolution organizations.[18] On the other hand, the mobilizing-agent approach asserts that revolutionary movements are purposely pursued and organized by revolutionary organizations and their leaders. The mobilizing-agent approach covers two aspects. First, the resource mobilization aspect highlights the revolutionary or insurgent organizations in collecting both tangible and intangible resources to

16. See James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 8; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), p. 6.

17. See Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 14 (April 1982), pp. 351-75; Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 6.

18. Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *supra* note 17, pp. 370-73.

make revolutions or guerrilla insurgencies possible.[19] Second, the strategist aspect stresses the role of strategic maneuvering in leading revolutions by opposition leaders.[20] Both aspects of the mobilizing-agent approach, however, do not consider the payoff calculation of opposition leaders in leading an opposition movement. Therefore, they largely take the emergence of opposition leaders for granted.

Both approaches just mentioned offer valuable theories and information through which we can study opposition movements in general. Nevertheless, since revolutions are rare in human history and guerrilla insurgencies are only one of many forms of political opposition, this study includes a much broader set of opposition movements. Moreover, this study recognizes the structural restraints imposed on the development of opposition movements; therefore, in Chapters 3 and 4, I examine how the degree of governmental coercion and opportunities for opposition leaders to emerge affect their expected value of leading an opposition movement. I tend to agree with the mobilizing-agent approach to the explanation of opposition movements and therefore do not focus on the causes of opposition movements, whether they are relative deprivation, absolute deprivation, or just social disequilibria.

What matters to this study is the simple fact that pervasive popular grievances always exist in repressive countries. For opposition leaders, the critical task is to mobilize those people and obtain their support to change political and social conditions to their advantage. Thus, the initial establishment of a permanent opposition organization to collect resources and conduct opposition movements while under a repressive regime is pivotal for mobilizing a disgruntled public. However, a costly opposition organization will not appear out of nowhere—someone must bear the high initial costs of setting up an opposition organization. Opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs certainly have to emerge to bear that burden, and we cannot take their emergence for granted. In this respect, my study is an attempt to construct an entrepreneurial explanation of opposition movements.

Some other scholars examine the psychological characteristics of opposition leaders.[21] For example, Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phil-

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19. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), pp.6-7.

20. DeNardo, *supra* note 16.

21. See Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips, "Governments and Radical Oppositions: The Psychologies of System-Supporting and System-Challenging Behavior," *Journal of*

lips ask whether regime leaders and opposition leaders (especially radical opposition leaders) have different psychological traits.[22] They examine 50 regime leaders and 50 revolutionary leaders in the world. The result reveals that asceticism-puritanism and oedipal conflict are characteristic of revolutionary leaders alone and that other psychological traits such as vanity-egotism, relative deprivation-status inconsistency, marginality-inferiority complex and estheticism-romanticism can be found in both regime leaders and revolutionaries.[23] Interesting though this study may be, it does not touch on the relationship between leaders and followers and the cost-benefit calculations in the mind of an opposition leader,[24] neither do these psychological traits explain convincingly how opposition leaders decide to become political entrepreneurs and how they adopt specific strategies under different political constraints. Such dynamic responses of opposition leaders, rather than a fixed and highly arguable set of psychological traits, are what truly matters to a study of opposition movements, and to my study.

International Affairs, Vol. 40 (Winter/Spring, 1987), pp. 353-72. In their study of Latin American revolutionaries, Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu indicate that most revolutionary leaders of guerrilla organizations came from well-to-do families. Radu and Tismaneanu assert that revolutionary leaders' isolation from society and their rebellious attitudes and behaviors towards their own well-to-do social background explain their cold-blooded approach to violence. See Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (McLean: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1990), pp. 11-14. Therefore, according to Radu and Tismaneanu, revolutionary leaders' violent orientation did not come from strategic considerations, but from their psychological traits molded by their ivory tower educations.

22. They identify six sets of psychological factors to distinguish between regime leaders and radical opposition leaders (revolutionaries): (1) vanity and egotism; (2) asceticism and puritanism; (3) relative deprivation and status inconsistency; (4) marginality and inferiority complex; (5) oedipal conflict; and, (6) estheticism and romanticism. See Rejai and Phillips, "Governments and Radical Oppositions: The Psychologies of System-Supporting and System-Challenging Behavior," *supra* note 21, p. 354. Rejai and Phillips do not give a clear boundary between regime leaders and revolutionary leaders. Yesterday's revolutionary leaders can be today's regime leaders. For example, Chiang Kai-shek was a revolutionary when he fought against the Ch'ing dynasty. Later, he united China and became the President of the Republic of China. Rejai and Phillips put him under the category of regime leaders (loyalist leaders) and thus ignore his earlier background as a revolutionary.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

24. One interesting conclusion from their research is that almost all of the regime leaders are drawn from the upper and middle socioeconomic strata and over three-fourths of the radical opposition leaders come from the middle and lower socioeconomic strata. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

Still, some other scholars focus on the study of a civil society. They believe the emergence or revival of a civil society is a necessary condition for democracy.[25] For them, opposition movements are merely part of the emergence or revival of a civil society. Edward Shils defines a civil society as "a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the state, and which is largely in autonomy from it."[26] A civil society consists of many autonomous civil groups, such as professional associations, women's groups, trade unions, human rights organizations, and the press.[27] Further, the emergence of a civil society in an authoritarian regime can contribute to the regime's democratic transition.[28] Political opposition comes not only from formal or party opposition, but also from other organizations, such as community-based non-party oppositions, churches, and independent peasant groups.[29]

Several authors underscore these non-party popular groups in leading civil participation in authoritarian regimes.[30] However, these studies of non-party popular groups pay more attention to the education programs conducted in the groups than to the roles and skills of the leaders who organize the groups. Also, these studies

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25. See Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5 (July 1994), pp. 4-17. Again, scholars who adopt the civil society approach focus on the role played by a civil society in the democratization process.

26. Edwards Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26 (Winter 1991), p. 3.

27. See Diamond, *supra* note 25, p. 5. We raise the question as to how many civil organizations will constitute a civil society? Will one strong civil organization and no other viable ones make a society a civil society? Scholars who take the civil society approach do not give us any clue as to the answers. Thus, one significant problem of the civil society approach emerged: it does not have a clearly defined research target.

28. Diamond, *supra* note 12, pp. 6-13; Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy," *World Politics*, Vol. 40 (April 1988), pp. 388-89. Nowadays, it has become a fashion for many authors to use the term "civil society" in their studies on political oppositions or democratic transitions.

29. Jean Grugel, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Lessons from Latin America," *supra* note 9, p. 365; Levine, *supra* note 28, p. 389. Larry Diamond indicates that civil organizations do not include efforts to compete for political power. See Diamond, *supra* note 25, p. 5. However, several scholars who use the concept of a civil society to discuss Polish opposition movements obviously indicate the important roles the Workers' Defense Committee and Solidarity played in the political struggle in Poland. Therefore, it is confusing to discuss opposition movements in the framework of the concept of a civil society.

30. See María Rosa S. de Martini, "Civil Participation in the Argentine Democratic Process" in Diamond, *supra* note 28, pp. 29-52; Monica Jimenez de Barros, "Mobilizing for Democracy in Chile: The Crusade for Citizen Participation and Beyond" in Diamond, *supra* note 12, pp. 73-88; Dette Pascual, "Building a Democratic Culture in the Philippines" in Diamond, *supra* note 12, pp. 53-72.

ignore the coordination between non-party organizations and formal party or quasi-party opposition. Indeed, most of the time these civil organizations have overlapping memberships and share resources with the major opposition organization.[31]

To discuss an opposition movement meaningfully, we have to identify the major opposition group and its leader(s), *i.e.*, the mastermind that struggles against a repressive regime politically. An abstract construct of a civil society leads us nowhere because, obviously, the existence of a number of civil organizations alone does not give rise to any effective opposition movement. Many civil organizations spring into action only after the rise of a relatively successful opposition movement led by a major opposition group, not the other way around. Therefore, instead of the abstract concept of a civil society, we spot the opposition mastermind and see how that person interacts with, coalesces with and manipulates the organizations in that civil society, and how that person eventually turns into a leader of opposition movements.

Finally, there are also scholars who are concerned only with case studies. In fact, amassed in American libraries are uncountable case studies of opposition movements in developing countries around the world. Many of them describe chronologically the political background of a target country, the ruling regime's coercive mechanism, and the development of opposition; however, such studies fail to apply any theoretical tool to their discussion.[32] These case studies are strong in information-gathering for individual countries, but weak and of little value in generalizing the emergence of opposition leaders in the given country, not to mention the emergence of opposition leaders in some countries collectively. Each

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31. Sometimes these civil organizations can play an important role in organizing political opposition when formal opposition parties are banned. For example, the Workers' Defense Committee played a very important role in the Polish opposition movements. See Robert Zuzowski, *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers' Defense Committee "KOR"* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

32. Most case studies of opposition movements adopt the historical approach. Some of them have a well-organized chronological analysis of the origin, the tactics, and the development of an opposition movement in a target country. See Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 27 (September-October 1978), pp. 37-51. Some of them use the concept of pact-making developed by the theorists of democratic transitions to discuss the interaction between regime leaders and opposition groups. See Kirk J. Beattie, "Prospects for Democratization in Egypt," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 36 (Spring 1991), pp. 31-47. Others have a loosely organized description of the events related to opposition movements. See W. E. Skillend, "The Political Opposition in South Korea," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 9 (February 1978), pp. 13-22.

opposition movement, therefore, looks like a chance event specific only to the country involved. To illustrate the weaknesses of such case studies, let us take one example of studies dealing with the opposition movements in China.

In "Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses: Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement," Daniel Kelliher indicates that the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident was "actually a broad-based protest with the potential to crystallize into a conscious effort at democratic change."[33] However, the elite intellectuals' group which led the "democracy movement" suffered from two major problems: (1) putting the goal of liberalization first and democratization later; and, (2) not trusting workers and peasants, and thus not embracing them and treating them as equal partners.[34] Kelliher is right to notice that "the failure to embrace the ordinary citizens of city and village doomed the enterprise entirely."[35] However, he does not probe the question as to why intellectuals could not mobilize ordinary people except by discussing ideological and class differences between intellectuals and ordinary people.[36] How did the dissident leaders marshal resources? What benefits could opposition leaders offer to city dwellers, peasants and workers? How could they minimize the costs imposed by the communist regime on their efforts to expand their organizations? How did they communicate with ordinary people? How did they coordinate actions among all participants? Kelliher does not ask nor answer these questions. He simply concludes that in order to transfer successfully from protest to a democracy movement, intellectuals must overcome the elite-masses chasm and form an elite-masses alliance for democracy.[37] However, he does not elaborate on the process of consummating that elite-masses alliance.

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33. Daniel Kelliher, "Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses: Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25 (July 1993), p. 379.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 380-90.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

36. Kelliher mentions that traditional Chinese intellectuals always distrust and despise peasants; however, he totally ignores the successful mobilization of peasants by the Chinese Communist Party led by intellectuals.

37. Kelliher, *supra* note 33, p. 391. Kelliher claims that the reason why countries such as [former] Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, and Chile can bring about successful democracy movements depends on the intellectuals in those countries who know how to embrace the masses. This simple generalization ignores the complex factors presented in those countries such as: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the weakening of a strong man, and the opportunity of elections.

In brief, the above-mentioned study on opposition movements in China suffers from three problems. First, it treats opposition movements as democracy movements; therefore, it never questions whether opposition leaders have goals other than democracy. Second, it never discusses the difficulties inherent in starting and developing an opposition movement in a totalitarian system like China; in other words, it fails to question the cost-benefit calculations of opposition leaders. Finally, it never examines how resources are collected and distributed by opposition organizations to their supporters, thereby ignoring the coordination process between opposition leaders and followers. These weaknesses may be rectified by an entrepreneurial leadership approach to the problems just raised.

Although my literature review covers the major approaches to opposition movements in developing countries, it certainly is not an exhaustive review. Based on what I have already discussed, what lies behind the general inadequacy in dealing with opposition movements in developing countries is a lack of conceptual clarity in the analysis of these movements. Very few scholars treat opposition movements as collective action problems. They thus avoid an examination of what it takes to foment an opposition movement and therefore cannot construct a solution to problems associated with developing an opposition movement.[38] The success or failure of an opposition movement depends not only on the tolerance of the ruling regime, but also on the entrepreneurial leadership played by its leaders in coordinating collective actions. This book, therefore, is an attempt to add a new dimension to the research on opposition movements in developing countries, especially in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries.

I define opposition movements as collective actions organized by opposition leaders to deliver both collective and private goods. The collective goods which opposition movements deliver demonstrate two characteristics of all collective goods: nonexcludability and indivisibility.[39] Once a collective good is provided, no one can

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38. Samuel L. Popkin is one of the few scholars who treats opposition movements as collective action problems. He discusses in detail how political entrepreneurs organize peasant movements in Vietnam. See Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and "Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam," in Michael Taylor, ed., *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 9-62.

39. See Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), p. 34.

be excluded from benefitting by it and there is no crowding effect on anyone's consumption of it. Collective goods supplied by opposition movements can be a change of governmental policy, structure or leadership.[40] For example, the lifting of martial law, a democratic transition from an authoritarian system, and the toppling of a military junta are collective goods which an opposition movement may deliver in a developing country. Every person who lives in that country is affected by the supply of those collective goods whether or not he or she joins the opposition movement. The formation of an opposition organization itself is also a collective good. Once an opposition organization is formed in an authoritarian country, everyone in that country will benefit from the checks and balances function offered by the opposition organization.

Because of the nonexcludability and indivisibility of collective goods, each individual always has the benefit of a free-ride. If an opposition movement successfully delivers the desired collective good, the free-rider can still enjoy the good; if the opposition movement fails, the free-rider does not bear any personal cost of participation in the action. People who have a common interest in fighting against an authoritarian regime do not necessarily form an opposition group to fulfill that interest because of this free-rider mentality.[41] Therefore, in order to form an opposition organization and to solicit support from the general public to deliver desired collective goods one has to overcome the free-rider problem. Opposition leaders can play this role of mobilizing agents and coordinate cooperation among participants.

The private goods which opposition movements can supply include jobs and material and spiritual payoffs. For example, an opposition movement can offer some of its participants full-time or part-time jobs in the opposition organization. It can also help its candidates run for elections. If it takes over the ruling power, it can distribute or redistribute patronage to its supporters and cadres.

An opposition movement can be a democracy movement, but it can also be a secessionist movement, an ethnic movement, a religious movement, or an ideological movement. It can be in the form of legal or illegal actions. Legal actions include participating in elections, publishing opposition magazines and newspapers, and holding rallies and demonstrations. Illegal actions include: holding

40. See Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Action," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80 (1986), p. 471.

41. Also, to form an opposition organization and to participate in its activities in an authoritarian regime involves huge costs.

illegal rallies and demonstrations; publishing illegal magazines or newspapers; forming underground groups to plot assassinations, sabotages, and other violent behavior; and, launching guerrilla warfare or even a revolution. In this research, opposition movements do not include oppositions which come from a faction of the ruling coalition. Therefore, palace power struggles, coup d'états, intra-regime conflicts are not forms of opposition movements.

As for opposition leaders, some of them sacrifice their personal welfare and deliver collective goods. Others make personal profits and do not deliver collective goods, while some deliver collective goods and also make personal profits. No matter who the opposition leaders are, sinners or saints, they have to face the bread-and-butter issue of leading an opposition movement. Opposition leaders have to collect the necessary resources to start an opposition organization and to maintain that organization on a daily basis. One of the major concerns in this study, therefore, is how these opposition leaders maximize resources under different degrees of repression from different regimes.

Using the aforesaid concept of the leadership inevitably tackling collective action problems, this study attempts to deal with opposition movements within a solid theoretical framework, to generalize opposition movements in developing countries, and to apply our touchstone to a case study. Chapter 2 presents the concept of entrepreneurial leadership in leading opposition movements. It treats opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs and discusses their expected value of leading an opposition movement, their perception of the potential production functions regarding the supply of some collective goods, and the accompanying strategies to gather resources to supply the collective goods. The foci are on how opposition leaders coordinate and communicate within an opposition organization and its supporters and how opposition leaders stimulate, foster, promote, or solicit contributions to opposition movements. Chapter 3 proposes a new typology of political systems to investigate opposition movements in greater depth. Chapter 4 uses the concepts developed in the previous chapters to examine opposition movements in different political systems. Chapter 5 discusses Taiwan as a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system, and Taiwan's opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs. The Conclusion summarizes the whole study and makes suggestions for further research into this phenomenon of world politics.

There are, however, some limitations to this study. First, although this study uses election data and the indices of political rights and civil liberties to build a typology of political systems, the artificial boundaries are imperfect. Second, although a discussion of opposition movements in different political systems has its merits, it can be a bit sketchy. Third, the choice of Taiwan as the case study is somewhat arbitrary. However, within the framework of this study, Taiwan can be seen as "merely" one example out of many that constitutes the quasi-democratic system, an "ideal type" in this research. Taiwan is quasi-democratic and one-party dominant. Under this political system, individual opposition leaders have been thriving but the opposition as a whole has not yet made a breakthrough in winning a majority of votes. This case study offers a good opportunity to examine the entrepreneurial leadership solution to collective action problems.

CHAPTER 2

OPPOSITION LEADERS AS POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

> Self-interest speaks all manner of tongues and plays all manner of parts, even that of disinterestedness.
>
> —La Rochefoucauld[1]

Opposition leaders may have ideals, and sometimes they can be martyrs, but to run a successful opposition movement these leaders must calculate the costs and benefits of their moves. That is how the concept of opposition leaders as "political entrepreneurs" is born. Unfortunately, scholars seldom use this concept to discuss opposition leaders with regard to the rise of opposition movements in developing countries.

This chapter, therefore, discusses the role of opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs in making opposition movements possible. The main issues to be explored are: (1) What are political entrepreneurs? (2) What are opposition movements, and what is the role of opposition leaders? (3) How do potential opposition leaders calculate the costs and benefits of leading an opposition movement? (4) What factors affect opposition leaders' cost-benefit calculations? and, (5) How do opposition leaders maximize resource collections?

I. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF "POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS"

The word "entrepreneur" comes from French, meaning "someone who undertakes something, including economic undertaking; an agent."[2] Nowadays, an entrepreneur is defined as a "person who organizes, operates, and assumes the risk for a business venture."[3] For economists, an entrepreneur brings together all production fac-

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1. La Rochefoucauld, *Maxims* (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1986), p. 42.

2. [no author] *Word Mysteries & Histories: From Quiche to Humble Pie* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), p. 75.

3. [no author] *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), p. 615.

tors, puts them into desired production, and obtains a profit.[4] The connotation of the quality of an entrepreneur includes managerial skill, innovative mind, risk-taking, and profit-seeking spirit.[5] In political science, scholars usually apply the term "entrepreneurs" to politicians quite loosely. A book, for instance, is entitled *Political Entrepreneurs and Urban Poverty*,[6] and yet the term "political entrepreneurs" is not really explained in the text. Other scholars use similar terms, like "public entrepreneurs" or "policy entrepreneurs," to discuss the role of entrepreneurial politicians in bureaucratic agencies[7] and in the United States Congress.[8] For these

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4. Elbert V. Bowden, *Abridged Economics: The Science of Common Sense* (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978), p. 285.

5. When Todd M. Cohan ventured to start a business of helping customers to send dead black roses to the person they hate, he was a typical entrepreneur. He dared to put an innovative idea to the test, took a risk, and expected to get a profitable return. See Michael Janofsky, "For an Un-Valentine: Dead Black Roses," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1993, p. L35. When Joel Babbit, the chief spokesman and marketer of Atlanta, Georgia, raised "millions of dollars by renaming streets and parks for corporate sponsors, implanting high-tech advertising in city sidewalks and sticking corporate logos on city garbage trucks," he also had an entrepreneurial mind since he tried an innovative idea and made a profit from it. See Peter Applebome, "How Atlanta's Adman Pushes the City to Sell Itself," *The New York Times*, February 9, 1993, p. A16. In some cases, an entrepreneur may also be crafty, shrewd, and fraudulent. For example, William Aramony, the ex-president of the United Way of America, lived lavishly at the expense of the non-profit charity organization. Although he successfully ran the charity organization as a corporation, built up a good relationship with corporate leaders, and raised large amounts of money, he rewarded himself with a huge salary ($475,000), incurred extravagant travel expenses, and hired friends and relatives to work in the United Way of America. See Felicity Barringer, "United Way Head Is Forced Out in a Furor over His Lavish Style," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1992, pp. A1, A14; Charles E. Shepard, "United Way Report Criticizes Ex-Leader's 'Lavish Lifestyle'," *Washington Post*, April 4, 1992, pp. A1, A9; John H. Cushman Jr., "Charity Leader's Success Was Also His Undoing," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1992, p. A14.

6. The book discusses the role of innovative politicians in reforming the anti-poverty project in New Haven. See Russell D. Murphy, *Political Entrepreneurs and Urban Poverty: The Strategies of Policy Innovation in New Haven's Model Anti-Poverty Project* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971).

7. See Eugene Lewis, *Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). Lewis uses the concept of the public entrepreneur to examine three administrators who reject traditional norms and expand the goals, functions, and power of their bureaucratic organizations. He defines a public entrepreneur as "a person who creates or profoundly elaborates a public organization so as to alter greatly the existing pattern of allocation of scarce public resources." *Ibid.*, p. 9.

8. See Burdett Loomis, *The New American Politician: Ambition, Entrepreneurship, and the Changing Face of Political Life* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988). Loomis examines the role and behavior of the new breed of U.S. Congressional leaders who

scholars, "public entrepreneurs" or "policy entrepreneurs" stand for politicians or policy makers who dare to make innovative changes in their political settings, usually to obtain unusual political or personal benefits.

All of these applications of the term "entrepreneur" shed no light on opposition movements. The following three studies, in contrast, use the term as pertinent in examining political phenomena; they deserve a closer look because their ideas are relevant to my study of opposition movements.

The first study deals with "social entrepreneurs." According to this study, when a demand for social change generates opportunities for social profits, social entrepreneurs will venture to instigate social innovations for those who demand them.[9] Social profits in the form of monetary and nonmonetary rewards accrue to social entrepreneurs and their coalitions when they can sell a "product" to those who want it.[10] In leading a social movement, the social entrepreneur marshals and maneuvers various kinds of resources, thereby generating social profits. Therefore, the emergence of a social movement depends on the emergence of social entrepreneurs, but they are unlikely to emerge unless they see potential social gain and are willing to organize and coordinate one or more aggrieved groups.

The second study establishes an entrepreneurial theory to account for the formation of "interest groups."[11] According to this theory, group organizers, as entrepreneurs, invest capital to realize a set of benefits for potential members who have to pay to join the group.[12] Therefore, the key to the continuation of an interest group is profits.[13] In organizing an interest group, entrepreneurs must obtain enough payoffs to cover their costs of investment and gain extra profits to reward their efforts; meanwhile, they also need to give members sufficient benefits to maintain their continuing interest

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emerged after the Watergate scandal. He discusses how these ambitious representatives and senators use their entrepreneurial skill to build coalitions, challenge the senior leadership, attract media publicity, set policy agenda, and gain influence and wealth.

9. See Albert Breton and Raymond Breton, "An Economic Theory of Social Movements," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 59 (1969), pp. 198-205.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

11. See Robert H. Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Group," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13 (1969), pp. 1-32.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 11. Salisbury indicates that, in farm organizations, entrepreneurs invest heavily out of their own pockets. He does not discuss how entrepreneurs collect capital needed to form an interest group.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

and support. Otherwise, these entrepreneurs will give up or move on to some other enterprise that may yield greater profits.

The third study identifies several conditions that affect the emergence of political entrepreneurs in local governments.[14] According to this study, the key factor for drawing potential political entrepreneurs to local governments is entrepreneurial profits. Such profits need not be solely monetary, but may include policy success, status, and job satisfaction.[15] In the arena of local governments, the probable emergence of political entrepreneurs is "a function of local fiscal conditions, local budgetary patterns, and local demographic conditions."[16] A fiscally wealthy local community, a local community with a large proportion of inadequately controlled budgetary resources, and a local community with a larger concentration of homeowners all increase the profit margins that can attract potential political entrepreneurs to emerge in these communities.[17]

These three studies indicate that the emergence of political entrepreneurs depends on the expected net gain generated from forming and leading an organization. This book therefore considers political entrepreneurs as individuals willing to invest their "own time or other resources to coordinate and combine other factors of production to supply collective goods."[18] They perform jobs similar to the traditional economic entrepreneurs.[19] Accordingly, the entrepreneurial profit is a crucial incentive for political entrepreneurs to emerge to create and preside over political organizations. They then have to maximize the benefits for both the organization and themselves and minimize the costs and risks involved in the enterprise. Therefore, when one talks about collective actions with re-

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14. See Mark Schneider and Paul Teske, "Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86 (1992), pp. 737-47.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 739-40. According to Mark Schneider and Paul Teske, the maximization of entrepreneurial profits depends on the ability of the entrepreneurs to restrict competition. There are two methods of restricting competition. One is to exclude other competitors from the information necessary to profit in a market. However, it is more difficult for political entrepreneurs to hide information because information sharing is central to the process of building and maintaining a political coalition. The other method is to set up entry barriers to prevent potential new competitors from entering the market and stealing profits.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 743.

17. *Ibid.*

18. See Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), p. 68.

19. *Ibid.*

gard to the supply of collective goods, leaders are essential because they coordinate the whole activity, facilitating the supply of collective goods.

At first glance, it may sound absurd that political entrepreneurs emerge only for entrepreneurial rewards, since there can be many other motivating factors—such as personal ideals, ideology, pursuit of justice, altruism, and ambition—that account for the rise of political entrepreneurs to bear the high initial costs of setting up an organization. Why do we, then, single out entrepreneurial rewards as the key to the emergence of political entrepreneurs? In the final analysis, organizing a group to successfully supply collective goods is costly. To start an organization, political entrepreneurs must pay for the organizing costs out of their own pockets or from the pockets of others. To sustain the organization, they need to cover new costs. Failure in covering these costs means paralysis, if not the demise, of the organization. Moreover, very few leaders are able and willing to continually pay the costs out of their own pockets. Therefore, a collective action that can last and deliver its target collective goods almost always involves rewards to cover the continuous operating costs and the leader's personal costs.

Although there may be a few altruistic political entrepreneurs who act without personal gain in mind, they still need rewards to cover the costs of supplying collective goods.[20] Most political entrepreneurs are not altruistic and expect a reasonable payoff for their leadership roles. Therefore, regardless of the motives of political entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial rewards are crucial for the formation and survival of collective action organizations. Moreover, even if political entrepreneurs are altruists, they must "pander to the interests, values, and needs of others" to make collective actions possible.[21] In order to run an organization, to sustain it, and to attract supporters, these altruists have to do cost-benefit calculations before they can develop proper strategies. That is why, in many ways, altruistic political entrepreneurs behave no differently from non-altruistic ones.[22]

In the process of political organizing, political entrepreneurs can receive rewards and deliver collective goods, but they also have

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20. Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer argue that the appearance of altruistic political entrepreneurs is likely to be no more frequent than that of devoted doctors or benevolent businessmen. See Frohlich and Oppenheimer, supra note 18, p. 84.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

22. This statement does not deny the fact that altruistic leadership may make a big difference in the quality of the political outcome. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

chances for self-enrichment without delivering goods.[23] For instance, political entrepreneurs may win full-time institutional positions and automatically obtain the accompanying remuneration as rewards,[24] without worrying about any collective goods. In this case, they are purely "instrumental leaders" who care more about their personal gain than the realization of group benefits.[25] Moreover, when the start-up costs of establishing an organization are very high, the founding leaders' motivations can be different from that of subsequent leaders.[26] In other words, altruistic leaders may bear the high costs of political organizing with limited resources, but profit-oriented leaders may attain lucrative careers in maintaining those organizations.[27] That is why political corruption occurs in many entrenched opposition groups after a costly and long struggle against repressive regimes.

In brief, altruistic or self-interested leaders have to consider their organization as an enterprise. Assuming a leadership role in an opposition organization may, therefore, be risky but potentially very lucrative. From this vantage point, opposition leaders are actually political entrepreneurs, with very few exceptions.

II. POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS AND OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS

A. Opposition Movements: Definition and Basics

An opposition movement is collective action organized by political leaders to deliver both collective and private goods;[28] it consists of a series of collective actions pursuing various kinds of collective goods at different stages.[29] For example, a peaceful opposition movement may include the following kinds of collective actions: forming an opposition organization, collecting resources to

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23. *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 69.

24. H. Andrew Michener, John D. DeLamater, and Shalom H. Schwartz, *Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1990), p. 574. The remuneration can be money, power, fame, and status.

25. Frohlich and Oppenheimer, *supra* note 18, p. 69.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

27. *Ibid.*

28. For the time being, we concentrate on the collective goods of a collective action. Private goods will be discussed later in this chapter.

29. Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver propose that a social movement is better understood as "complex aggregates of collective actions or events." See Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, "Collective Action Theory and Social Movements Research," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, Vol. 7 (1984), p. 6. An opposition movement is also an aggregate of many collective actions.

maintain the daily operation of the organization and promote opposition strategies, holding anti-government rallies and demonstrations, and participating in elections. Similarly, a guerrilla opposition movement may include forming a guerrilla organization, collecting resources to support operations, and launching guerrilla strikes. To discuss an opposition movement, therefore, involves complicated aggregates of many collective activities that such a movement encompasses.

An opposition movement can be operated by several different opposition groups, but usually one carries out most of the activities. These opposition groups may enter into an alliance to fight against a repressive regime at one point; at another, however, they may compete with one another for scarce resources.[30] In the end, a major group usually arises that takes a lion's share of opposition resources and becomes the major opponent of the regime. In this study, when I discuss opposition leaders, I primarily refer to the major opposition group.

As for the collective good, it can mean different things to different people. For example, the "democracy" pursued by an opposition movement may have several different meanings: for some opposition leaders, getting elected and taking over power; for merchants, a new market-oriented economy; for intellectuals, freedom of speech and expression; for peasants and workers, a redistribution of land and wealth; and, for many others, it may mean a better life.

Basically, the collective goods an opposition movement pursues are of two kinds: "step goods" ("lumpy goods") or "nonlumpy goods."[31] Electing opposition candidates is an example of step

30. For example, both the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party are anti-apartheid groups in South Africa. The two parties were in a power struggle at the end of white rule. Before the Israeli-PLO agreement that Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho by December 13, 1993, both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the militant Palestinian Hamas group had competed for the leadership of the intifada to fight against Israeli rule. After the agreement, the Hamas group refused to accept the agreement and defied Yasser Arafat's leadership. Both parties started a new round of competition for Palestinian support. Assassination of one's opponents became the most common means used in the power struggle between opposition groups.

31. "Step goods" (or "lumpy goods") are defined as "those that can be supplied only in discrete amounts." Step goods, such as a bridge and policy legislation, are available only in lumpy units. That is, it does not make any sense to provide a portion of a bridge or one-third of policy legislation. "Nonlumpy goods" are goods that can be supplied "on a continuous basis." That is, "any amount of resource may be applied to the supply of an increment of such a nonlumpy good." See Norman Frohlich and Joe A.

goods since it comes in lumpy units—these candidates are either elected or not. In contrast, mustering resources can be a nonlumpy good that comes in a continuous flow of donations; for instance, voluntary donations an opposition group collects can accumulate from small and large contributions. Furthermore, the collective goods an opposition movement pursues can be hierarchically related or independently separated.[32] For example, holding a rally to protest a government's suspension of an upcoming election can be the initial step to a larger goal—democracy; thus, both collective goods, having an election and democracy, are hierarchically related. In contrast, collecting material and non-material resources for an opposition organization can be an independent collective good separate from other collective goods pursued by an opposition movement if the resources collected are not used for other opposition causes.

In pursuing collective goods, opposition groups can vary in size; in fact, the size often changes from one collective action to another in the process of forming an opposition movement. For example, the number of members required to form an opposition organization is relatively small compared to that required for an anti-government rally or demonstration. Also, some forms of opposition movements require forced consumption, such as a revolution or violent clandestine operations. Others are voluntarily assumed or undertaken or can even be avoided, such as anti-government demonstrations or rallies and elections.

The two above-mentioned factors—the size of the group involved in collective actions and the nature of collective goods (lumpy or nonlumpy)—influence how opposition leaders develop strategies to coordinate collective actions. For instance, under a repressive regime, forming an opposition organization is one kind of nonlumpy collective goods;[33] the opposition participants need it desperately because there are no private goods alternative to fulfill their goals. The need for that collective goods, however, is not as intense, or may even be nonexistent, for the general public. Since

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Oppenheimer, "I Get by with a Little Help from My Friends," *World Politics*, Vol. 23 (October 1970), p. 109.

32. The notion of hierarchically related collective goods comes from a discussion of social movements by Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver. See Marwell and Oliver, *supra* note 29, pp. 11-12.

33. The formation of an opposition organization is one kind of nonlumpy collective goods because the organization can come in different sizes and have different amounts of resources contributed by the organization members.

the size of the group strongly needing an opposition organization is relatively small, and since that desired collective goods are nonlumpy in character, opposition leaders have a better chance of promoting cooperative behavior among themselves and their enthusiastic followers.[34] Therefore, opposition leaders may focus on convincing the group members that their contributions to the desired collective goods are worthwhile and that their payoffs will accelerate once the opposition organization is successfully formed and fully operational.

One final concept to be clarified is the difference between an opposition movement and other social movements, such as an environmental movement, a labor movement, an anti-war movement, and a feminist movement.[35] Although there are various definitions of "social movements" according to sociologists,[36] the term generally refers to collective behaviors mobilized to "promote or resist some kind of social change."[37] Opposition movements and social movements have much in common: both are aggregates of a series of collective actions; both deal with collective action problems; and, in both movements, leaders play a significant role in furthering their goals. However, opposition movements in general involve the ultimate goal of attaining political power, but most social movements do not. The goal of replacing a repressive regime implies a broader scope of changes than that of a single-issue social movement.[38] Moreover, the targets of an opposition movement are al-

34. Since the group size is small, the network effect functions more easily and the free-riders are easier to spot. Everyone knows everyone else, and the information and enforcement costs are relatively small. Also, since the desired collective goods are nonlumpy in character, members know that they can contribute whatever amount they feel comfortable and their contributions to the cause will increase the output of the collective goods.

35. In general, sociologists assume that a political opposition movement is one of many social movements. They do not make a difference between opposition movements and social movements.

36. The following are two definitions of social movements: Social movements are "[c]ollective enterprises to establish a new order of life." See Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements," in Barry McLaughlin, ed., *Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 8; "A social movement is a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order by noninstitutionalized means." See John Wilson, *Introduction to Social Movements* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), p. 8.

37. See Marwell and Oliver, *supra* note 29, p. 5.

38. A successful turnover of political power from a ruling regime to an opposition group can bring about a series of social changes. No wonder an opposition movement usually makes an alliance with many social movements to bolster its strength. Overlap-

ways the ruling regimes; however, in a social movement, targets can include, for example, another social group, a nuclear power plant, or a whaling industry. Finally, the costs of participating in an opposition movement under a repressive regime are generally much higher than that of participating in a social movement.

B. The Emergence of an Opposition Movement and Its Leaders

Since conflict of preferences is inevitable in a human society, political opposition has always existed to some extent in any political system.[39] However, what factors make an opposition movement emerge? Does mass discontent itself contribute to the emergence of an opposition movement? Spontaneous eruption of riots against coercive regimes are not rarities in history. Nevertheless, such riots cannot develop into an opposition movement if there is no further organization. Following the logic of collective action, disgruntled people who support the common interest of opposing the government will not necessarily contribute to the cause due to the free-rider mentality.[40]

This leads to the question of whether or not there really is a free-rider problem in any collective action.[41] Some sociologists as-

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ping membership in both opposition and social movement organizations is quite common.

39. See Robert A. Dahl, "Governments and Political Oppositions," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Macropolitical Theory* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), p. 115.

40. Mancur Olson's book *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) drew attention to the collective goods (or public goods) and collective action problem in the field of political science. Olson argues that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests." See *ibid.*, p. 2. He also indicates that the provision of collective goods depends on the size of the group and the existence of selective incentives to group members. Later, many scholars made significant contributions to the studies of the provision of collective goods.

41. If the free-rider problem is prevalent, then why did some collective actions take place? To account for people's participation in such collective actions, many authors give different explanations. David Mason, for instance, thinks that in many cases the value of the desired collective goods itself, such as civil rights for blacks, can attract participation; he also compares the relative low cost of participation with the benefit of the collective goods when the group size is large. See David Mason, "Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78 (1984), pp. 1040-56. Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp claim that group rationality may override individual rationality with regard to the supply of collective goods. See Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Action," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80 (1986), pp. 471-87. Mark Granovetter offers a "threshold model" and asserts that an individual

sert that the rational choice approach to collective actions overemphasizes the theoretical significance of free-riding.[42] They also consider the approach as a utilitarian model of human beings that assumes an instrumental rationality, while neglecting the fact that individuals are "socially embedded with loyalties, obligations, and identities."[43] Moreover, the assumption of "individual profit-maximizing behavior" reduces all motivations to incentives and ignores other "intrinsic motivators," like value or commitment.[44] These sociologists observe that, in many cases, individuals do not free-ride, but instead participate in collective actions out of shared fates, emotional experience, self-fulfillment, and altruism.[45] If a collective action is a peaceful demonstration and participation involves no danger, then people do not necessarily need economic incentive to participate in the given action.[46] For example, many black South Africans were systematically discriminated against by the white regime; they did not need material incentives to participate in an anti-apartheid march—being part of the march was enough to give them feelings of self-fulfillment and triumph. In these situations, therefore, individuals may be willing to contribute voluntarily to a collective action because of its psychological value to them.

At first glance, such arguments may sound forceful; however, how long can an individual's passion, loyalty, commitment, and value last to support collective action without any material incentive, or without the eventual supply of collective goods while being

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will participate in a collective action and his benefit will outweigh the cost when the number of participants reaches his "level of safety," which differs for different individuals. See Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 83 (1978), pp. 1420-43. Although these explanations seek to modify the free-rider problem, they are still based on the basic assumptions of the rational choice model.

42. For a general criticism of the rational choice approach to collective actions, see Myra Marx Ferree, "The Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice Theory and Resource Mobilization," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 29-52. Ferree indicates that the rational choice approach overemphasizes the theoretical significance of free-riding, it offers only a one-dimensional view of rationality, and it presents a decontextualized view of interests. See *ibid.*, p. 32.

43. See Carol McClurg Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," in Morris and Mueller, *supra* note 42, p. 5.

44. Ferree, *supra* note 42, p. 34.

45. *Ibid.* Also see William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Morris and Mueller, *supra* note 42, p. 56.

46. In the case of voting, it is more complicated. It may or may not involve danger or economic incentive. For instance, in many elections, votes are like other commodities with a market price. In other cases, going to the polls can be deadly.

under constant threat and harassment from the regime?[47] In situations where the supply of collective goods is costly and where long-term resource collecting is required, a coordination mechanism instituted by political entrepreneurs is crucially needed.[48] Through the coordination mechanism, individuals can develop mutual trust and pool their resources to facilitate the supply of collective goods. Once the mechanism is established, political entrepreneurs can use other means, such as "economic exchange" and coercion, to make individuals continually contribute to collective actions.

In summary, in terms of contributing to collective actions, individuals do not free-ride all the time, but usually do so if there is no coordination mechanism to enhance the worth of their contributions. Moreover, since an opposition movement consists of a series of collective actions, even if the participants do not free-ride in a few cases, the opposition leaders almost always have to deal with the free-rider problem in each collective action.

Generally speaking, the solution to the free-rider problem depends on the emergence of individuals who are willing to bear the heavy start-up costs of organizing collective actions, collecting resources, and supplying the desired collective goods.[49] Where opposition movements are concerned, the formation of an opposition organization is the first important step, and the emergence of opposition leaders is crucial to that step.

As a collective action, the formation of an opposition organization can be treated as an "assurance game"[50] among the members

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47. In an opposition movement, "social exchange" may work for a while in the inner group of the loyal adherents who share certain kinds of ideology or salient common interests. In other words, the core members of the movement can endure material shortage in the organization and government oppression longer than ordinary supporters. However, in the long run, these die-hard members also need rewards to boost their morale and commitment.

48. Frohlich and Oppenheimer, *supra* note 31, pp. 119-20.

49. See Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 6; Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 11.

50. An "assurance game" is a game in which no player has a dominant strategy, cooperation is possible among players, and a Pareto-inferior outcome is not necessarily inevitable. See Michael Taylor, *The Possibility of Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 19. In some cases, an assurance game has both a history and a future. Under these circumstances, group members have an ongoing relationship with one another. Therefore, since there exists an effective coordination mechanism operated by some coordinators, each member has an incentive to cooperate and is reluctant to be a free-rider if everyone else cooperates.

of the inner circle of the opposition camp. For potential opposition leaders, the production function of forming an opposition organization moves at an accelerating production pace—early contributions generate very small payoffs, but successive contributions produce larger ones.[51] At the initial stage of forming an opposition organization, the contributions of resources have only a small effect on the desired collective good. For example, at the beginning, an opposition organization may not have an office, the number of staff may be small, and the general public may be afraid of joining the organization from fear of the regime's retaliation. The symbolic meaning of establishing the opposition organization is more important than anything else at this stage. The accelerating marginal return will come only after long start-up costs have been incurred. Therefore, once the opposition organization has established its foundation, each new contribution makes the organization more productive and encourages more contributions.

Meanwhile, however, contributions do not come automatically. Opposition leaders and core members may cover the high start-up costs, but their resources are limited. To sustain the organization and to lead an opposition movement, these leaders need to collect new resources from the general public. There are four methods of collecting resources: (1) soliciting voluntary donations; (2) collecting "taxes" from individuals on the threat of punishment; (3) selling private goods in exchange for desired resources; and, (4) extorting resources from a group on the threat of dire consequences.[52] These four methods, however, are not mutually exclusive. What follows is a discussion of these four methods with examples of how opposition leaders may gather sources of revenue from voluntary and non-voluntary contributions.

Voluntary donations are, of course, welcomed at any stage of an opposition movement and by any opposition leader. However, such donations are most unreliable because usually people do not make donations if their only return is possible danger. Generally speaking, opposition leaders rely heavily on voluntary donations only when they lack a coercive organization and when the opposition movement is peaceful.

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51. Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, *The Critical Mass in Collective Action—A Micro-Social Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 62-3.

52. Frohlich et al., *supra* note 49, p. 7.

In an opposition movement, both ideological recruiting and organizational recruiting are important in soliciting popular support.[53] Ideological recruiting is purely based on voluntary donations in the form of time, material goods, and votes. Collective actions, such as holding anti-government rallies and demonstrations and electing opposition candidates, depend on voluntary participation of the general public. Also, in these rallies and demonstrations, opposition leaders can collect money from the sympathetic audience on behalf of the jailed political dissidents or other victims of governmental abuses. However, because of the free-rider mentality, only a small number of people in the general public will donate money and other material goods to opposition leaders. Thus, material donations from the general public only constitute a small part of the necessary resources.[54] Most material donations come from businessmen sympathetic to the causes of the opposition movement. Sometimes, the largest donations come from foreign governments or wealthy émigrés. However, some of these big donations are essentially an investment in opposition leaders in exchange for future favors. For example, opposition candidates get donations from some businessmen. If they are elected to public offices, they will usually take care of their business friends' interests. To the businessmen-donors, having a friend who holds an elective office can be an asset to make use of. Under these circumstances, "donations" become fees for service. Therefore, sometimes the boundary between donations and private goods purchases is blurry.

Like ideological recruiting, organizational recruiting is very important. Private goods exchanges are the major part of organizational recruiting. In order to make an opposition organization function, opposition leaders have to use both material and non-material incentives to "purchase" services from both full-time workers

53. Ideological recruiting is a technique to solicit popular support by presenting political stances on certain issues that differ from those of the government. See James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 43. People whose political preferences lie closer to the political positions of the opposition group may contribute to the opposition causes. In contrast, without resorting to ideological appeal or political content, organization recruiting uses incentives such as solidarity, job offers, or coercion to solicit popular support. See *ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

54. See Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, "Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action," in Morris and Mueller, *supra* note 42, p. 253. Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell give an insightful discussion of the mobilizing technologies for collective actions in the United States. Many such technologies, like telemarketing, cannot be used in poorer developing countries.

and part-time volunteers.[55] Other private goods exchanges include: (i) selling books, magazines, or newspapers published by opposition groups for profits;[56] (ii) providing constituency services in exchange for votes and other electoral support; (iii) giving favors to interest groups or corporations in exchange for electoral campaign funding;[57] (iv) offering vigilante protection in exchange for money;[58] and, (v) providing a network of social services in exchange for both material and non-material support.[59]

When opposition leaders have a coercive organization, like a guerrilla force,[60] they can easily collect "taxes" and extort resources from the territories they occupy or control.[61] They may also mo-

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55. Many organizational functions require many part-time volunteers. Especially during the electoral campaigns, opposition leaders need volunteers to distribute campaign pamphlets, oversee the vote counting process, etc. To keep volunteers loyal to the organization, usually ideological appeal alone is insufficient in the long run. Rather, the opposition leaders would devise certain material benefits in return for their service. Some hardworking or efficient volunteers may be promoted to certain institutional positions and may even make a career out of it.

56. For instance, underground publication and distribution of opposition groups' books, magazines, or newspapers were very profitable in Poland and Taiwan.

57. Both (ii) and (iii) are common when opposition leaders hold elective offices.

58. For example, residents in many South African shantytowns have to pay the African National Congress (ANC) or the Inkatha Freedom Party for vigilante protection against crimes. See Bill Berkeley, "The Warlords of Natal," *The Atlantic* (monthly), Vol. 274 (September 1994), p. 95.

59. In both Egypt and Algeria, the mosques offer an effective network of social services, such as setting up clinics and schools, to poor people neglected by the governments. See Mona Makram-Ebeid, "Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality?" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43 (Summer 1989), p. 431; Robert Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45 (Autumn 1991), pp. 577-79. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria successfully recruit members and receive material and non-material support from those people.

60. Although many guerrilla organizations get their guns, ammunition, and military training from foreign aid, when it comes to daily logistic problems, they have to turn to the ordinary people, especially peasants, in the places they control. In a fully cooperative fashion, local peasants can offer food and shelter to guerrillas. They can also serve as guides, lookouts, or errand runners. Moreover, they can offer organizational cooperation with guerrillas at the village level, including establishing schools and civil defense. Some peasants may even join the guerrilla forces. Passively, local peasants do not report the guerrillas' activities to the authorities. In return, guerrilla leaders can sell protection in exchange for food and shelter. They can also use ethnicity and ideological appeal to solicit peasants' voluntary donations. See Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 54-55.

61. It is a common practice for the members of opposition groups with coercive organizations to collect resources through taxation and extortion. For example, the mil-

nopolize certain lucrative businesses in their controlled territories. For example, the Peruvian guerrilla organization the Shining Path has an estimated annual revenue range from US$20 to US$100 million, predominantly coming from "revolutionary taxes" on drug trafficking.[62] Therefore, in violent opposition movements, the leaders may use coercive organizations to collect resources and generate lucrative revenues.

In summary, we have pointed out how through these four methods of collecting resources, opposition leaders may maintain the organization and generate huge rewards for themselves. In addition, this section has covered the topics of free-rider tendencies and resource-collecting, two intertwined problems opposition leaders have to tackle as they emerge. What remains for us to discuss is: How do potential opposition leaders calculate the costs and benefits of leading an opposition movement? The details of their calculations are the subject of the following sections.

III. EXPECTED VALUE OF POTENTIAL OPPOSITION LEADERS

As rational individuals, potential opposition leaders will calculate the costs and benefits of leading an opposition movement before they decide to assume the role of opposition leaders. The

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itant Palestinian group, Hamas, levied "taxes" among local residents. See Alan Cowell, "Militants, Once Seen as Useful to Israel, Are Now Its Main Foe," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1994, p. A16. Residents of a shantytown controlled by the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa have to pay about $6 a month to the Party; otherwise, they will be beaten, expelled from the town, or even killed. See Berkeley, *supra* note 58, p. 96. Members of opposition groups with coercive organizations can use their guns to extort resources from the people they encounter. The rebels of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia were not paid by their leader, but were allowed to use their guns to get whatever they wanted. See Bill Berkeley, "Liberia: Between Repression and Slaughter," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 270 (December 1992), p. 52. The guerrillas of the Shining Path in Peru set up "toll booths" across the highways they controlled to extort money from passing vehicles. See José E. Gonzales, "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," in David Scott Palmer, ed., *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 111.

62. Gonzales, *supra* note 61, p. 121. Similarly, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, Jonas Savimbi, monopolized oil and diamond deposits in the territory his guerrilla organization controlled. See Keith B. Richburg, "Ex-Rebel Group's Withdrawal Mars Mozambique's 1st Multi-Party Vote," *Washington Post*, October 28, 1994, p. A33. The rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) even stole and used for its own disposal the international relief which was supposed to be used to help the starving Sudanese. See Julie Flint, "The Unwinnable War," *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (November/December 1993), p. 48.

expected value of leading an opposition movement can be formulated as:

$$EV(O) = [B(W) - C(W)]*P(W) + [B(D) - C(D)]*P(D) + B(O) - C(O)$$

I will refer to this formula as "Equation 1." Although this equation cannot be mathematically substantiated, it helps in sorting out the complicated elements involved in opposition leaders' calculations. The content of each variable in the equation is as follows:

W stands for an opposition movement's winning the political contest (that is, taking over the power from the ruling party), and D is for defeat.

B(O) = the benefits that opposition leaders expect to receive from organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome.

C(O) = the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome.

B(W) = the benefits of winning the political contest (for the opposition movement), or the benefits derived from the collective goods opposition leaders supply.

C(W) = the costs of winning the political contest.

B(D) = the benefits of losing the political contest.

C(D) = the costs of losing the political contest.

P(W) = the estimated probability that opposition leaders assign to winning the political contest (that is, the probability of taking over the power from the ruling party).

P(D) = 1 – P(W) = the estimated probability that opposition leaders assign to losing the political contest as a group.

EV(O) = the expected value of leading an opposition movement, or the expected value of being an opposition leader.

The benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome, B(O), are rewards derived from the opposition organization, including: the payoffs of the administrative positions of the organization; the revenue generated from "taxation," extortions, private goods exchanges and donations amassed by the organization; and, the benefits of any position (including elective offices) gained with the help of the organization. The costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome, C(O), are the operating costs of setting up and maintaining an opposition

organization, the costs of collecting resources, and the costs of being harassed and punished by the repressive regime.

The benefits of winning the political contest [B(W)] include the satisfaction and material goods derived from the successful supply of collective goods, such as a change of policy, structure, or leaders. The costs of winning the political contest [C(W)] are costs other than the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome. A drop in voluntary donations, the decline of members' loyalty, and a decrease in the marginal return of collective goods because of the success of an opposition movement are examples of C(W).

The benefits of losing the political contest [B(D)] are the "rewards of martyrdom," that is, waiting for future benefits in some cases, or for the rewards offered by the regime in return for the opposition leaders' clandestine cooperation with the regime. The costs of losing the political contest [C(D)] are the costs of losing freedom, property, lives, and other collateral damages incurred by the relatives and coalition friends of the opposition leaders. The value of each variable in Equation 1 will be assessed differently by potential opposition leaders under different circumstances and in different political systems.

Potential opposition leaders will find it reasonable to lead an opposition movement under the following condition: $EV(O) > 0$. That is, the expected value of leading an opposition movement must be greater than zero.

When a regime is highly coercive, the probability of the opposition winning the political contest [P(W)] is near zero, and so is the value of B(O), the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome.[63] This means that when both P(W) and B(O) are zero, Equation 1 becomes the following: $EV(O) = [B(D)-C(D)]*P(D) - C(O)$. In addition, under an extremely coercive regime, the benefits of losing the political contest [B(D)] are very small, and both the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [C(O)] and the costs of losing the political contest [C(D)] are very high.[64] Thus, Equation 1 has a large negative value. Normally, under these circumstances, rational po-

63. Here we assume that guerrilla warfare is impossible.

64. If opposition leaders expect and are willing to be co-opted by the ruling regime, then the benefits of losing the political contest [B(D)] could be high and the costs of losing the political contest [C(D)] could be small. Under these circumstances, opposition leaders would use the opposition leadership as a springboard to gain benefits from the ruling regime. Thus, these opposition leaders use opposition movements to fulfill

tential leaders will not emerge to lead an opposition movement; however, there are exceptions. Courageous people like Wei Jingsheng[65] in China and Andrei Sakharov[66] in the former Soviet Union risked their lives and spoke against the evils of the repressive regimes. These individuals' behavior cannot be explained by Equation 1, since they are not political entrepreneurs as defined earlier in this chapter.

When a coercive regime allows some room for opposition operations, such as establishing formal or informal opposition organizations and participating in some elections and gaining electoral seats, Equation 1 will have a different value. In this case, the probability of the opposition winning the political contest [P(W)] is still near zero. When P(W) equals zero, Equation 1 becomes the following: EV(O) = [B(D)–C(D)]*P(D) + B(O) – C(O). Now, the value of B(O) (the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome) is no longer zero and may have a fairly large positive value.[67] That is, the opposition leaders can collect resources through the four methods described in the previous section. These resources are highly fungible and opposition leaders can use them for many purposes without much outside scrutiny. Meanwhile, the benefits of losing the political contest [B(D)] may have a large positive value, too. For example, to some opposition leaders, short-term imprisonment may turn out to be a huge asset for later use, such as obtaining more donations and winning electoral seats. In some cases, since the regimes need the presence of opposition leaders to downplay their repressive image, they may reward opposition leaders with some governmental posts or other benefits and co-opt the defeated opposition leaders. Moreover, both the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [C(O)]

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their personal goals. Meanwhile, they also risk losing their credibility as genuine opposition leaders.

65. Wei Jing-sheng was an editor of the underground magazine, *Exploration*, and he published several articles castigating the Chinese Communist regime and its paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. Wei was categorized as one of several Chinese dissidents who participated in "Beijing Spring" Democracy Movement in 1979. He was sentenced to 15 years in jail in October 1979 and released in the fall of 1993. He was arrested again in 1995.

66. Andrei Sakharov was a Soviet physicist and dissident. In the late 1960s, he became an outspoken advocate of human rights and a critic of the Soviet Communist regime's repression. He was banished to Gorky from 1980 to 1986. He died in 1989.

67. This is especially true when a coercive organization can be formed. As mentioned earlier, a coercive organization has high potential to generate huge profits for opposition leaders.

and the costs of losing the political contest [C(D)] decrease greatly compared with those in highly coercive regimes. Therefore, under these circumstances, the expected value of leading an opposition movement [EV(O)] is very likely positive. That is, it is worthwhile for potential opposition leaders to try their organizational skills at supplying collective goods and producing an entrepreneurial revenue for themselves.

In summary, under a repressive regime, as long as there is room for political organizing, even though the probability of the opposition winning the political contest [P(W)] is near zero, the expected value of leading an opposition movement [EV(O)] can still be positive because the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [B(O)] can offset the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [C(O)]. Guerrilla warfare and partially competitive electoral politics are the two most fertile "battlegrounds" for skillful opposition leaders to prosper.[68] In many cases, purely "instrumental leaders" have emerged and rewarded themselves well.[69]

IV. CONDITIONS AFFECTING OPPOSITION LEADERS' COST-BENEFIT CALCULATIONS

As previously mentioned, under Equation 1, the probability of the opposition winning the political contest [P(W)] is not crucial to the decision of an opposition leader to emerge; rather, the crucial variables are B(O) (the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome), C(O) (the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome), and C(D) (the costs of the opposition losing the political contest). These three variables are closely related to the degrees of repression exercised in different political regimes.

Generally speaking, when the regime is highly repressive, opposition behavior is associated with treason, and therefore loss of freedom, property, and even lives. Under such circumstances, a

68. Guerrilla organizations and elective offices can generate the largest benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [B(O)] for opposition leaders in repressive political systems.

69. For example, Charles McArthur Taylor, the guerrilla leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, rewarded himself millions of dollars from "taxes" levied on foreign investors who exploited timber, rubber, gold, and diamond reserves in the Liberian territories controlled by his guerrilla organization. See Berkeley, *supra* note 61, p. 60.

"leader's surplus"[70] is extremely small or negative; thus, very few opposition leaders will emerge. Even if they do, they will find it difficult to recruit members and even if they recruit some members, the problem of defections of members from the opposition organization will be quite serious. In other words, under highly repressive regimes, an opposition movement is hard to start and can be harder to sustain, which discourages potential opposition leaders from emerging. That is not to say, however, that there is absolutely no chance for them to arise, since circumstances may change.

In contrast, after an opposition organization is firmly established, leading the movement usually involves less danger, and the leader's surplus often increases. Once the maintenance of the organization becomes routine, self-interested and ambitious opposition leaders can find a profitable career in running the organization.[71] Under these circumstances, more opposition leaders will emerge.

To lead an opposition movement, first of all, opposition leaders must have some chance, however small, of organizing an opposition organization (or a quasi-organization) regardless of the outcome of the opposition movement. In other words, C(O) must not be too large as to discourage the existence of any opposition organization. Second, the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of the outcome of the opposition movement [B(O)] must have a potentially large positive value to make the risk of forming an opposition organization worthwhile. There are certain conditions under which B(O) may become a large positive value, thus encouraging opposition leaders to emerge.

In the final analysis, it is the potential opposition leaders who assess the conditions and decide whether or not to lead an opposition movement. Opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs always consider both positive and negative signals in their political environments and plan their strategies and moves accordingly. I proceed to identify both internal and external conditions that potential opposition leaders take into account in assessing the values

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70. A leader's surplus is produced when the total resources political entrepreneurs can collect exceed the costs. See Frohlich et al., *supra* note 49, p. 7. When the leader's surplus is large, there will be more political entrepreneurs vying for the leader's position.

71. Frohlich and Oppenheimer discuss different motivations between generations of political leaders. See Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), p. 85. Different generations of opposition leaders have different motivations to promote opposition movements.

of B(O), C(O), and C(D) and in determining if they want to emerge under repressive political systems.

Internal conditions involve three elements. The first is a stage or a forum to provide opposition leaders with a legal mechanism for competing with the ruling regimes, such as regularly held elections and the tangible and intangible rewards of incumbency. Regularly held elections on either the national or local level offer potential opposition candidates opportunities to compete legitimately for elective offices. Also, the electoral system must enable opposition candidates to win some seats in various kinds of representative bodies or some local executive offices even if the opposition as a whole does not win the majority of the votes. Otherwise, it would not be worthwhile for opposition candidates to participate in elections. For example, a single-vote multi-seat constituency system increases the chances for opposition candidates to win some seats. Furthermore, the rewards of elective offices in the long run must be worth more than the organizational costs of an opposition group;[72] otherwise, opposition leaders would be discouraged from entering elections and holding office. Generally, however, electoral competitions offer opposition leaders a good opportunity to amass resources and to reap entrepreneurial benefits. Eventually, the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [B(O)] can be large when regularly held elections are available to opposition leaders.

If there is no stage or forum for opposition leaders to legally compete with the ruling regime, but there is a safe haven for developing guerrilla warfare, then potential opposition leaders can still collect resources through a guerrilla organization and realize entrepreneurial benefits. As mentioned before, guerrilla leaders can use coercive means to collect resources, unlike their counterparts in a peaceful opposition movement. Therefore, sometimes, guerrilla leaders can muster larger assets in organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [B(O)] than the leaders of a peaceful opposition movement.

The second element of internal conditions is a target issue (or a set of target issues) to be exploited by potential opposition leaders, such as the disproportional distribution of political and economic powers among different tribal groups or among different ethnic groups. Opposition leaders often use such issues to stimulate sup-

72. Gordon Tullock, "Entry Barriers in Politics," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 55 (1965), pp. 464-65.

port from the underprivileged groups and build a reservoir of resources needed to form and maintain an organization. Once these target issues are mobilized by opposition leaders, the potential revenue generated from the B(O) can be enormous.

The third element is the weakening of the ruling regime, including among other factors, the death of a dictator, a military defeat, the collapse of the economy, or a power struggle within the ruling party. As the ruling regime weakens, the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [C(O)] and the costs of losing a political contest [C(D)] decrease, and the potential opposition leaders tend to become more active. Moreover, there will be fewer restrictions on the opposition leaders when they muster resources and increase the rewards of organizing the opposition movement regardless of its outcome [B(O)].

Taken apart, a single element does not guarantee the emergence and growth of opposition movements and their leaders. For example, regularly held elections and lucrative elective offices may eventually co-opt opposition leaders into the ruling party and the established interests. A target issue may not be exploited if the ruling regime ruthlessly suppresses the public airing of the issue. The weakening of the ruling regime may co-exist with a weak opposition camp, and the ruling regime may still have enough time to reform and exercise its vested power. However, when two or more of the internal elements take place simultaneously, they may reinforce one another and affect the cost-benefit calculations of opposition leaders. The expected value of leading an opposition movement, EV(O), may turn positive and large enough to make opposition leaders emerge.

External conditions involve foreign countries' military or financial aid, which encourages the emergence of opposition leaders and the formation of an opposition group within or outside the given country. For example, the exiled Iraqi opposition leaders formed the Iraqi National Congress in Vienna in June 1992 with the encouragement of the United States after the defeat of the Iraqi government in the Gulf War.[73] The Nicaragua Contras was another foreign-assisted opposition group which operated in Nicaragua. The effectiveness of foreign-aided opposition depends on the extent to which the opposition group can take root in the target country.

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73. See Morton H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer, and Patricia L. Small, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 43.

The opposition group must either have a strong showing in national or local elections or have a formidable guerrilla organization; otherwise, it would merely be a symbolic gesture of an international ploy to overthrow the existing regime.

Potential opposition leaders make their moves according to their expected net returns (costs and benefits) of leading an opposition movement, including all internal and external conditions just mentioned. They seize every possible opportunity, such as regularly held elections, ethnic frenzy, economic chaos, foreign intervention, and take the risk of competing with the in-party to pursue their share of the political market.[74]

Before I explore the strategies of opposition leaders for maximizing resource collection in the next section, let us take a look at two phenomena regarding the backgrounds of opposition leaders in relation to their followers and the ruling parties. Although these two phenomena may not be directly related to the cost-benefit calculations of opposition leaders, they certainly illustrate these leaders' calculated moves.

When one compares the backgrounds of opposition leaders[75] with those of their followers, there seems to be no rules. Some opposition leaders share the same socioeconomic background as the majority of the respective movement's members. For example, the Polish Solidarity leader, Lech Walesa, was an electrician at the Gdansk shipyard and shared the same socioeconomic background with most Solidarity members. The backgrounds of other opposition leaders, differ from most of their members'. For example, the leader of the 1994 Chiapas Indian insurgency in Mexico, "Subcommandante Marcos," is neither an Indian nor a peasant, while most insurgents are. Therefore, opposition leaders do not necessarily share a common socioeconomic or an ethnic background with the majority of the followers. From another vantage point, though, it is

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74. Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer assert that in political competition, "one competes to drive one's opponent out of business." See Frohlich and Oppenheimer, *supra* note 71, p. 71. Actually, in many cases, it is possible for politicians to compete for shares of the political market. For instance, opposition representatives may occupy one-third of the seats in a legislative body, while the representatives of the ruling party occupy the other two-thirds.

75. According to Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, guerrilla leaders in Latin America have the following profiles: relatively young (average age is from 25 to 34), male dominant (more than two-thirds of them), and come from the middle and upper classes. Most of them were students and professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, accountants, engineers, and teachers. See, Wickham-Crowley, *supra* note 60, pp. 19-25, 327-39. Opposition leaders, in general, may hold similar profiles.

very likely that background-sharing for opposition leaders is not the key issue regarding their emergence. Rather, they seize the right moment to emerge regardless of whether or not they share a socio-economic or an ethnic background with their followers.

The second interesting phenomenon is that many opposition leaders come from the ruling party. They may want to run for an elective office but are not nominated. The ruling party may weaken and no longer meet their ambitions. In such cases, they are apt to change their party affiliations by joining an existing opposition group or forming a new one. There are numerous examples. Hsu Hsin-liang, for instance, was originally a member of the Kuomintang (the ruling party in Taiwan); later, he became the chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—Taiwan's largest opposition party. Back in 1977, when he did not win a party nomination, he broke with the ruling Kuomintang and ran in the Taoyuan County Magistrate election as an independent candidate. Later, he joined the opposition camp and became one of its key members. Another good example is Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a formidable opposition candidate in the 1988 Mexican presidential election. Similarly, he was a member of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and maintained loyalty to the Party for many years, serving both as a senator and as the governor of Michoacán. In 1986, he launched a dissident movement within the party and, when that effort failed, he broke with the PRI and formed his own political party.[76] These examples show that opposition leaders can come from the very party they oppose; they may change their political ideology and party affiliation when they deem the change personally beneficial.

My investigation of the backgrounds of opposition leaders indicates that they are usually politics-conscious intellectuals, not mere idealists. They seize the best opportunity to arise. As long as they see the emergence to their advantage, they do not mind if their background differs from the majority of their followers, and they can break with the party to which they have been loyal for years.

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76. Larry Rohter, "Can He Save Mexico," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 20, 1988, p. 92. Similarly, President Ion Iliescu of Romania is a former Communist official who emerged during the 1989 revolution as the head of the National Salvation Front. See "Romania's Opposition Finds Hero a Liability," *The New York Times*, November 13, 1992, p. 14. President Yeltsin of Russia is also a former member of the Communist Party. Such cases are numerous.

V. OPPOSITION LEADERS' STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE RESOURCE COLLECTION

The strategies of opposition leaders vary from one stage to another, and from one movement to another. However, resource-collecting is crucial to the very existence of an opposition organization and to revenue production for opposition leaders; therefore, their strategies mostly revolve around resource-collecting. I have discussed various methods for resource-collecting, in Section B of Part II; here I focus on their strategies to maximize it.

In peaceful opposition movements, as mentioned before, sources of revenue mainly come from donations and private goods exchanges. The amount of these two sources of revenue which opposition leaders can collect are closely related to the values of several variables in Equation 1: P(W), C(D), C(O), and B(O). When the values of P(W) and B(O) are near zero, C(D) and C(O) have large negative values; thus, opposition leaders can hardly collect enough resources from donations and private goods exchanges to offset the high costs of organizing an opposition movement and thereby have little incentive to emerge. Opposition movements in totalitarian and many autocratic systems have faced these problems, as discussed in Chapter 4.

When P(W) is still near zero, C(D) and C(O) have smaller negative values than those in extreme coercive regimes, and B(O) has a potentially large positive value. Under these circumstances, opposition leaders will develop strategies to maximize revenue generated from donations and private goods exchanges. This happens when a ruling party remains dominant for a long time while allowing opposition candidates to participate in regularly held elections. The chief sources of funds are elective offices and resource collection organizations. Since elective offices and the accompanying rewards can be very lucrative, opposition leaders' strategies center on winning and holding elective offices for themselves.[77] They use their opposition roles to solicit donations and sell services in exchange for both material and non-material goods. With regard to soliciting votes, opposition leaders center on differentiating their policy position sharply from the ruling party's; they may also make policy promises freely because their chances of becoming ruling elites is

77. When they can win lucrative elective offices, they will be in a better position to solicit donations and sell their services in exchange for material and non-material goods.

slim and they will not be held responsible for the policies they propose.[78]

When it comes to collecting voluntary monetary donations from the general public, opposition leaders favor big donors, such as managers and executives of small and medium-size industries.[79] Their strategy in selecting donors is to focus on the people "who are most likely to contribute or who are likely to contribute the most."[80] This strategy can far outweigh the input resources used in attracting donations for the output contributions received.[81] With regard to collecting resources through private goods exchanges, opposition leaders who hold elective office have plenty of opportunities to make deals with their "customers" and maximize their "leaders' surplus."[82]

When P(W) is no longer zero but has an uncertain value, other things being equal, opposition leaders can adopt a more subtle strategy to "influence potential contributors' information about the production function governing the supply of some collective good."[83] In other words, they can exaggerate or distort information in a way that makes their supporters strongly believe that voluntary contributions will make a difference.

In violent opposition movements, opposition leaders have coercive organizations to collect resources through threat or violence. As a result, opposition leaders have more leverage than their counterparts in peaceful opposition movements to generate revenue for themselves. Since potential revenue generated from "taxation" and extortion can be substantial, opposition leaders may center on con-

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78. Norman Frohlich et al. have a general discussion about the consequences of a political competition in which opposition leaders have a low probability of winning the ruling leadership position. See Frohlich et al., *supra* note 49, pp. 102-105.

79. Occasionally, executives of big corporations donate handsomely to an opposition cause, although they always make more donations to the ruling party.

80. See Marwell and Oliver, *supra* note 51, p. 130.

81. *Ibid.* In the case of Taiwan's opposition movements, opposition leaders usually solicited money from the people attending opposition rallies or demonstrations. During rallies or demonstrations, opposition leaders presented their causes and asked for monetary donations. Usually, they could collect a small amount of money on those occasions. Also, opposition leaders received large contributions from big donors, such as small businessmen and a few business tycoons, by visiting them directly.

82. Opposition leaders can provide their constituents services in exchange for votes and other resources. They can also offer favors to the big donors in exchange for their financial support.

83. Norman Frohlich, Thomas Hunt, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and R. Harrison Wagner, "Individual Contributions for Collective Goods," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 19 (June 1975), p. 329.

solidating their coercive organizations and maximizing the revenue generated by coercion. Under these circumstances, opposition leaders do not need to consider their supporters' preferences in designing their program because their major source of revenue does not come from their supporters' donations.

This chapter discusses opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs from various theoretical vantage points. As mentioned, the emergence of opposition movements depends on their leaders. For these leaders to emerge and to run a successful movement, they have to measure costs and benefits and adopt strategies according to different political climates. To further the investigation of how opposition leaders make their moves in different political systems, the next chapter proposes a new typology of political systems.

CHAPTER 3

A NEW TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

> A wit has said that one might divide mankind into officers, serving maids, and chimney sweeps. . . . When a classification does not ideally exhaust its object, a haphazard classification is altogether preferable, because it sets imagination in motion.
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> —Kierkegaard[1]

To study opposition movements in different political systems, I find scholars' classifications of regimes highly subjective, lacking supportive quantitative data, and shedding little light on the nuances and meaningful variations in opposition movements.[2] Cur-

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1. W. H. Auden and Louis Kronenberger, eds., *The Viking Book of Aphorisms* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 223.

2. Most categorizations of political systems are very impressionistic and short of quantitative bases. For example, the seven classes of political systems which Gabriel A. Almond adopts are confusing. These seven classes are: (1) Traditional Systems, (2) Modernizing Authoritarian Systems, (3) Tutelary Democracies, (4) Immobilist Democracies, (5) Conservative Authoritarian Systems, (6) Totalitarian Systems, and (7) Stable Democracies. The classification is based on the integrative, accommodative, participant and distribution capabilities of political systems. However, it does not have a clear boundary between each class and does not have unambiguous criteria for assigning real countries to each class. See Gabriel A. Almond, *Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 173, 171-72. In another example, Jean Blondel classifies political systems into five ideal types: traditional conservative systems, liberal democratic systems, communist systems (or radical authoritarian systems), populist systems, and authoritarian conservative systems. The classification is based on three dimensions of norms and policy goals of political systems: the means of government (liberal or authoritarian approach to decision-making); participation (number of people involved in decision-making—democracy versus autocracy); and the policy goals of government (more or less equal distribution of social and economic benefits—radical versus conservative goals). See Jean Blondel, *Comparing Political Systems* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 37-46, 32-7. Since these three criteria are descriptive and non-empirical, it is difficult to assign real countries to each category. For instance, according to Blondel's classification, Mexico was a populist system and Taiwan was an authoritarian conservative system in early 1970s (pp. 246, 248). Taiwan at that time had finished a series of successful land reforms and had relatively equal income distribution. According to Blondel, the policy goals of authoritarian conservative systems are conservative, thereby maintaining social and economic inequalities. *Ibid.*, p. 43. Therefore, even based on Blondel's dimension of policy goals of government, to assign Taiwan to the category of authoritarian conservative systems

rently, the most popular typology is a trichotomy of democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems.[3] According to this typology, most countries are "authoritarian." When we look closely, however, these authoritarian countries do not really share similar political traits. For instance, Burma, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia vary greatly in restraints on political freedom and competition, but they are all labelled "authoritarian." This overgeneralized term only leads to confusion if we want to examine opposition movements in "authoritarian" systems.

Based on various definitions of "authoritarian" regimes,[4] such regimes monopolize political power and repress political opposi-

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was questionable and unfounded. Larry Diamond et al. use three essential conditions to identify democratic systems. Then on a decreasing scale of fulfilling the three democratic conditions, they divide the remaining political systems into semidemocratic, hegemonic, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems. See Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989), pp. xvi-xviii. Diamond et al. do not use any empirical indicators to support their classification. Therefore, the assignment of each country into a category is subjective and arbitrary. Bruce M. Russett divides political systems into competitive, semicompetitive, and authoritarian systems. " 'Competitive' systems are democracies where two or more parties compete without government interference." Authoritarian regimes are "those where competitive party politics is either nonexistent or rigidly controlled by the government. States satisfying neither of these conditions can be grouped in a residual category." See Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965) p. 88. Russett's classification of political systems is crude and without any indicators.

3. A democratic system refers to what Dahl describes as polyarchies in which political participation and competition are least restricted. A totalitarian system is another ideal type in which political freedom is severely restricted and organized opposition is prohibited. An authoritarian system lies between these two ideal types and exercises various restrictive measures on political freedom and competition. The above trichotomy has developed from an earlier dichotomy of autocratic and democratic systems. See Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 3; Betty B. Burch, ed., *Dictatorship and Totalitarianism: Selected Readings* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p. 4.

4. Some common definitions of authoritarian systems include: (1) political systems in which a leader or a small group of elites exercises unrestrained power without the help of elaborate ideology and frequent large-scale political mobilization [see Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 255]; (2) "political systems with significant procedural proscription on political contestation or inclusiveness" [see Donald Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 19 (1987), p. 527]; (3) "a political system which limits political pluralism, advocates a blind submission to authority . . . a government free of accountability favoring the concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people" [see Carlos B. Gil, ed., *Hope and*

tion. They modify existent constitutions or create their own to achieve concentration of power. They co-opt, curtail, or even totally eliminate political opposition.[5] In brief, authoritarian regimes, whether in the form of a party-state, a corporatist state, or a praetorian state,[6] are characterized by "a concentration of power and an intolerance of political opposition."[7]

According to the characteristics of authoritarian regimes, there seems to be no room for the operation of opposition movements, which is not the case in reality. There is actually a wide variety of opposition movements in various "authoritarian" countries, movements arising from various regime repressions and opportunities open to opposition leaders. For example, both Malawi and Senegal are labelled as "authoritarian," but political opposition has nearly been wiped out in Malawi,[8] while opposition leaders have maintained a steady stronghold in Senegal.[9] Similarly, both Haiti and Mexico are called "authoritarian," but opposition leaders fare very differently in these two countries. Haitian opposition leaders have accomplished little at the risk of their lives in leading opposition

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Frustration: Interview with Leaders of Mexico's Political Opposition (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992), p. 21]; and, (4) regimes whose purpose is to "coopt, subdue, or eliminate all sources of political power outside the state system, whether they are mass based or controlled by social elites" [see Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 26].

5. Authoritarian regimes repress opposition by: (1) using violence to kill, harm, or harass opposition leaders and their supporters by police, secret agents, or military forces; (2) destroying any autonomous mass organizations, such as labor unions and political parties; (3) forbidding freedom of expression and censoring all means of mass communication; and, (4) suspending all elections or manipulating election outcomes to suit the regimes' needs. See Clive Y. Thomas, *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), pp. 89-92.

6. Amos Perlmutter identifies four modern authoritarian models: the party-state, the police state, the corporatist state, and the praetorian state. See Perlmutter, *supra* note 4, p. 28.

7. See Thomas M. Magstadt and Peter M. Schotten, *Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions, and Issues*, 2nd. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 144.

8. Baffour Ankomah gives a grisly tale of thirty years of human rights violations and tortures of opposition leaders under the control of the Hastings Kamuza Banda in Malawi. See Baffour Ankomah, "The Shame of Malawi," *New African*, February 1993, pp. 7-11. Opposition parties have gradually gathered strength recently only after Banda became seriously ill. See Victor Ndovi, "Grip Slackens," *Africa Events*, Vol. 10 (January 1994), p. 14. Although the opposition leader, Bakili Muluzi, of the United Democratic Front won the presidential election on May 17, 1994, the political future of Malawi is still uncertain.

9. Senegal has regularly held elections and opposition parties receive an average of 20 percent of popular votes in each election.

movements, but their counterparts in Mexico have led organized political opposition and occupied a constant percentage of the parliamentary seats without fear for their lives.[10]

Such extremes of opposition movements can be found in many other "authoritarian" countries as well. Although the historical or structural idiosyncrasies of each individual country may explain some of the differences, there can be distinctive features common to Senegal and Mexico that make their political oppositions a reality. Similarly, there can exist certain distinctive traits common to Malawi and Haiti that make a political opposition an impossibility under the existing circumstances.[11]

Unfortunately, studies of authoritarian regimes pay too much attention to the causes of the rise of authoritarian regimes and their repressive structures; meanwhile, they ignore the wide range of responses from, and activities of, political opposition under different repressive structures. None of the above-mentioned characterizations of authoritarian regimes can account for the varied performances of opposition movements in those regimes. For instance, why can opposition leaders still emerge and even lead successful opposition movements under different repressive conditions? To answer such questions, we need to break down the overgeneralized term "authoritarian" and look for a more detailed classification of different political systems.

Although it is impossible to perfectly classify the political systems of all countries around the world, my categorization overcomes some of the shortcomings of previous scholars' categorizations. I use quantitative data and gather election information to help build a new typology. My typology is based on two most relevant sets of data: (1) political rights and civil liberties indices, and (2) election criterion. The former measures the degree of repression of a political system, and the latter monitors the degree

10. Leaders of peasants and Indians in the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas have a higher risk of being the victims of political killings and other human rights violations. See Amnesty International, *Mexico Human Rights in Rural Areas: Exchange of Documents with the Mexican Government on Human Rights Violations in Oaxaca and Chiapas* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1986), *passim*.

11. Both Haiti and Malawi experienced dramatic changes in 1994. The exiled Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was restored to power by the United States' armed intervention in September. Long-time Malawi dictator, Hastings Kamuza Banda, was defeated by his former cabinet minister in the first multiparty election in May. Since Banda is 96 years old and has been chronically ill, his departure from power was not a surprise.

of opportunities for opposition leaders to participate in political competitions.

The political rights index includes individuals' rights to vote and to organize political parties, while the civil liberties index includes the freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary.[12] Both indices are based upon data coded annually for the years 1972-92.[13] Each of the two indices ranks countries with scores ranging from 1 to 7 (the highest degree of political rights or civil liberties to the lowest).[14] My categorization involves 147 countries.[15]

I calculate the "average political rights score" (hereafter PRIDX) and the "average civil liberties score" (hereafter CLIDX) of each country for the years 1972-92, as shown in Appendix A. A country is categorized as "democratic" when both its PRIDX and

12. See Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1981* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 3; "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," in Alex Inkeles, ed., *On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 26, 32-33. Political rights and civil liberties indices were developed by Raymond Duncan Gastil and have been used to rank countries in the world since 1973.

13. Since the annual data are available each January, the data actually cover the ratings of countries in the world in the previous year. For example, the 1973 ratings are actually the 1972 ratings. The annual ratings of countries from 1972 to 1978 are from the data of *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III.* See Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, eds., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III*, 3rd. ed., Vol. 1, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. The annual ratings of countries from 1979 to 1981 are from *Freedom in the World* (1980-1982). See Gastil, *supra* note 12; Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1982* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1980* (New York: Freedom House, 1980). From 1982 to 1992, the annual ratings of countries were collected from the January/February issues of *Freedom at Issue* (the journal name was changed to *Freedom Review* in 1990).

14. See Taylor and Jodice, *supra* note 13, pp. 60-61, 64-65.

15. The data of *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III* cover 155 countries. However, among them: Hong Kong and Puerto Rico are not independent countries; Cyprus was divided into Turkish Cyprus and Greek Cyprus in 1981; South Vietnam and North Vietnam had disappeared since the reunification of Vietnam in 1975; East Germany (GDR) had disappeared since the reunification of Germany in 1990; and, North Yemen and South Yemen were merged in 1990. Therefore, there are 147 countries left for my classification.

CLIDX are less than 3.5, as shown in Table 3.1.[16] As of 1992, there were 46 democratic countries.[17]

After the democratic system comes the "quasi-democratic" system, which I define in two steps. First, I look for countries fulfilling one or both of the following conditions: (1) $3.5 \leq \text{PRIDX} \leq 5.5$; and, (2) $3.5 \leq \text{CLIDX} \leq 5.5$. There are 53 such countries,[18] and I group them as the first-round quasi-democratic systems in Table 3.2.

I then apply the election criterion to these countries, as shown in Table 3.3. The election criterion involves: (1) regularly held elections to national legislatures (the lower house in bicameral cases); and, (2) the validity of elections.[19] Of the 53 countries, those which held at least four consecutive elections to national legislatures between 1972 and 1992 and which honored the election results are considered quasi-democratic countries.[20] Table 3.4 shows 11 such countries in total. Of the remaining candidates for quasi-democratic systems, I categorize 12 as "near-quasi-democratic" countries because of their frequent electoral practices, as shown in Table 3.5.

Next is the "least democratic system," which includes countries whose PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 5.5, and countries not meeting the election criterion and holding no democratic elections

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16. In Table 3.1, there are 33 countries whose PRIDX and CLIDX are less than 3.5 and there is no score fluctuation in these countries. These countries are well-recognized, long-time democratic countries. In addition to these 33 countries, there are 9 countries whose PRIDX and CLIDX are less than 3.5, but there is score fluctuation in each country. The reason why they are still categorized as democratic systems lies in their scores ranging from 1 to 3 since the early 1980s (in some cases since the early 1970's). These 9 countries are relatively more vulnerable than the aforementioned 33 countries to unstable factors because they have a shorter democratic history. In all, as of 1992, there were 42 countries whose PRIDX and CLIDX were less than 3.5.

17. Although one of PRIDX and CLIDX or both of them is greater than 3.5 in Bolivia, Honduras, Turkey and Uruguay, these four countries are still treated as democratic systems because their scores met the democratic standard since the early 1980s.

18. Bolivia, Honduras, Turkey and Uruguay are removed from the total number of 57 countries which meet one or both of the conditions.

19. The two volumes of *World Elections on File* offer basic information about the frequency and validity of elections of each country up to 1987. Use is also made of *The World Factbook 1993*, *Political Handbook of the World: 1993*, and additional electoral information scattered in news reports and articles to supplement the electoral data after 1987. See Thomas S. Arms and Eileen Riley, eds., *World Elections on File*, 2 Vols. (New York: Facts of File, 1987); Arthur S. Banks, ed., *Political Handbook of the World: 1993* (Binghamton: CSA Publications).

20. Although Senegal and Zimbabwe held only three consecutive popular elections to national legislatures between 1972 to 1992, they are still counted as quasi-democratic countries for reasons given in the footnotes in Table 3.4.

between 1987 and 1992 (even though their PRIDX or CLIDX is less than 5.5). There are 42 such countries, as listed in Table 3.6.[21]

Finally, I leave 36 countries as "uncategorized" because they either underwent dramatic political changes between 1987 and 1992, or had a civil war in the last decade, or are currently engaged in a civil war. Based on my criteria, it would be premature to classify these countries, which are listed in Table 3.7.

Although the political rights and civil liberties indices can be quite subjective,[22] they cover most countries around the world for the longest period of time, and thus are preliminary measures for categorizing political systems globally. The political rights index, however, sees little in non-democratic countries' electoral practices, and thus misses some significant intricacies in the politics of such countries. That is why I further use an election criterion to help differentiate political systems.

The election criterion involves four consecutive elections to national legislatures in a period of 21 years. I choose elections to national legislatures instead of popular presidential elections because the latter have a winner-take-all characteristic, while the former may enable opposition candidates to win offices without winning the majority of the popular votes for the opposition as a group. Also, I do not use elections below the national level because global information of provincial, district, or municipal elections is far too insufficient, although such elections are as important as those on the national level where opposition movements are concerned. Furthermore, almost all elections to national legislatures are held every 3-5 years. A period of 21 years, therefore, may see 4-7 such elections in a country that holds such elections regularly. That is why I consider 4 consecutive elections to national legislatures as the minimum for "regularly held elections."

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21. In this category, some countries were autocratic and some were totalitarian, but the strict distinction between them is not relevant to this study.

22. Raymond Duncan Gastil admits that "the survey has always been highly personal," even though he tries to stick to the same standards. See Gastil, *supra* note 12, p. 22. It is impossible for him and others to have full knowledge of all the countries and to give fully objective political rights and civil liberties scores to each country in the annual survey of freedom. Therefore, some countries were either overscored or underscored in the annual rankings. For example, in 1993, Taiwan held a fair and competitive election in December and political rights and civil liberties were highly respected, but according to the 1993 rankings of the countries issued in January 1994, Taiwan only scored 4 in the political rights index and the civil liberties index. Mongolia, however, was given 2 for a political rights score and 3 for a civil liberties score because of its first democratic election. It is hard to believe Mongolia was more democratic than Taiwan in 1993.

As to the validity of elections, I do not follow Western standards, which regard an election as invalid when it involves fraud or when it does not select the most powerful political leader.[23] There are, however, many variations in discredited elections, variations that involve significant implications. Therefore, I consider an election valid when the opposition candidates can win seats and the election outcomes are honored.[24] The proof of valid elections is that opposition candidates did win a certain percentage of the elective offices and took office.[25] Also, where electoral fraud is concerned, as long as it does not significantly alter overall election outcomes, the election is considered valid.[26]

As a whole, in order to discuss opposition movements meaningfully, my typology of political systems is based on the degree of repression and that of opportunity for political opposition.[27] Therefore, according to my classification, democratic systems are least repressive and most favorable to opposition activities. People can form political parties and organize opposition activities without fear for their lives or property. Meanwhile, regularly held elections offer opposition leaders opportunities to take elective offices and make possible the rotation of political power between different political parties from time to time. By degrees, quasi-democratic systems and the least democratic systems are more repressive and

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23. For Western standards of the validity of elections, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 10.

24. Also, the effectiveness of the elective offices is not crucial as long as they function in some small degree of policy-making. For instance, Interpellation, bill discussions and voting are examples of minimum functions of policy-making.

25. By "invalid elections," I mean: (1) election outcomes were totally nullified by the regimes; for example, Nigeria's military regime nullified the presidential elections won by opposition leader, Moshood Abiola, in June 1993; the Algerian government nullified the parliamentary elections won by the opposition Islamic Salvation Front in 1991; (2) electoral systems could not translate votes cast for opposition candidates into seats to a national legislatures; for example, in the 1989 Tunisian parliamentary elections, the opposition candidates won 14.5 percent of the votes nationwide, but they failed to win any seats [see John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45 (Summer 1991), p. 431]; (3) elections were boycotted by all major opposition parties and no opposition candidates participated in elections as independent candidates; and, (4) candidates can only come from the single ruling party.

26. Electoral harassment and violence may occur; however, they must be under control and not widespread.

27. My typology does not involve other societal indicators, such as the standard of living or the quality of life. For example, India is a recognized democratic country, but women's welfare and status in that country are negative in every respect.

less open to opposition. Regularly elections are held in quasi-democratic systems, but such elections do not meet Western standards.

In differentiating these three political systems, however, my typology does not give each class an equal interval in both indices, *i.e.*, 1-3, 3-5, and 5-7. Rather, I use the following three ranges: 1-3.499, 3.5-5.5, and 5.501-7. The reason is twofold. First, as average scores, PRIDX and CLIDX do not reflect the fluctuation of points in the 21 years. For example, Ecuador's PRIDX is 3.476, but its annual political rights score in 1979-1992 has never exceeded 2.[28] Therefore, it should be categorized as democratic, and not quasi-democratic, as it would be if we applied the equal interval point system. Many other Latin American countries are similar to Ecuador; their political rights and civil liberties scores were poor in the 1970s, but have improved tremendously since 1980. If I use equal class intervals for my classification, they would all be incorrectly categorized as quasi-democratic systems.[29] Second, the two indices involve subjective biases and give some countries worse scores than they merit, like Singapore and Peru, among others.[30] I therefore use 5.5 instead of 5 in both indices as the lower end for quasi-democratic systems.[31]

To verify the range (3.5-5.5) assigned to quasi-democratic systems, I conduct a sensitivity test. It turns out that the best range for quasi-democratic systems in both indices is 2.9-4.9, but if I had applied that range instead of 3.5-5.5, the outcome would have been the same.[32]

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28. Ecuador's relatively high average political rights score, 3.476, was due to the high numbers (7's and 6's) it scored under military rule in the 1970s.

29. Although some scholars believe some Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, are not truly democratic but are "neoauthoritarian," this study still classifies them as democratic according to my criteria. See James Petras and Steve Vieux, "The Transition to Authoritarian Electoral Regimes in Latin America," *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 21 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-20.

30. For instance, in 1992, according to the two indices, Singapore scored 4 and 5, and Peru, 6 and 5, while Jordan scored 3 and 3. I think the author favors Jordan over the other countries with prejudice.

31. Interestingly enough, none of the eleven quasi-democratic countries have average scores higher than 5, as seen in Table 3.4. Therefore, my adjustment from 5 to 5.5 does not change the result when I incorporate the election criterion to distinguish quasi-democratic systems from the least democratic systems.

32. There are 42 countries located between the 3.5 to 5.5 range in both political rights and civil liberties indices. When we hold the lower end of quasi-democratic systems, 5.5, unchanged and let the upper end of quasi-democratic systems, 3.5, decrease to 3.3, Argentina and Malaysia are added to the original set. Holding 5.5 unchanged, and then letting 3.3 decrease to 3.1, Brazil, El Salvador, Grenada and Honduras are

Also, to mitigate problems resulting from fluctuations in political rights and civil liberties, I examine each case carefully. First, I check if each country has a frequent score fluctuation incompatible with its PRIDX and CLIDX. If there are no inconsistencies, then I categorize it into the political system according to my criteria. For instance, Ecuador's PRIDX (3.476) and CLIDX (2.810) make it a democratic system according to my criteria. I further check and see that, since 1979, its annual political rights score has been 2 for more than a decade. Its annual score of each index since 1979 corresponds to its PRIDX and CLIDX, respectively. In this way, I confirm my categorization of Ecuador as democratic.

Second, if a country's scores in both indices changes drastically, or if its recent scores contradict its PRIDX or CLIDX, then I leave it uncategorized. For instance, in both indices, Mongolia scored 7 for 18 years. In 1990, Mongolia held its first democratic election and scored 4 in both indices. Then, because of parliamentary and direct presidential elections in 1992-93, its scores further moved up to 2 and 3 in both indices. Mongolia's drastic change of scores in 1991 would make it a democratic country, but such changes are incompatible with its PRIDX (6.429) and CLIDX (6.429), which would bring it under the least democratic system. I therefore leave it uncategorized.

Despite all the care I have taken to establish this typology of political systems, any typology of political systems is time-dependent and only reflects the classification at the time the person develops the typology. When James S. Coleman categorized

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added to the list. No country is added to the list, when 3.1 decreases to 2.9, holding 5.5 unchanged. When 2.9 decreases to 2.7, Ecuador and Turkey are added to the list. As previously explained, both of them are democratic countries. Thus, I conclude that 2.9 is the critical point for the upper end of quasi-democratic systems because lower than that point, only democratic countries are added to the list. When we hold the upper end of quasi-democratic systems, 3.5, unchanged and let the lower end of quasi-democratic systems, 5.5, decrease to 5.3, Bahrain, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, United Arab Emirates and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) are dropped from the original list. Holding 3.5 unchanged, and then letting 5.3 decrease to 5.1, Chile, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland are dropped from the list. When 5.1 decreases to 4.9, holding 3.5 unchanged, Bhutan, Egypt, Kuwait, Madagascar, Nigeria, Paraguay, Zimbabwe and Zambia are deleted from the list. Among them, only Zimbabwe is on our final list of quasi-democratic countries. Holding 3.5 unchanged, and letting 4.9 decrease to 4.7, Comoros, South Korea, Maldives, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Singapore and Taiwan are deleted from the list. Among them, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are on the final list of quasi-democratic countries. Therefore, I conclude that 4.9 is the critical point for the lower end of quasi-democratic systems because at lower than that point, several targeted countries are removed from the list.

Venezuela as "authoritarian" in 1960,[33] that assignment was only "valid" for that time. Later, Venezuela became a democratic country and has remained one since. Similarly, in my typology, Gambia was democratic as of 1992, but a military coup in 1994[34] disqualifies it from being a democratic country. In other words, a drastic change in a country's political system may render its classification in a typology invalid, as South Africa and the former Soviet Union best exemplify.

Finally, it is possible that my typology can be used in many ways, but, for this study, I use it as a reasonable basis on which I further examine the common traits of each class of political systems and discuss opposition movements and their leaders in different political systems.

33. See James S. Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 534.

34. See Howard W. French, "In Gambia, New Coup Follows Old Pattern," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1994, p. A4.

TABLE 3.1 LIST OF DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (AS OF 1992)

(The first number in the parenthesis is PRIDX and the second number is CLIDX)

(I) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are less than 3.5 and no score fluctuation:

1. Australia	(1, 1)	19. Italy	(1.2, 1.5)
2. Austria	(1, 1)	20. Jamaica	(1.8, 2.5)
3. Bahamas	(1.5, 2.2)	21. Japan	(1.4, 1.1)
4. Barbados	(1, 1.1)	22. Luxembourg	(1.2, 1)
5. Belgium	(1, 1)	23. Mauritius	(2.2, 2.3)
6. Botswana	(1.9, 2.8)	24. Netherlands	(1, 1)
7. Canada	(1, 1)	25. New Zealand	(1, 1)
8. Colombia	(2.1, 3.1)	26. Norway	(1, 1)
9. Costa Rica	(1, 1)	27. Papua New Guinea	(2.1, 2.2)
10. Denmark	(1, 1)	28. Sweden	(1.1, 1)
11. Finland	(1.7, 1.8)	29. Switzerland	(1, 1)
12. France	(1, 1.9)	30. Trinidad and Tobago	(1.4, 1.8)
13. Gambia[a]	(2.3, 2.7)	31. United Kingdom	(1, 1.1)
14. Germany[b]	(1, 1.7)	32. United States	(1, 1)
15. Iceland	(1, 1)	33. Venezuela	(1.3, 2.2)
16. India	(2.1, 3.1)		
17. Ireland	(1, 1.2)		
18. Israel[c]	(2, 2.3)		

(II) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are less than 3.5, but there is score fluctuation in each case:

34. Argentina	(3.4, 3.3)
35. Brazil	(3.2, 3.4)
36. Dominican Republic	(2.1, 2.6)
37. Ecuador	(3.4, 2.8)
38. Greece	(2, 2.3)
39. Grenada	(3.1, 3.3)
40. Malta	(1.5, 2.2)
41. Portugal	(2.1, 2.4)
42. Spain	(2.2, 2.7)

(III) Both PRIDX and CLIDX or one of them are a little greater than 3.5 and there is score fluctuation, but they are considered as democratic by most scholars:

43. Bolivia	(3.7, 3.5)
44. Honduras	(3.7, 3)
45. Turkey	(2.7, 4)
46. Uruguay	(3.8, 3.9)

Notes: [a] A bloodless military coup occurred in Gambia in July 1994. The military government has not returned power to the civilians. Thus, the coup broke Gambia's long tradition of electoral democracy.

[b] The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was united with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in October 1990.

[c] The evaluation of Israel does not include its record in the occupied territories.

TABLE 3.2 LIST OF FIRST-ROUND QUASI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (AS OF 1992)

Country Name	PRIDX	CLIDX	Country Name	PRIDX	CLIDX
Bahrain	5.429	4.714	Nicaragua	4.857	4.476
Bangladesh	4.381	4.333	Nigeria**	4.905	4.048
Bhutan	4.905	4.714	Pakistan**	4.810	4.714
Bolivia**	3.714	3.524	Panama**	*5.524	4.524
Cape Verde**	5.278	*5.556	Paraguay	4.714	4.905
Chile**	5.286	4.286	Peru**	3.810	3.857
Comoros**	4.833	4.444	Philippines	4.095	4.048
Egypt	5.095	4.619	Poland**	5.286	4.667
El Salvador	*3.143	3.857	Qatar	*5.571	5.048
Ghana	*6.048	5.190	Senegal	4.286	3.952
Guatemala**	3.905	4	Seychelles**	*5.706	5.353
Guyana	4.333	3.762	Sierra Leone	5.381	5.048
Honduras**	3.714	*3.000	Singapore	4.429	4.857
Hungary**	5.143	4.619	South Africa	4.810	5.429
Indonesia	5.143	5.190	Sri Lanka	*2.667	3.667
Ivory Coast	*5.810	5.048	Suriname**	4.333	3.833
Jordan	5.476	5.429	Swaziland	5.429	4.857
Kenya	5.429	5.000	Taiwan (China, Republic of)	4.857	4.381
Korea, South**	4.048	4.810	Thailand	3.905	3.810
Kuwait	5.050	4.100	Tunisia	*5.619	4.810
Lebanon	4.476	3.905	Turkey	*2.714	3.952
Lesotho	5.333	4.619	Uganda	*5.762	5.476
Liberia	*5.905	5.095	United Arab Emirates	5.429	5.000
Madagascar	5.048	4.905	Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)**	5.429	4.762
Malaysia	*3.333	4.048	Uruguay**	3.762	3.857
Maldives**	4.762	4.571	Western Samoa	3.619	*2.429
Mexico	3.714	3.714	Zambia**	4.857	4.952
Morocco	4.333	4.619	Zimbabwe	4.905	4.905
Nepal**	4.095	4.286			

Notes: *The index number indicates that it does not fall within the range 3.5-5.5.
**The country has experienced severe fluctuations of index numbers during the last two decades.

Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Turkey are categorized as democratic because of their skewed average scores. Although these countries scored poorly in the 1970s, their scores on both the political rights and the civil liberties indices in the recent 10 years fall within the range of the requirement for democratic countries. Therefore, the mean scores here do not reflect their current standings.

TABLE 3.3 ELECTION FREQUENCIES OF THE FIRST-ROUND QUASI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (FROM 1972 TO 1992)*

Country	Election Number**	Conse. Elec. No.***	Type and Year
Bahrain	1	0	National Assembly[1] (partially elected): 1973
Bangladesh	5	2	National Parliament[2]: 1979, 1986, 1991 President[3]: 1978, 1986
Bhutan	0	0	
Bolivia	10	3	President[4]: 1979, 1980, 1985, 1989 Senate: 1980, 1985, 1989 Chamber of Deputies: 1980, 1985, 1989
Cape Verde	2	0	President: 1991 National People's Assembly: 1991
Chile	3	0	President: 1989 Senate: 1989 Chamber of Deputies: 1989
Comoros	2	0	President: 1990 Federal Assembly: 1992
Egypt	4	3	People's Assembly[5]: 1977, 1984, 1987, 1990
El Salvador	7	4	President: 1977, 1984, 1989 Legislative Assembly: 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991
Ghana	4	0	President: 1979, 1992 National Assembly: 1979, 1992
Guatemala	4	2	President: 1985, 1990-91 National Congress: 1985, 1990,
Guyana	4	4	National Assembly: 1973, 1980, 1985, 1992
Honduras	6	3	President: 1981, 1985, 1989 National Assembly: 1981, 1985, 1989
Hungary	1	0	National Assembly: 1990
Indonesia	3	3	People's Representation Council: 1982, 1987, 1992
Ivory Coast	2	0	President: 1990 National Assembly: 1990
Jordan	2	2	House of Representatives: 1984 (by-election), 1989
Kenya	2	0	President: 1992 National Assembly: 1992
Korea, South	7	5	President: 1987, 1992 National Assembly: 1978, 1981, 1985, 1988, 1992
Kuwait	1	0	National Assembly[6]: 1992
Lesotho	0	0	

Madagascar	4	0	President: 1982, 1989, 1992-93 National Assembly: 1989
Malaysia	5	5	House of Representatives: 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990
Maldives	1	0	Citizens' Council[7]: 1989
Mexico	14	7	President: 1976, 1982, 1988 Senate: 1976, 1982, 1988 ,1991 Chamber of Deputies: 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991
Morocco	2	2	House of Representatives: 1976-77, 1984
Nepal	3	3	National Assembly: 1981, 1986, 1991
Nicaragua	5	2	President: 1984, 1990 National Assembly[8]: 1974, 1984, 1990
Nigeria	1	0	President: 1979 National Assembly[9]: 1992
Pakistan	3	2	National Assembly: 1977, 1988, 1990
Panama	3	2	President: 1984 Legislative Assembly[10]: 1984, 1989
Paraguay	3	0	President: 1989 Senate: 1989 Chamber of Deputies: 1989
Peru	9	3	President: 1980, 1985, 1992 Senate: 1980, 1985, 1990 Chamber of Deputies[11]: 1980, 1985, 1990
Philippines	8	3	President: 1981, 1986, 1992 Senate: 1987, 1992 House of Representatives: 1984, 1987, 1992
Poland	3	0	President: 1990 Senate: 1991 National Assembly: 1991
Qatar	0	0	
Senegal	6	3	President: 1978, 1983, 1988 National Assembly: 1978, 1983, 1988
Seychelles	0	0	
Sierra Leone	0	0	
Singapore	6	6	Parliament: 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991
Sri Lanka	4	2	President: 1982, 1988 Parliament[12]: 1977, 1989
Suriname	2	2	National Assembly: 1987, 1991
Swaziland	0	0	
Taiwan (China, Republic of)	11	7	Legislative Yuan[13]: 1972, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992 National Assembly: 1972, 1980, 1986, 1991
Thailand	7	6	House of Representatives[14]: 1975, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1992
Tunisia	1	0	House of Representatives[15]: 1989

Turkey	6	6	Grand National Assembly: 1973, 1977, 1983, 1987, 1991
Uganda	1	0	National Assembly[16]: 1980
United Arab Emirates	0	0	
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)	3	0	President: 1978
			Assembly of People's Deputies[17]: 1978, 1992
Uruguay	6	2	President: 1984, 1989 Senate: 1984, 1989 Chamber of Deputies: 1984, 1989
Western Samoa	6	6	Legislative Assembly[18]: 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991
Zambia	2	0	President: 1991 National Assembly: 1991
Zimbabwe	4	3	President: 1990 House of Assembly: 1980, 1985, 1990

Sources: Arthur S. Banks, ed., *Political Handbook of the World: 1993*, Binghamton: CSA Publications, 1993; Thomas S. Arms and Eileen Riley, eds., *World Elections on File*, Vols. 1 and 2, New York: Facts on File, 1987.

Notes: *Black majority in South Africa had been deprived of voting rights for many decades until May 1994. Lebanon and Liberia have had civil wars for a long time. Thus, these three countries are excluded from the list.

**Election number is the sum of the number of presidential elections (in presidential systems) and that of elections to national legislatures.

***Consecutive election number is the sum of consecutive elections to national legislatures.

[1] The Assembly was dissolved on August 26, 1975.

[2] The 1988 election was boycotted by all the leading opposition parties; therefore, it was not counted here.

[3] The President was indirectly elected by Parliament in 1991.

[4] When no presidential candidate wins an absolute majority, both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies have to meet to choose a winner from among the three leading candidates. In 1990, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies made a revision that they only choose a winner between the two leading candidates when there is no winner in popular votes.

[5] Since there was a break between the 1977 election and the 1984 election, only three consecutive elections are counted.

[6] The Assembly was dissolved by decree of the emir from August 1976 to February 1981 and from July 1986 to October 1992. Only literate, adult, native-born males whose families have resided in Kuwait since 1920 have been allowed to vote.

[7] No political parties exist in the Maldives. Although there was an election to the Citizens' Council, there was no record of the electoral results.

[8] The predecessor of the National Assembly was the National Constituent Assembly. The 1984 election involved selection of the members of the National Constituent Assembly.

[9] The 1992 election to members of the National Assembly was limited to only two government endorsed party candidates; therefore, it is not counted as a valid election.

[10] The results of the 1989 election were nullified by the Noriega regime. However, most of the elected deputies were back on their jobs after the removal of Noriega by U.S. troops in 1990. Ten seats were filled in 1991 by election.

[11] The bicameral Congress elected in 1990 was dissolved by President Fujimori in April 1992. In its place, a new unicameral Democratic Constituent Congress was established. The election of members to the new Congress was held in November 1992.

[12] In a 1982 referendum, the government got the voters' approval for extending the life of the Parliament elected in July 1977 to August 1989 because of communal violence between the Sinhalese and Tamils.

[13] The 1992 election to the Legislative Yuan was the first time that all members were elected by Taiwan's residents. The 1991 election to the National Assembly was the first time that all members were elected by Taiwan's residents. In all other elections, only a portion of the total membership was up for vote.

[14] The government that came after the 1975 election was defeated on a non-confidence vote. A new election was held in 1976. Since the 1976 election was not a scheduled one, it is not counted as one of the consecutive elections.

[15] The 1989 election was the first time in which opposition candidates were allowed to run. Although all the opposition candidates combined got 20 percent of the vote, they did not receive any seats because of the biased electoral system.

[16] The new government under the National Resistance Movement held a democratic election in March 1994 based on non-partisan ballots endorsed by the majority of the voters.

[17] Its predecessor, the National Assembly, was dissolved in 1974 and 1980.

[18] Only *matai* (head of family) can run for the Legislative Assembly. As of 1985, members of the Assembly were indirectly elected by approximately 10,000 *matai*, with direct elections being limited to two special representatives chosen by universal adult suffrage of persons outside the *matai* system. In a popular referendum on October 29, 1990, voters favored the adoption of universal suffrage for all persons 21 or over.

TABLE 3.4 LIST OF QUASI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (AS OF 1992)

Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater or equal to 3.5 (in some cases one of the scores is less than 3.5), but less than or equal to 5.5 in each country, and at least four consecutive elections have been held in the last two decades:

Country Name	PRIDX	CLIDX	1994pridx (for 1993)	1994clidx (for 1993)
1. El Salvador	*3.143	3.857	3	3
2. Guyana	4.333	3.762	2	2
3. Korea, South	4.048	4.810	2	2
4. Malaysia	3.333	4.048	4	5
5. Mexico	3.714	3.714	4	4
6. Senegal**	4.286	3.952	4	5
7. Singapore	4.429	4.857	5	5
8. Taiwan (China, (Republic of)	4.857	4.481	4	4
9. Thailand	3.905	3.810	3	5
10. Western Samoa	3.619	*2.429	2	2
11. Zimbabwe***	4.905	4.905	5	5

Notes: The 1994 political rights and civil liberties scores are taken from *Freedom Review* (January-February 1994), pp. 14-15.

*The score is less than 3.5.

**Senegal held a presidential election and an election to its National Assembly in 1973, but the ruling Senegalese Progressive Union (which changed its name to the Socialist Party in 1976) won all the seats. Since we cannot confirm whether opposition candidates were systematically deprived of any chance of winning some seats in that election, we do not count it as one of the consecutive elections Senegal held from 1972 to 1992. Even though Senegal held only three consecutive popular elections to the National Assembly from 1972 to 1992 (which does not fulfill our requirement of four consecutive elections), it held another valid popular election to the National Assembly in 1993. Therefore, we still count Senegal as a quasi-democratic country.

***The transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority was fulfilled in Zimbabwe in 1979. On April 18, 1980, Britain formally recognized the independence of Zimbabwe. From 1980 to 1992, Zimbabwe held three consecutive popular elections to the House of Assembly. Although it does not meet our requirement of four consecutive elections to national legislature, it is still counted as a quasi-democratic country.

TABLE 3.5 LIST OF NEAR-QUASI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (AS OF 1992)

County Name	PRIDX	CLIDX	1994pridx (for 1993)	1994clidx (for 1993)
1. Bangladesh	4.381	4.333	2	4
2. Egypt	5.095	4.619	6	6
3. Guatemala	3.905	4.143	4	5
4. Indonesia	5.143	5.190	7	6
5. Jordan	5.476	5.429	4	4
6. Morocco	4.333	4.619	5	5
7. Nepal	4.095	4.286	3	4
8. Nicaragua	4.857	4.476	4	5
9. Pakistan	4.810	4.714	3	5
10. Peru	3.810	3.857	5	5
11. Philippines	4.095	4.048	3	4
12. Sri Lanka	2.667	3.667	4	5

Notes: The 1994 political rights and civil liberties scores are from *Freedom Review* (January-February 1994), pp. 14-15.

TABLE 3.6 LIST OF LEAST DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (AS OF 1992)

(I) At least one of the two indices is less than 5.5, but there were either no elections or no valid elections:

1. Bahrain
2. Bhutan
3. Ghana
4. Kenya
5. Kuwait
6. Maldives
7. Nigeria
8. Qatar
9. Seychelles
10. Sierra Leone
11. Swaziland
12. Tunisia
13. United Arab Emirates

(II) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 5.5, and the countries are non-communist:

1. Algeria
2. Burma (Myanmar)
3. Burundi
4. Cameroon
5. Central African Republic*
6. Equatorial Guinea
7. Ethiopia
8. Guinea
9. Guinea-Bissau
10. Haiti
11. Iran
12. Iraq
13. Kampuchea (Cambodia)
14. Libya
15. Malawi
16. Mauritania
17. Niger*
18. Oman
19. Rwanda
20. Saudi Arabia
21. Syria
22. Tanzania
23. Togo
24. Zaire

(III) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 5.5, and the countries are communist:

1. China
2. Cuba
3. Korea, North
4. Laos
5. Vietnam

Notes: "No valid elections" means: (1) election outcomes were nullified by the regimes in some cases; (2) elections were boycotted by all major opposition parties; (3) elections were held irregularly; or, (4) candidates can only come from the single ruling party.

*Both the Central African Republic and Niger held democratic elections in 1993.

TABLE 3.7 LIST OF UNCATEGORIZED COUNTRIES (AS OF 1992)

(I) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are less than 3.5, but there was a coup d'état in the past 5 years:

1. Fiji[a]

(II) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 3.5 and less than 5.5, and democratic elections were held between 1987 and 1992. However, these countries do not fully satisfy the election criterion for quasi-democratic systems:

1. Chile
2. Comoros
3. Hungary
4. Lesotho
5. Madagascar
6. Paraguay
7. Poland
8. South Africa
9. Suriname
10. Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)
11. Zambia

(III) One of the indices is slightly greater than 5.5, and the other is within the 3.5 and 5.5 range. These countries held democratic elections only between 1987 and 1992; therefore, they do not fully satisfy the election criterion for quasi-democratic systems:

1. Cape Verde
2. Ivory Coast
3. Panama
4. Uganda

(IV) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 5.5, but the 1993 score has been improved to the 2 and 3 range because of recent democratic elections:

1. Benin
2. Bulgaria
3. Congo
4. Czech Republic[b]
5. Mali
6. Mongolia
7. Sao Tome and Principe

(V) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 5.5, but the 1993 score has been improved to the 3 and 4 range:

1. Albania
2. Gabon
3. Rumania
4. Russia[c]

(VI) Both or one of the two indices are less than 5.5, but the countries had a civil war in the last decade or are currently engaged in a civil war:

1. Lebanon
2. Liberia
3. Yugoslavia[d]

(VII) Both PRIDX and CLIDX are greater than 5.5, but the countries had a civil war in the last decade or are currently engaged in a civil war:

1. Afghanistan
2. Angola
3. Chad
4. Mozambique
5. Somalia
6. Sudan

Notes: [a]Although Fiji scored 2 in both political rights and civil liberties indices for 15 years, it had a coup d'etat in 1987. Fiji's 1993 political rights and civil liberties indices are 4 and 3, respectively. Since a new score pattern has not yet been formed, Fiji was placed in the uncategorized systems.

[b]The former Czechoslovakia was divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993.

[c]The former Soviet Union was divided into Russia and 15 other independent republics in 1991.

[d]The former Yugoslavia was divided into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia in 1992.

CHAPTER 4

OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND LEADERS IN DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS

> It still holds true that man is more uniquely human when he turns obstacles into opportunities.
>
> —Eric Hoffer

This chapter examines opposition movements in the three political systems defined in the previous chapter: democratic, quasi-democratic and least democratic. I investigate how potential opposition leaders may evaluate the opportunity to emerge, based on Equation 1 given in Chapter 2. It is virtually impossible to discuss all opposition movements. Therefore, I select some typical ones to explicate the forms of opposition movements and the major factors that influence a leader's calculations.

The political systems in my typology, however, are ideal types in that the countries of each have common traits and variations. In the real world, for example, some democratic countries can be more democratic than others, and some least democratic countries can be more repressive than others. I stress the common traits in each political system, focusing on developing countries. In addition, I discuss the democratic system only as a comparison with the other two systems.

I. DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS

A democratic system's PRIDX and CLIDX are less than 3.5, with modifications in some cases. Of the three political systems, the democratic system is least repressive and most open to political opposition. Opposition leaders can easily form a new political party or join existing ones. They and their followers can freely voice their opinions, organize activities, and receive fairly objective coverage by mass media. Also, people can freely choose their national and local leaders or representatives through regularly held elections. Consequently, opposition candidates have a reasonable chance of winning elective offices and opposition parties may also become the dominant party. When opposition leaders or their followers are indicted by the government, they will have a fair trial by an impartial judicial system. Because of the fair political competition, political

corruption and policy errors are checked by opposition parties and leaders. Moreover, the grievances of ordinary people can be addressed through various channels, such as participation in political parties and interest groups. Meanwhile, since there are established legal procedures for opposition competition, the political arena is relatively peaceful and calm.[1]

In other words, there are very few barriers to prevent opposition leaders from entering politics in democratic systems. The major battleground for political competition is elections. Opposition leaders' strategies, thus, revolve around running successful electoral campaigns to win election. The methods they use to collect resources are non-coercive: soliciting voluntary donations and selling private goods in exchange for desired resources. This ideal type of democratic system cannot cover all variations of democratic countries in the real world, but it spells out a characteristic they share, *i.e.*, they all offer a favorable environment for peaceful opposition movements.

To discuss how democratic systems affect an opposition leader's expected value of leading an opposition movement, I refer to Equation 1: $EV(O) = [B(W)-C(W)]*P(W) + [B(D)-C(D)]*P(D) + B(O) - C(O)$. Since opposition leaders seldom lose their lives, freedom, and property when they lose a political competition, the costs of losing a political contest [C(D)] are near zero. Also, the costs of organizing an opposition movement or running an electoral campaign regardless of the outcome [C(O)] can be offset by the benefits of organizing the movement or running the campaign regardless of the outcome [B(O)], if the potential leader can amass a decent amount of resources. He can usually solicit donations and

1. Sometimes, riots and mass killings can occur in democratic countries when ethnic conflicts are at issue. For instance, nearly 1,500 people were killed in the 1993 Bombay riots between the muslims and Hindus in India. See John Ward Anderson, "India's Muslims Fear New Physical Threat," *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1994, p. A16. Coup d'état attempts can also happen in democratic countries. For example, failed coup attempts occurred in Venezuela and Argentina. The 1987 military coup even destroyed the democratic system in Fiji. Some democratic countries were under military rule in the 1970s and early 1980s. Take several democratic countries in Southern Europe as examples. Turkey experienced a military coup in 1980 and the elected civilian government took back power in late 1983. Greece was under military control from 1967 to 1974 and power was returned to civilians in July 1974. Portugal experienced a military coup against the military regime in 1974 and power transferred to civilians in 1975. In Spain, power was transferred to civilians in 1975 after the death of Franco. Many Latin American democratic countries were also under military rule in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. To some extent, these countries are still vulnerable to the old military factor.

sell private goods in exchange for resources. Under these circumstances, the positive value of Equation 1 depends on the benefits of winning the political contest [B(W)] and the probability of winning the political contest [P(W)]. Normally, the rewards of elective offices are very lucrative; therefore, B(W) is very high, too.

For a prominent and ambitious opposition leader who has never run for any elected office and believes that he has a decent chance to win, the expected value of entering an electoral competition against the incumbent is very enticing. Even if he loses the contest, he may still gain more fame and new connections with politicians and business elites. For instance, Al Sharpton, a black community leader, stood for black victims in almost every racial conflict in New York City. By leading many political rallies and demonstrations held for black causes, he was rewarded handsomely, since later Sharpton was charged with stealing $250,000 from charitable donors and cheating on his income tax in 1989.[2] In 1992, his reputation tarnished by the scandal, Sharpton knew very well that he could not win the Democratic senatorial primary, but he joined the election. He lost in third place, but the 15% (166,665 votes) of votes he received won him new recognition and new access to the power elites in New York State. For Sharpton, both leading political movements and running for elections were lucrative. Even losing elections could become a political asset.

II. THE LEAST DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS

A. Totalitarian Systems

The least democratic system includes two subdivisions: totalitarian (more repressive) and autocratic (less repressive). In totalitarian systems,[3] lacking basic civil and political rights and regular elections, opposition movements usually face severe suppression and can hardly secure their organizations. The probability of winning the political contest [P(W)] is almost zero and the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [B(O)] are almost non-existent, while the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [C(O)] and the costs

2. Catherine S. Manegold, "The Reformation of a Street Preacher: Al Sharpton Tries On the Power of 166,000 Votes," *The New York Times Magazines*, January 24, 1993, p. 26.

3. Totalitarian systems include all current and former East European communist regimes. Although not all current and ex-communist countries can be properly lumped into this category, they share some essential repressive features.

of losing the political contest [C(D)] are tremendously high. Enter these values into Equation 1—EV(O) = [B(W)–C(W)]*P(W) + [B(D)–C(D)]*P(D) + B(O) – C(O) and, EV(O), the expected value of leading an opposition movement, is negative.

In a totalitarian system, the costs of leading an opposition movement are very high, since the government harshly penalizes anti-regime behaviors, such as publishing and distributing *samizdat* (underground publications), organizing protests or demonstrations, initiating strikes at work, and above all, organizing opposition organizations. Punishment ranges from demotion, loss of one's job, constant police harassment, to imposed exile, imprisonment, and even death. In the former Soviet Union, for instance, political dissidents were arrested and tried without proper judicial process.[4] Many of them were sent to labor camps and some were incarcerated in mental institutions for years.[5]

In a totalitarian system, the chance of running a successful opposition movement is very slim. Theoretically, if a potential opposition leader can effectively mobilize popular support and collect resources consistently, he may still have a chance. However, it is very difficult to garner popular support on a daily basis because the general public has no incentive to become part of an opposition movement. Ordinary people are frightened by the regime's coercive potential and usually avoid supporting or joining opposition movements.[6] For example, in China, the Communist Party conducts close surveillance on people's activities by means of "street committees" and other party organizations in different *danwei* (literally work units),[7] through which subversives are discovered.[8] Any politically nonconformist behavior is easily checked and the transgressors are punished accordingly. Under such circumstances,

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4. See David E. Powell, "Case Study: Controlling Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 7 (Winter 1972), pp. 85-98.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

6. Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver indicate that the perception of the KGB's coercive potential played a more important role in deterring the former Soviet citizens interviewed in a research project from committing politically nonconformist behavior. See Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81 (December 1987), pp. 1065-98. In the case of Hungary and former Czechoslovakia, the brutality of the Soviet invasions in 1956 and 1968, respectively, made citizens of these two countries and other East European countries think twice before launching another democracy movement.

7. Fox Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea*, revised edition (New York: Times Books, 1990), pp. 40-42, 322-323.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

opposition leaders can hardly recruit members and solicit resources from the general public. Therefore, large-scale and organized opposition movements are almost impossible under the usual tight control of communist regimes.[9]

Based on my argument so far, there would be no opposition behavior whatsoever in a totalitarian system. The fact is that such movements do exist. The contradiction can be resolved from two angles. First, the totalitarian system in my argument is an ideal type that never changes, but in the real world a totalitarian country may change from time to time, offering potential opposition leaders the opportunity to emerge. Second, there are true altruists and martyrs who act selflessly and go beyond the rational choice model, such as some courageous persons who openly criticize a communist regime's policies or even challenge its legitimacy. However, these persons' behavior usually cannot develop into an organized opposition movement.

When an opposition leader rises and leads an opposition movement in a totalitarian system, he usually becomes a political entrepreneur and calculates no differently from other economic entrepreneurs, asking: Can the organization collect enough resources to operate in the first place? Can the organization make a profit to sustain itself and grow? Above all, what is the long-term benefit for the leader?[10] Even altruistic leaders have to design their strategies with cost-benefit calculations in mind, merely to sustain the opposition camp and organize activities, if not for their personal interests. For example, those persons who risked their personal welfare to voice their dissent in Hungary and former Czechoslovakia acted gingerly without invoking a headstrong confrontation with the communist regimes. They mobilized their informal organizations on issues of environmental protection, peace movements, and human rights protection, which were not outright politically ori-

9. H. Gordon Skilling, "Background to the Study of Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 3 (Summer 1968), pp. 319-24.

10. I do not intend to downplay opposition leaders' political ideals and ideological pursuit in their decisions to initiate an opposition movement. Certainly, there is little to gain and much to lose at the initial stage of any opposition movement in a repressive political system. The expectation of the "leader's surplus" does not make sense at the beginning. However, we cannot deny that the high probability of building an opposition organization plays a critical role in potential opposition leaders' decisions to take risks to start opposition movements. Moreover, in the long run, if opposition leaders cannot support themselves through leading opposition movements, they will certainly quit the business.

ented, so that they could minimize the chance of being outlawed by the regimes.[11]

Strictly speaking, these dissident activities are not the opposition movements defined and examined in this study. Opposition movements as collective action problems can be effectively coordinated by political entrepreneurs. The emergence of political entrepreneurs depends on a potential "leader's surplus" engendered in the process of organizing an opposition movement. Theoretically, in a totalitarian system, without elective offices and resource-collecting, an opposition leader's surplus is a null; therefore, there is no incentive for political entrepreneurs to emerge. In reality, apart from the dissident activities mentioned above, one seldom sees large-scale and organized opposition movements under a totalitarian regime. Poland, the only exception, will be examined later.

In reality, a totalitarian system may weaken and potential opposition leaders may grasp opportunities to rise and even overthrow the ruling regime. The East European communist regimes collapsed in this way. On the one side, the explosive economic crises significantly weakened the ruling regimes and triggered popular discontent. On the other, these regimes had been imposed by the former Soviet Union, which started to dissolve in the late 1980s and no longer posed a threat to the people in these countries. For potential opposition leaders in these countries, the values of certain variables in Equation 1 changed drastically. The costs of losing the political contest [C(D)] and the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [C(O)] decreased significantly. Meanwhile, the probability of winning the political contest was no longer minuscule.[12] Moreover, the benefits of winning the political contest [B(W)] and the benefits of organizing an opposition movements regardless of its outcomes became very promising.[13] Consequently, the "leader's surplus" generated from organizing an opposition movement and supplying collective goods became real and enticing. Opposition leaders could easily mobilize the public,

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11. William Echikson, *Lighting the Night: Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London: Pan Books, 1991), pp. 161-63, 168-71.

12. Under both domestic and international pressures, communist regimes in East Europe decided to hold national elections to form new governments. Opposition leaders were confident of winning those elections.

13. The rewards of elective office and the resources generated from the organizing process were no longer out of the reach of opposition leaders. Besides, since opposition leaders had tangible resources to distribute among their active followers, they could recruit more members and consolidate their organizations.

and mass demonstrations against communism became the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, many new opposition groups suddenly emerged and several previously existing dissident groups, such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, revived and became the leading opposition force to facilitate the removal of the communist regimes.[14]

Long before the democratic tide caused by the disappearance of the Soviet hegemony, Poland was the only exception in East Europe in which opposition movements emerged and were sustained. The main reason was that opposition leaders in Poland trod their ground very gingerly and calculated correctly. At first, they initiated independent trade unions movements, which did not challenge the ruling regime politically. With the traditionally relative tolerance by the Polish regime,[15] opposition leaders were able to establish a viable resource collection organization. Once they could distribute resources, they started to organize further activities.

In 1976, fourteen intellectuals formed the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, or KOR).[16] Their cause involved arrested workers who had participated in strikes in several cities. Again, to avoid governmental repression, from the very beginning, the KOR declared that its activities were moral and nonpolitical, since it merely sought to offer financial, legal, and medical

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14. Negotiations between the ruling regimes and the opposition coalitions in Hungary and former Czechoslovakia started in the late 1980s and in the following democratic elections, opposition coalitions won a majority in each country. Two opposition parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and Free Democratic Party, combined won the majority of the 1990 parliamentary election. The Czech opposition coalition, Civic Forum, won the June 1990 election. In Romania and Bulgaria, ex-communists and their newly formed political parties won the newly-held elections and promised to stick to the democratic practice.

15. Robert Zuzowski, *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers' Defense Committee "KOR"* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 245-48.

16. See Michael H. Bernhard, *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 76. Roman Laba argues that the importance of the KOR in the process of the Polish democratization was exaggerated. See Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 3-7. According to Laba, Polish workers had a long history of organizing ability to pursue their interests and oppose the regime's repression and they did not need those intellectuals in the KOR to teach them how to conduct political activities. Laba seems to downplay the elite explanation of the Solidarity movement. However, political entrepreneurs do not necessarily come from the intellectuals. They can come from the working class, too. Therefore, the entrepreneurial interpretation of opposition movements is also applied to working-class dominant opposition movements.

assistance to many victimized strike workers and their families and to request amnesty for the detained workers.[17] Moreover, the KOR held open membership and did not have bylaws, officers, or dues.[18] It also adopted peaceful tactics to avoid Soviet intervention in case of a popular upheaval caused by the movements.[19]

As stressed before, opposition leaders must collect resources to keep their movements operating. The KOR survived and expanded primarily because it succeeded in resource-collecting.[20] It had representatives in many cities to collect money on the workers' behalf from the sympathetic public.[21] It also had overseas offices to solicit financial contributions from Polish emigrés and Western trade unions and intellectuals.[22] Meanwhile, by publishing and distributing mass volumes of underground newspapers, journals, and books, the KOR created job opportunities for ordinary people such as printers, typesetters, bookbinders, and distributors; it also opened many forums for intellectuals to be professional free-lancers.[23]

Once it solidified its organization, the KOR began to ally with sympathetic churches, student organizations, farmers' organizations, and other human rights groups.[24] It sponsored and organized demonstrations and collective hunger strikes.[25] It also helped

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17. Bernhard, *supra* note 16, pp. 79, 100-21, 124-29; Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 27 (September-October 1978), p. 40.

18. Bernhard, *supra* note 16, p. 83. David Ost asserts that when the leaders of the KOR and Solidarity claimed their movements were not political, they not only tried to avoid irritating the regime but also sincerely detested the pursuit of power. Ost argues that the essence of their movements was to educate and empower citizens to defend the civil society and oppose the authoritarian state. See David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 1-2, 4. Ost's interpretation of the motives of the Polish opposition leaders seems to be too romantic considering that many of the key opposition leaders are important politicians in the Polish Parliament and government now.

19. Bromke, *supra* note 17, p. 46.

20. Bernhard, *supra* note 16, p. 129.

21. Even many parish priests collected money and gave it to individual KOR members. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 102, 107. According to one estimate, each month there were nearly 100,000 volumes of underground periodicals, books and brochures circulated in Poland. Also, several KOR members formed the Society for Academic Courses (also known by the nickname "flying university") to offer nearly 120 individual lectures in many cities. See *Ibid.*, pp. 149, 147.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-40, 143-47.

25. The successful mass demonstration protesting the death of Stanislaw Pyjas, a student and KOR activist, became a watershed in increasing opposition leaders' confidence in sponsoring later demonstrations. Following an intense campaign of state re-

workers organize discussion groups, publish their own newspaper and other publications, and form Founding Committees for Free Trade Unions.[26] By 1980, when the independent trade union, Solidarity, was formed, there were more than 20 different opposition committees in Poland.[27]

The ultimate victory of the alliance of the KOR and the trade unions movements was the legalization of Solidarity. However, when the Polish regime recognized the potential threats posed by the increasing power of Solidarity and its political ramifications, it declared martial law, outlawed all opposition organizations, and arrested the majority of the opposition leaders and many of their followers in December 1981.[28] The political reality of conducting opposition movements in a totalitarian system reared its ugly head again. However, the organizational skills and networks formulated by the KOR remained intact. The thriving publication and distribution of mass volumes of underground writings had continued until the formation of a Solidarity-led coalition government in 1989.[29] Moreover, the banned underground Solidarity organization was

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pression in late April 1977 and the death of Pyjas, the Workers' Defense Committee increased its scope of assistance to all victims of human rights violations. After the release of the workers and several KOR members, the Committee changed its name to the Social Self-Defense Committee (Komitet Samoobrony Spolecznej, or KSS-"KOR") in September 1977. The new Committee continued to perform former KOR functions closely allied with workers' organizations which later paved the way for the formation of the Solidarity. It eventually was dissolved to avoid overlapping functions with the Solidarity in the fall of 1981. See *ibid.*, pp. 87, 116-17, 121, 123, 131. Many leading KOR members became advisors to the Solidarity. Some others formed two new opposition organizations. See Zuzowski, *supra* note 15, pp. 213-15.

26. Bernhard, *supra* note 16, pp. 159-92.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 76. Obviously, the success of the KOR attracted many new leaders to form similar organizations and competed with the KOR leaders for the overall opposition leadership position. The most important alternative organization was the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (also known as ROPCiO). See *ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

28. Zuzowski, *supra* note 15, pp. 223-25. The sudden announcement of martial law and the mass arrest of opposition leaders and their followers caught many opposition leaders by surprise. They did not expect to serve long sentences in prison. However, their prison terms eventually became an asset in their opposition credentials. See *ibid.*, p. 220.

29. According to the Polish official record, the police traced 1,600 illegal opposition organizations and 1,200 underground printing houses and confiscated five million leaflets and copies of illegal publications between December 1981 and May 1986. See *ibid.*, p. 231.

generously assisted by a network sponsored by former U.S. President Reagan and Pope John Paul II.[30]

Although there are many reasons to the successful opposition movements in Poland, three things are essential. First, opposition leaders evaluated the political environment correctly. They avoided governmental repression for a long time, expanding their organization in the meantime. When the ruling regime perceived the political threat from them, it was too late to repress them effectively. Second, opposition leaders manipulated issues to their advantage. Their moral banner helped gather resources and support from the public and overseas. Third, most importantly, as political entrepreneurs, they solidified their organization like a successful enterprise. The abundant resources kept them going and ignited other new leaders to rise. They also created private goods in exchange for their resources. For instance, 750 writers and 600 journalists worked with the dissident press and the largest underground publishing house employed nearly 200 full-time workers.[31]

In contrast to the relative success of the Polish opposition movements, the sudden emergence and death of the students' movement in China in 1989 reveals the difficulties of leading opposition movements in totalitarian systems. The Chinese Communist regime won its ruling status through a successful revolution and was not being imposed by the Soviet Union. Thus, it has more grassroots support than do the East European communist regimes. As indicated before, the Chinese regime has an omnipresent coercive network; it is almost impossible for the regime to have a sudden breakdown like the sudden fall of dictators in many developing countries or the collapse of the East European communist regimes. The sudden rise of the 1989 students' movements in Tiananmen Square was a chance event which lacked a normal organization like the KOR in Poland to sustain its survival. For a moment, those students who occupied Tiananmen Square did have the ability to amass tangible and intangible resources from Beijing residents and

30. Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance," *Time*, February 24, 1992, pp. 28-35. Various kinds of equipment, such as fax machines, shortwave radios, telephones and computers, were supplied to the banned union by priests and U.S. agents. Monetary donations to the banned union came from "CIA funds, the National Endowment for Democracy, secret accounts in the Vatican and Western trade unions." See *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

31. Zuzowski, *supra* note 15, p. 231.

some corporations through their moral appeal.[32] Many temporary organizations were formed and leaders emerged to coordinate activities at the Square.[33] Had they saved all these newly attained organizational skills and networks for a later grassroots organization, they probably would have had a chance to test the regime's tolerance of its existence. However, the students had an illusion that the government would cave in because of the tremendous support they received from the public and the worldwide sympathy generated by the intensive coverage by Western media. Once martial law was imposed and the tanks rolled into the Square, all their hopes were crashed and the movement was dead. After the crackdown, there was little incentive for potential political entrepreneurs to lead another opposition movement and the political arena became quiet as usual.

In summary, there is almost no incentive for potential political entrepreneurs to assume the job of opposition leaders in totalitarian systems. Occasionally, chance events give opposition leaders a rare opportunity to organize a long-term organization. Most of the time, however, opposition leaders have difficulty in setting up a resource collection organization. Thus, opposition leaders practically have no chance to solicit voluntary donations or sell private goods in exchange for desired resources through a collection organization on a regular basis. Also, collecting resources through extortions and taxation are out of their reach because opposition leaders can hardly resort to guerrilla warfare under the coercive networks of totalitarian regimes. Moreover, since there are no regularly held elections for them to participate in, opposition leaders have no chance to use elective offices to generate resources to distribute to followers as compensation for their organization costs. Therefore, opposition leaders have little material leverage to recruit followers and consolidate their organizations.

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32. Beijing's residents supplied students with food and water and cheered them along. People who had motorcycles volunteered to provide the students with information about troop movements after martial law was declared. A private company not only financed the students but also provided them with advanced communications networks. See Tony Saich, "The Rise and Fall of the Beijing People's Movement," in Johathan Unger, ed., *The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), p. 31.

33. Saich, *supra* note 32; Josephine M. T. Khu, "Student Organization in the Movement," in Roger V. Des Forges, Ning Luo, and Yen-bo Wu., eds., *Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 161-75.

Since there are no legalized channels for opposition leaders to participate in political competition, access to political power is either through the "pecking order" within the communist parties or co-optation by the regimes. Ideologically committed dissidents have to face constant harassment in order to express their dissents. Quasi-autonomous pursuits in the cultural and economic arena may be tolerated by the regimes.[34] However, any sign of forming a political organization will be squelched immediately. Cumulative popular grievances occasionally disappear in the face of spontaneous rebellion activities, but seldom is the way paved to further organized movements without provoking the ire of the regimes. Only when the regimes lose their grip on their coercive power, due to an economic crisis or an intraparty power struggle, do opposition leaders have a chance to organize and generate leader's surplus.[35] Once the resource bases are consolidated, opposition leaders focus their strategies on the demand for the protection of political and civil rights and new and fair elections to redistribute political assets. When fair national elections were held for the first time in many years in Hungary, Poland, former East Germany and former Czechoslovakia, the communist regimes were voted out one by one. Suddenly, former political prisoners became presidents, cabinet ministers, and parliamentary representatives. Opposition movements reached their ultimate goals and their leaders received the highest rewards. However, whether the success of opposition movements in these countries can effectively deliver the collective goods they promised is still under test;[36] whether the newly recognized democratic rules of political competition can survive is still uncertain.

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34. See Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, *East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition, and Social Activism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 258.

35. For example, when the former Soviet Union faced enormous economic crisis, then President Gorbachev allowed informal political associations to be formed in the late 1980s. Later, these informal political associations evolved into many political parties to promote and encourage further political reform by the regime. See Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, *The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1993), *passim*.

36. Since the electoral victories of anti-communist parties and candidates in Poland, Hungary, and former Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1990, new governments formed by former opposition leaders have not produced the reforms they promised. As a result, new political parties formed by former communists won recent legislative elections in Poland and Hungary. The enduring influence of the ex-communists in the Eastern European countries makes the future of these countries uncertain. See John Pomfret, "Reform Wins; Dissidents Lose," *The Washington Post*, October 24, 1994, pp. A1, A14.

We do not know what influence, if any, the collapse of the Soviet empire had on individual communist regimes' breakdowns. At least, the vulnerability of the East European communist regimes reveals that the totalitarian regimes are not invincible and total control of citizens' lives is no longer tolerable at the end of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the relatively long reigns of the totalitarian regimes indicates the hard time which opposition movements have experienced. The current communist regimes in China, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea and Laos, still effectively control their countries with an iron fist, although they loosen economic control in different degrees. Based on arguments presented in this section, opposition movements still have a long way to go in these countries.

B. Autocratic Systems

Autocratic political systems, like totalitarian systems, are without basic political rights, civil liberties, and regular elections. Unlike totalitarian systems, there are no ideologies or mass parties to omnipotently dominate society. The ruling parties or dictators usually severely repress all opposition organizations. Meanwhile, coup d'états and political assassinations occur frequently. However, these mutinies often come from within the ruling regimes, not from opposition parties. Once a new dictator or a new monolithic party replaces the old one, usually the same cruel suppression used against opposition movements and their leaders takes place again. The expected value of leading an opposition movement in this political context is negative most of the time. P(W) is close to zero; C(O) and C(D) are very high; and B(O) is limited. Therefore, EV(O) is negative. For this reason, not a large number of opposition leaders emerge under these circumstances. Only when electoral competitions or prolonged underground operations are possible in an autocratic political system do self-interested and ambitious leaders run a profitable long-term opposition organization. In this section, I will examine opposition movements in various autocratic countries listed in Table 3.6.

Leaving aside communist countries in Table 3.6, we can divide the other countries into several subtypes: oil-rich monarchy or sheikdom, non-oil-rich monarchy, military regime, and civilian one-party regime.[37] Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and

37. Three countries in Table 3.6 cannot be assigned to any subtypes. Seychelles and Maldives are very small countries, and I do not have enough information to make an assessment of opposition movements in these two countries. Iran is the only clerical

United Arab Emirates are oil-rich monarchies or sheikdoms. Under a tribal system of consultation, the ruling royal families and tribal leaders of these countries have dominant power over their subjects. These countries have no popularly elected parliaments and do not permit political parties. On the one hand, they use highly coercive methods to suppress opposition; on the other, they provide their subjects with cradle to grave service, which is the world's most extravagant welfare.[38] Under these circumstances, P(W) is near zero and the value of B(O) can hardly offset that of both C(O) and C(D). Moreover, the opportunity cost of assuming the role of an opposition leader is very high because the rewards of taking other enterprises are much more lucrative in these oil rich countries. Thus, potential opposition leaders have very few incentives to emerge, and opposition movements in these countries would serve no purpose.[39]

Bhutan and Swaziland are non-oil-rich monarchies.[40] Traditional cultures and political systems still have deep roots in these two countries. Modern political organizations can hardly penetrate

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country in Table 3.6. Organized opposition organizations can hardly survive under the tight control of the Iranian clergymen. For instance, the Mojahedin, the best disciplined opposition organization, was severely cracked down upon by the ruling clerical party. See Haggay Ram, "Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 426-39. Over 9,000 Mojahedin members were executed in the four year period after June 1981. See *ibid.*, p. 1. The Iranian clerical regime also sent assassins to kill political dissidents living in Europe. See Rick Atkinson, "Killing of Iranian Dissenters: 'Bloody Trail Back to Tehran'," *The Washington Post*, November 21, 1993, pp. A1, A35.

38. In addition to the generous welfare services these countries provide, the 1988 GDP per capita of these countries ranged from US$5,311 (Saudi Arabia) to US$15,909 (Qatar), among the highest in the developing countries. See *The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics* (London: The Economist Books Ltd. 1990), p. 35.

39. Among these countries, Saudi Arabia is facing a financial crisis. See Clay Chandler, "Desert Shock: Saudis Are Cash-Poor," *The Washington Post*, October 28, 1994, pp. A1, A30. The potential for a volatile change is high if Saudi Arabia cannot use its flat oil revenue to offset the costs of military expenses and welfare services.

40. Actually, these two countries are very poor. The 1988 GNP per capita of Bhutan was US$199 and the 1989 GNP per capita of Swaziland was US$750. Three countries on the "List of Near-Quasi-Democratic Countries" in Table 3.5 are also non-oil-rich monarchies: Jordan, Morocco, and Nepal. These three countries have gradually incorporated regularly held elections into their political systems, a practice that distinguishes them from autocratic countries.

these two countries,[41] where opposition movements seem to play no role.[42]

Among the military regimes, Libya, Iraq, and Syria are ruled by long-time military dictators. These leaders have repressed opposition movements relentlessly in their countries. The most notorious example was the destruction of Hama, the stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in 1982.[43] In that bloody confrontation, a large proportion of the city was reduced to rubble and around 10,000 to 25,000 people were killed.[44] Opposition movements in these countries, like those in totalitarian systems, have little chance of surviving.[45]

Intermittent military rule has existed in the following countries: Mauritania, Burma, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cambodia, Burundi, Haiti, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria.[46] The common denominator in these countries is frequent military coup d'états.[47] The majority of these military leaders plundered their countries and enriched themselves;[48] very few others played a

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41. The major threat to Bhutan's monarchy comes from the Nepalese minority living in Bhutan. See John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, " 'Ethnic Cleansing' Charges Echo in Himalayan Bhutan," *The Washington Post*, April 4, 1994, pp. A1, A14. An illegal political party, the People's United Democratic Movement, tried to activate itself in Swaziland, but more than a dozen of its members were arrested and faced possible treason charges. See Norman Sowerby, "Multi-Partyism Hits Swaziland," *New African*, August 1990, p. 18.

42. Very little information about opposition movements in these two countries is available.

43. See Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989), pp. 76-105; Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982," *Orient*, Vol. 24 (December 1983), pp. 604-08.

44. Friedman, *supra* note 43, p. 77.

45. The Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq supported by Iran on and off was suppressed by the Iraqi regime in 1988. After the Gulf War, the Shiites rebellions in southern Iraq were also suppressed by Saddam Hussein.

46. Several countries in Table 3.7 were also under intermittent military rule before they held relatively fair elections by 1992: Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Lesotho, Madagascar, Benin, Congo, Uganda, Mali, Suriname, Chile, Paraguay, and Panama. Seven countries in Table 3.5 were also under intermittent military rule before they began to hold elections regularly a decade ago: Bangladesh, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Peru.

47. All of these countries have experienced at least one military coup d'état.

48. For example, Equatorial Guinea's President Teodoro Obiang Nguema used Annobon island as a dumping ground for toxic waste in exchange for US$1.6 million from a U.S. corporation. The waste caused the sudden disease that struck the island's crops. As a result, people on the island were dying of starvation. See Francois Misser, "Annobon: Starvation Island," *New African*, February 1994, p. 17. Zaire's President

benign authoritarian role in seeing to the welfare of their citizens.[49] Some were not willing to hand over power to civilians,[50] and others retreated to the barracks and let civilian governments take charge.[51]

In general, there seems to be no way to predict the direction which each autocratic country will take. Nor are there rules to determine how a military-ruled country makes and consolidates a successful democratic transition. A military-ruled country may, for instance, suddenly hold a relatively free and fair election and become an "uncategorized country," to be listed in Table 3.7 and subject to further examination. By the same token, a former military-ruled country which was on the list of "uncategorized countries," due to its relatively free and fair electoral practice over the past few years, may suddenly experience a military coup and again become one of the least democratic countries, as those listed in Table 3.6.[52] As a result, political environments in military-ruled countries are very volatile for opposition leaders. Opposition leaders' chances of organizing an opposition movement are slim when facing determined dictators who can eliminate their competitors by force. However, when some internal or external conditions, as discussed

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Mobutu Sese Seko had estimated assets of US$5 billion coming from Zaire's diamond trade, while most Zairians were extremely poor. See Cindy Shiner, "Mobutu Ascendant," *Africa Report*, Vol. 39 (May/June 1994), p. 44.

49. For example, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni has brought Uganda back to a relatively peaceful and orderly country after two decades of dictatorship of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. See Bill Berkeley, "An African Success Story?" *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 274 (September 1994), pp. 22-30.

50. For instance, Nigeria's military leaders failed to hand over power to a civilian government as they promised by 1993. See Paul Adams, "Legacy of the General," *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (September/October 1993), pp. 67-69.

51. For example, Mali's military coup leaders, who overthrew a corruptive regime in 1991, retreated and allowed the democratic process to take its turn in 1992. See Richard Vengroff, "Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political Parties and the Party System in Mali," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31 (December 1993), pp. 541-62.

52. For instance, Lesotho had been under intermittent military rule since its independence in 1966. It held a free and fair election in March 1993. The largest opposition party, the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), won the election and all the parliamentary seats. See "Lesotho: Clean Sweep," *New African*, June 1993, p. 15. Ntsu Mokhehle, the BCP leader, was sworn in as Prime Minister. Thus, the democratic election made Lesotho move from the list of least democratic countries, in Table 3.6, to the list of uncategorized countries, in Table 3.7. However, a mutiny occurred in April 1994; four cabinet ministers were kidnapped, and the deputy prime minister, killed. Then, Parliament was dissolved in August 1994 and Lesotho was controlled by the military once again. See Paul Taylor, "Lesotho's Parliament Dissolved," *The Washington Post*, August 18, 1994, p. A25. As a result, Lesotho moves back to my list of least democratic countries.

in Section IV of Chapter 2, are ready for exploitation, potential opposition leaders still have plenty of incentives to emerge, even in autocratic countries. I will further examine the opportunities for their emergence after taking a brief look at civilian one-party regimes.

Civilian one-party states include Tunisia, Algeria (ruled by the military now), Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya, and Cameroon.[53] All of the ruling parties in these countries were the founding parties that led their respective countries to independence, except in Cameroon.[54] Many other African nations were one-party states at one time or another.[55] However, only the ruling parties in the above-mentioned countries survived for more than two decades. Opposition movements in these civilian one-party countries faced hard times because the entrenched ruling parties used hegemonic power and coercive force to restrict their development.[56] Even so, opposition leaders in such countries have a chance of overcoming the political competition when certain internal or external conditions become advantageous to them.

The most common opportunity that potential opposition leaders have to emerge in both military-ruled countries and civilian one-

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53. Several countries in Table 3.7 were civilian one-party states before they held democratic elections. These include: Zambia, Cape Verde, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, and Côte d'Ivoire (one-party dominant).

54. The ruling party in Tunisia is the Destourian Socialist Party (later changed to Democratic Constitutional Assembly Party). It was the only legal party from 1963 to 1981. The Malawi Congress Party (formed in 1959) had been Malawi's ruling party until May 1994. The Kenya African National Union (KANU, formed in 1960) has been Kenya's ruling party since its independence in 1963. The Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (a union of the Tanganyika African National Union and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party) has been Tanzania's sole party. Before the military coup in January 1992, the National Liberation Front (FLN) had been Algeria's ruling party. Actually, the military factor has always played a significant role in the FLN. The Cameroon National Union, formed in 1966 after the independence of Cameroon, has been Cameroon's ruling party since then.

55. Of the various rationales behind the declaration of one-party rule in many African countries, the main reason is that it can reduce ethnic and communal conflicts. See S. E. Finer, "The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 2 (July-October 1967), pp. 491-509. Usually, ethnic and communal sentiments are manipulated by opposition leaders who represent ethnic and communal interests.

56. William J. Foltz gives other reasons to explain why the ruling parties in many African countries can eliminate all formal opposition. See William J. Foltz, "Political Opposition in Single-Party States of Tropical Africa," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 151-54.

party countries is to participate in elections.[57] Relatively free elections may be available in autocratic systems if: debt-ridden countries' donors or creditors demand multipartyism and elections;[58] the ruling regimes weaken because of aging, long-time dictators; harsh economic conditions bring about civilian uprisings;[59] or, coup leaders intend to use elections to legitimize their regimes.[60] Once opposition parties are allowed to be formed and popular elections are available, opposition leaders will have a better chance of increasing the value of B(O)[61] or even winning the elections. For this reason, many new opposition parties suddenly emerged and prominent exiled leaders rushed back to participate in new elections.[62]

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57. Tom Young criticizes Western countries' obsession with bringing electoral politics to African countries. See Tom Young, "Elections and Electoral Politics in Africa," *Africa*, Vol. 63 (1993), No. 3, pp. 299-312. Young is skeptical about the effective application of multi-party elections to multi-racial and multi-tribal African countries. However, in this book, disregarding the normative meanings of elections, I argue that electoral politics is crucial for the emergence of opposition movements and their leaders.

58. In the early 1990s, the pressure that these autocratic regimes felt from creditors and donors, mainly ex-colonial powers, to open up their politics was tremendous. Most African countries were experiencing an economic crisis and had huge foreign debts. Twenty of African's fifty-one countries have debts in excess of their total Gross National Product. See Guy Arnold, "Crippling Debt Problems," *New African*, November 1993, p. 25.

59. For example, a series of food riots in 1988 made Algeria's ruling party, FLN, loosen its control and hold the first free municipal election in 1990, and the first free parliamentary election in 1991. See John L. Esposito, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace," *Current History*, January 1994, p. 21; John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45 (Summer 1991), p. 432. Also, the 1990 food riots in Zambia led senile leader Kenneth Kaunda to allow the formation of opposition parties and to hold general elections in 1991.

60. Whether the ruling regimes are pressured or not, they have to weigh the costs and benefits of holding multi-party elections. They usually believe that they still have a better chance of winning both presidential and parliamentary elections because of their incumbent advantages. Also, they can manipulate election outcomes to their benefit as they deem necessary.

61. Once opposition leaders are allowed to conduct electoral campaigns, they can mobilize tangible and intangible resources which were previously inaccessible. For instance, they can legally request donations from the general public for election purpose.

62. For instance, in 1990, immediately after President El Hadj Omar Bongo's announcement that he would allow the formation of opposition parties and hold a multiparty election for a new National Assembly, Gabon's opposition leaders emerged to form new political parties and the most famous exiled leader, Mba Abessole, flew back from Paris to revive his own political party. See James F. Barnes, "Adieu, Système Bongo?" *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (November/December 1993), pp. 66-69.

Generally, the incumbent "leader's surplus" is very high in many autocratic countries,[63] which is why many military coups occurred in such countries. That also explains why incumbent leaders and their parties have every incentive to manipulate the elections to increase their odds of victory once they are compelled, whether by internal or external pressures, to hold multi-party elections. As a consequence, election outcomes may or may not be recognized by the ruling regimes. Also, since different electoral systems or regulations offer different degrees of opportunity for opposition candidates, opposition leaders must cope with these uncertainties and pursue their best interests accordingly.

When elections are relatively fair and opposition candidates win the elections by surprise, there are several possible responses from ruling regimes. First, they may admit defeat and let the opposition leaders assume control of the government, as in Zambia.[64] Second, they may nullify the election outcomes and claim a state of emergency, as occurred in Nigeria.[65] Third, while the incumbent president accepts the loss and gives up power, some faction in the government, such as military officers, may launch a military coup and overthrow the elected civilian government, as was the case in Burundi.[66]

Even though they have considerably less mobilized resources than the ruling party, opposition leaders believe that the first multiparty elections after a long period of dictatorship hold some hope of winning the elections, as long as the elections are relatively free

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63. This is especially true in many African countries. The incumbent leaders have access to state coffers and many other resources (like oil or diamond mining revenue), while the majority of the people live very poorly.

64. When opposition leader Frederick Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) defeated incumbent President Kenneth Kaunda and the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia's 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections, Kaunda accepted the outcome and ended a 27-year rule by the UNIP. See Margaret A. Novicki, "A Lesson in Democracy," *Africa Report*, Vol. 37 (January/February 1992), pp. 13-17. Cape Verde, Comoros, and Malawi are further examples in which the long-time ruling parties accepted electoral defeat and turned power over to the victorious opposition parties.

65. In June 1993, in Nigeria's first democratic presidential election in more than a decade, opposition candidate Moshood Abiola apparently won the election, but the military government nullified the results. See Paul Adams, "The Deepening Stalemate," *Africa Report*, Vol. 39 (July/August 1994), pp. 62-64. Algeria is another example in which the government canceled the election results.

66. When incumbent President Pierre Buyoya was defeated by opposition candidate Melchior Ndadaye in the 1993 presidential election, he accepted the defeat. However, a few months later, the new president was murdered in a military coup.

and fair.[67] Therefore, opposition leaders will usually participate in the new elections. If they win the elections and are lucky enough to take power, they receive their ultimate rewards. If they win the elections but are denied their victories, they may have different reactions depending on how a regime reacts. If the regime suspends future elections and suppresses all opposition activities, then opposition leaders are thrown back to square one. Under such circumstances, opposition leaders may: accept the setback and retire from the scene; vigorously mobilize protests against the annulment of election outcomes; or, resort to violent clandestine operations. Once the electoral opportunity is taken away, no matter which reaction opposition leaders may take, the expected value of leading an opposition movement, EV(O), reverts to negative again. Under such circumstances, there is little incentive for potential opposition leaders to emerge or to continue to fight.

If a regime only nullifies the presidential election outcome but continues to hold parliamentary elections, then opposition leaders will have to decide whether or not to participate.[68] Usually intraparty conflicts arise because some of the opposition leaders insist on boycotting the elections, while others want to run in the elections.[69] For those who decide to run, if they win some parliamen-

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67. I temporarily discount the ethnic factor in opposition leaders' calculations. For these opposition leaders, P(W) has a high value. Their reasoning lies in their belief that the general public has been fed up with the long-time human rights abuses, corruption, and poor economic performance of the repressive ruling regimes. Also, they believe opposition causes stand on a higher moral plane than that of the ruling parties. Therefore, they believe voters will use their votes to throw the rascals out of the government and elect opposition candidates.

68. Usually, ruling regimes are more likely to commit fraud in presidential elections than in parliamentary elections because the stakes in the presidency are far too high for the incumbent leaders to give up, while parliaments do not have real power in autocratic countries. For instance, the ruling regimes in Cameroon, Togo, Gabon, Kenya, and Ghana were accused of practicing electoral fraud in their presidential elections, which the incumbent leaders won unfairly. When the incumbent president wins the elections fraudulently, opposition leaders have to decide whether their parties and candidates should run for parliamentary elections.

69. Since regularly held elections have never become the norm in these autocratic countries and military coups can strike unpredictably, opposition leaders who insist on boycotting the elections do not believe in the fairness of the new elections and are inclined to take an uncompromising approach in dealing with the ruling regimes. If these opposition leaders have the ability to mobilize large-scale and prolonged mass demonstrations, they may have a good shot of forcing further concessions from the ruling regimes. Otherwise, these opposition leaders will be crushed easily. The possibility of boycotts means that opposition leaders are prone to split. For instance, in Ghana, four opposition parties boycotted the 1993 parliamentary election. Opposition

tary seats, they will have a better chance of expanding B(O). Of course, some of them may easily be co-opted by the ruling regimes for personal gain.[70]

In order to keep their advantages in elections, the ruling regimes either design electoral systems tilted in their favor or openly rig the elections. Among the designed electoral systems, some prevent opposition parties from winning any seat even though they may win a certain percentage of votes (*e.g.*, Tunisia);[71] some forbid partisan candidates, but allow independent candidates, to run for elections (*e.g.*, Uganda);[72] and, others only allow ruling party candidates to run in elections (*e.g.*, Tanzania).[73]

In an electoral system which prevents opposition candidates from translating their votes into electoral seats, the accumulated frustrations of opposition parties and their leaders may eventually erupt at the cost of societal stability. In an electoral system which only allows independent candidates to run for elections, opposition leaders still have a good chance of winning parliamentary seats for themselves as long as the elections are relatively free and fair. Finally, in an electoral system which only allows ruling party candi-

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leaders held different opinions regarding the boycott issue. See Ruby Ofori, "The Elections Controversy," *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (July/August 1993), pp. 33-35.

70. Usually, opposition leaders who ignore the boycott call and run for parliamentary elections reap the largest benefits. For instance, Togo's prominent opposition leader, Gilchrist Olympio, and his party, the Union of Forces for Changes (UFC), boycotted the 1993 presidential election and the 1994 legislative elections because Olympio was not allowed to participate in the presidential election. However, other opposition groups participated in the parliamentary elections and one opposition leader, Edem Kodjo, was chosen as the country's Prime Minister in 1994. See Peter Da Costa, "The Dictator's Duet," *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (November/December 1993), pp. 61-65; Ebow Godwin, "Eyadema on Top," *New African*, October 1993, pp. 35-36.

71. Tunisia's winner-take-all electoral system prevents opposition candidates from translating their votes into parliamentary seats. In the 1989 parliamentary election, the candidates of the Islamic group won 14.5 percent of the votes nationwide, but they failed to gain any seat in parliament. See Esposito and Piscatori, *supra* note 59, p. 431.

72. In Uganda's election of delegates to the constituent assembly in March 1994, only non-partisan candidates were allowed to run. The government claimed that political parties in the past have helped exacerbate ethnic and religious conflicts, and "no-party movement" was a method to prevent the same tragedy from happening again. See Catharine Watson, "No to Multi-Party," *Africa Report*, Vol. 39 (May/June 1994), pp. 24-26.

73. Although only candidates from the ruling party (the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania) were allowed to run for elections in Tanzania, the ruling party always had two candidates for every electoral seat in the legislature. See Joel Samoff, "Single-Party Competitive Elections in Tanzania," in Fred M. Hayward, ed., *Elections in Independent Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 149-86.

dates to participate in elections, opposition leaders are apt to be co-opted by the ruling regimes and become part of the ruling coalition.

In summary, irregularly held elections are the norm rather than the exception in autocratic political systems. Military coups have taken place more often than elections. One or two free and fair elections do not guarantee a stable electoral competition in the future.[74] Furthermore, many autocratic regimes are forced to hold elections because of internal or external pressures. They do not intend to make elections a regular practice, nor do they want to lose their power through elections. Therefore, they use various methods to manipulate elections to their advantage. Nonetheless, once electoral opportunities are open to opposition leaders, they have incentives to emerge because the expected value of leading an opposition movement, EV(O), may become positive. The new electoral opportunities change the values of P(W), C(D), C(O), and B(O). Once the ruling regimes allow popular elections, B(O) may offset C(D) and C(O). Moreover, opposition leaders may believe that they have a high probability of winning the political contest [P(W)] if the elections are free and fair. Even though they do not know how long the newly-created electoral politics will last, how the ruling regime will deal with the election outcomes, or when a military coups may strike, opposition leaders will emerge in many autocratic countries and risk the new electoral opportunity.

Another opportunity for opposition leaders to take in leading an opposition movement in autocratic political systems, other than participating in elections, is in carrying out prolonged underground operations. After a long-term coercive underground organization is securely formed, B(O) increases significantly because, through the coercive organization, opposition leaders can amass profits through taxation and extortion in the territories they control or occupy. At the same time, both C(O) and C(D) decrease and P(W) increases. Thus, since EV(O) is no longer negative, it becomes worthwhile for potential opposition leaders to emerge.

Prolonged underground operations include guerilla warfare and other "illegal" activities. In terms of guerrilla warfare, there are several factors necessary for it to survive: (1) geographical factor (having mountain areas to hide, border nations' support and tolerance); (2) foreign factor (being offered financial and military

74. Sierra Leone is a good example. It had fair and free elections in 1962 and 1967, but has had no democratic elections ever since. See Fred M. Hayward and Jimmy D. Kandeh, "Perspectives on Twenty-Five Years of Elections in Sierra Leone," in Hayward, *supra* note 73, pp. 53-54.

assistance by foreign countries, especially a super power, openly or clandestinely); and, (3) a governmental factor (having a ruling regime that cannot effectively suppress the insurgency).

Guerrilla organizations, such as the Sandinista Front and the Contra in Nicaragua[75] and the Shining Path in Peru,[76] used selective incentives to obtain cooperation from the people in their controlled territories. Although these guerilla organizations provided services to those people who supported them, they also used intimidation and terrorism to tax and coerce local people. For example, under the Somoza regime, Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) used a small part of neighboring Honduran and Costa Rican territories as the bases of its clandestine organization to launch guerrilla warfare against the government.[77] During the process, the Sandinistas established alliances with many moderate opposition groups within Nicaragua and gained financial support from many rich Nicaraguan businessmen. Even the governments of Venezuela and Panama offered help to the Sandinistas.[78] Most of the core members of the Sandinistas eventually filled in key positions in the Sandinista government after the toppling of the Somoza regime.[79]

Another guerrilla operation is the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which fought against the dictator Samuel K. Doe and became one of Liberia's major guerrilla groups in 1989. Doe's regime was too corrupt to deliver basic collective goods. Charles Taylor, an exile turned opposition leader, seized the chance and exploited the genocidal rage of the tribes which Doe had suppressed. Taylor's operation began with 150 insurgents trained in Libya and eventually expanded into a formidable force to oppose Doe's re-

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75. Shirley Christian gives a detailed description of the organizations and activities of the Sandinista and the Contra. See Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1986), *passim*.

76. The Communist Party of Peru (the Shining Path) with about 5,000 armed fighters, using intimidation and terrorism, successfully built up one of the most powerful insurgent guerrilla forces in South America. See Eugene Robinson, "Peruvian Guerrilla Group Launches Urban 'Final Campaign'," *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1992, pp. A1, A16; James Brooke, "In a Peru Shantytown, Terror Reigns," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1992, p. A5.

77. Christian, *supra* note 75.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

79. Ironically, the anti-Sandinistas guerilla organization, la Contra, also used neighboring Honduran and Costa Rican territories to safeguard its guerrilla operations. The Contra received financial aid from the United States and used selective incentives, like a piece of land, to draw support from peasants in the northern mountain areas. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

gime. Taylor's NPFL gradually became a lucrative enterprise, receiving profits from the sale of positively valued private goods to potential buyers. For example, foreign investors had paid Taylor millions in "taxes" for the right to exploit Liberia's natural resources.[80] Taylor did not pay his NPFL fighters, but he allowed them to use their guns to obtain material goods. Accordingly, for Taylor and his NPFL, the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [B(O)] are very high and the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [C(O)] are very low. Even without total political victory, Taylor's NPFL is highly profitable.

Of all the guerrilla operations, the Shining Path of Peru (Sendero Luminoso, or the Communist Party of Peru) may best illustrate entrepreneurial leadership in leading a successful opposition movement. Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso[81] and his partners all came from outside Ayacucho, the birthplace of the Shining Path. Ayacucho, a poor and isolated region where Peru's underprivileged Indians dwell, has been ignored by the government for a long time. This region's geographical terrain is also favorable to guerrilla operations.[82] Guzmán and other Sendero leaders used the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga where they were professors to form and develop their original organization during the military control of the Peruvian government in the 1960s.[83] Their major recruits were university students who were frustrated in their attempts to improve their socioeconomic status through education.[84] The Shining Path launched a series of skirmishes and terrorist movements in 1980 when Peru held its first presidential election in seventeen years.[85] The rapid expansion of the legal Marxist parties in the late 1970s had threatened the resource base of the Shining Path. Also, Sendero leaders knew that they could

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80. Bill Berkeley, "Liberia: Between Repression and Slaughter," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 270 (December 1989), p. 60.

81. Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, who called himself Resident Gonzalo, is a mestizo.

82. Michael L. Smith, "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes," in David Scott Palmer, ed., *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 17.

83. Carlos Iván Degregori, "The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, pp. 34-35.

84. Smith, *supra* note 82, p. 27.

85. Degregori, *supra* note 83, p. 33. Sendero guerrillas received their guerrilla training in China.

not gain political power through elections.[86] Therefore, when electoral politics became available to legal opposition parties, it was in Sendero leaders' interest to sabotage elections and formally launch their armed struggle in pursuing political power.[87]

The question remains, though, as to how the Shining Path expanded its guerrilla organization to become a formidable force in Peruvian society. First, Sendero leaders fully understood and exploited the community structure, peasants' preferences, local authority networks, and geographic traits in the rural areas they controlled or penetrated.[88] With all this valuable information, Sendero leaders designed their strategies to take power from the local community leaders, set up Sendero grass-roots organizations, and coordinate popular support networks.[89] Second, they used all four methods of collecting resources described in Chapter 2 to amass money, labor, time and other valuable resources from peasants and local residents. They used ideology, kinship, peer pressure, and other relationships to recruit cadres from university student populations and rank and file from the peasants and local Indians.[90] They provided services to local peasants in exchange for their support. For instance, Sendero leaders used force or a threat

86. On the one hand, the Shining Path was an illegal organization and its members were not allowed to run for elections. On the other hand, even if the party was allowed to participate in elections, it could not overtake the legal Marxist parties in winning electoral support.

87. Sendero leaders' refusal to lay down their weapons and participate in elections indicates that when organizing guerrilla warfare yields more benefits than running for elections opposition leaders will not hesitate to choose the former. Similarly, when Jonas Savimbi, the guerrilla leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), lost the 1992 presidential election which was arranged by the United Nations to end the long-time civil war, he refused to accept his defeat and continued to launch guerrilla operations. See Vicki R. Finkel, "Savimbi's Sour Grapes," *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (January/February 1993), pp. 25-28. Since Savimbi had run a lucrative guerrilla organization by controlling the diamond fields and trade in the territories his UNITA occupied, he had no incentive to accept his electoral defeat. See Vito Echevarria and Alan Rake, "Scramble for Africa's Diamonds," *New African*, November 1993, p. 24.

88. Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten, "The Center's Multiple Failures," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, p. 47.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-49.

90. Smith, *supra* note 82, pp. 26-27. Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano gives a detailed description of the organization of the Shining Path. See Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, "The Organization of Shining Path," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, pp. 171-90. In addition to its domestic organizations, Sendero also had overseas support groups in France, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. Through these overseas organizations, Sendero requested contributions from its international sympathizers. See *ibid.*, pp. 174, 188.

of force to take land from landholders and then redistributed it to the poor landless peasants.[91] They also gained popular support by punishing corrupt local officials and killing cattle thieves whom local peasants hated the most.[92] In addition to using positive selective incentives to gain popular cooperation, Sendero leaders never hesitated using selective terror to coerce cooperation from the peasants. For instance, they killed informers ruthlessly to deter other potential informers.[93] Sendero leaders also levied "taxes" on individual peasants and extorted money from local communities. Since 1987, Sendero leaders had steady annual revenue of US$20 to US$100 million by controlling coca trafficking in the Upper Huallaga valley.[94] With such large financial revenues, Sendero leaders distributed resources to recruit new members and finance various kinds of guerrilla operations. Finally, the Shining Path expanded its operations to urban areas, intending to garner support from the working class.[95] Its major competitors were organizations of the legal Marxist political parties and shantytown communities. Leaders of these organizations became Sendero's targets of assassinations.[96] In order to undermine electoral politics which blossomed after 1980, the Shining Path sabotaged polling offices, assassinated candidates, and discouraged local voters from going to the polls.[97]

In summary, since Sendero leaders could secure their guerrilla organization in Ayacucho, C(D) and C(O) were limited. Through their calculated strategies and coercive organization, Sendero leaders had no problem of collecting resources in the insurgent areas. "Revolutionary taxes" on coca trafficking constituted the largest proportion of the B(O) and consolidated the financial base of the Shining Path. Since "leader's surplus" generated from running the

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91. Smith, *supra* note 82, p. 23.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 25; de Wit and Gianotten, *supra* note 88, p. 54.

93. Smith, *supra* note 82, p. 24; Ronald H. Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, pp. 92-93.

94. Smith, *supra* note 82, p. 16; José E. Gonzales, "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, pp. 105-25.

95. Michael L. Smith, "Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, pp. 127-47.

96. Tarazona-Sevillano, *supra* note 90, p. 186; Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton, "Shining Path and the Marxist Left," in Palmer, *supra* note 82, pp. 207-24; Robinson, *supra* note 76; Brooke, *supra* note 76.

97. In many of the areas where the Shining Path exerted influence, null votes and abstentions were significantly high because many voters were afraid of going to the polls. See Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton, *supra* note 96, pp. 218-20. In some cases, Sendero guerrillas cut off the fingers of those peasants who went to vote. See Smith, *supra* note 82, p. 25; Tarazona-Sevillano, *supra* note 90, p. 186.

Shining Path is high, we can predict the continuing operation of this guerrilla organization even though Peru has practiced electoral politics since 1980.[98]

In addition to guerrilla warfare, other "illegal" activities are currently taking place in some autocratic countries. One very formidable underground operation was led by the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and its splintered militant factions in Algeria. Algeria had been a one-party state under the control of the National Liberation Front (FLN) since its independence from France in 1962. The ruling FLN loosened its control and introduced a multi-party system after a series of bloody anti-government riots protesting food shortages in 1988.[99] As a result, the Islamic Salvation Front was formed and gained legal status in 1989. The FIS candidates won the majority of votes in the June 1990 municipal election, the first multi-party election held since 1962.[100] Stunned by the election outcomes, the FLN government passed a bill to gerrymander the electoral districts to achieve rural overrepresentation in FLN's favor in the coming parliamentary election.[101] Accordingly, the FIS mobilized demonstrations to challenge the new redistricting law. When the radical wing of the FIS continued to riot in the streets, the government declared martial law and postponed the scheduled parliamentary elections.[102] Under pressure, however, the FLN government soon lifted martial law and held the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991. The FIS gained another stunning electoral victory and prepared to take control of the National Assembly after the symbolic second round of

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98. The arrest of Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, the head of the Shining Path, indicates that the risk still exists in leading an effective opposition guerrilla force. See James Brooke, "Fugitive Leaders of Maoist Rebels Is Captured by the Police in Peru," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1992, pp. A1, A8. However, the main organization of the Shining Path still remained intact and new leaders replaced the arrested core members. See Nathaniel C. Nash, "Blow to Rebels in Peru: An Elusive Aura Is Lost," *The New York Times*, September 14, 1992, p. A8.

99. Esposito and Piscatori, *supra* note 59, p.432.

100. The FIS captured 54 percent of the votes and controlled 850 of the 1500 municipalities. It also captured two-thirds of the provincial assemblies. See Robert Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45 (Autumn 1991), p. 584.

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 587-89.

102. Internal rifts occurred within the FIS. The radical wing of the FIS preferred insurgency to compromise after martial law was declared, while the moderate wing wanted to stop insurgency in exchange for the government's promise to hold parliamentary elections soon. *Ibid.*, p. 591.

voting scheduled in January 1992.[103] Fearing the disastrous consequences of an Islamic fundamentalist government, the military quickly intervened in January 1992. It dissolved the ruling FLN, outlawed the FIS, arrested FIS's leaders and supporters, and seized FIS's assets.[104] Consequently, the outlawed FIS went underground and many new militant Islamic groups came into existence.

In addition to examining how the FIS emerged, it is important to look at how the FIS became the strongest opposition party in Algeria within a short period of time and how the underground FIS and its splintered militant factions survived and became a formidable threat to the military government. During the 1980s when Algeria's economic and social conditions deteriorated, Islamic organizations gained increasing support from young people and rural-urban migrants.[105] In order to avoid government regulation, Islamic leaders used makeshift buildings to set up "free mosques" to preach social justice promised by an Islamic state.[106] Through these mosque organizations, Islamic leaders established a network of social services to many poor people. For instance, they set up medical clinics in the poorest neighborhoods of big cities and brought aid to earthquake victims before the government's relief workers did.[107] These mosque organizations later became the backbone of the FIS. Based on the effective network of social services provided by mosques, the FIS could mobilize the largest bloc of supporters in elections.[108]

In summary, Islamic opposition leaders successfully used "free mosques" to avoid a government crackdown. Once the mosque organizations were well established, Islamic leaders could effectively increase the value of B(O) by generating revenue from donations and positive private goods exchanges. Also, for these Islamic leaders, the benefits of winning the political contest [B(W)] were large

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103. In the first round of parliamentary election in December 1991, the FIS won 188 seats, while the ruling FLN won only 16 seats. See Alfred Hermida, "Democracy Derailed," *Africa Report*, Vol. 37 (March/April 1992), p. 14.

104. Esposito, *supra* note 59, p. 21.

105. Mortimer, *supra* note 100, p. 577. The contemporary Islamic movement had deep roots in Algeria. Islamic identity played an important role under French colonization. See *ibid.*, p. 575.

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 577-78.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 579.

108. The FIS also mobilized the largest number of observers at the polling places to prevent electoral fraud by the government. *Ibid.*, p. 585. Besides, the FIS also intimidated voters by warning them that to vote against the FIS was to vote against Allah. See Hermida, *supra* note 103, p. 15.

because the ideal of establishing an Islamic state was at stake. Furthermore, Islamic leaders truly believed that their probability of winning the political contest [P(W)] was high because they knew Algerians were tired of 30 years of the FLN's authoritarian rule.[109]

On the one hand, the FIS's success demonstrates the entrepreneurial leadership of the Islamic leaders in leading an effective opposition movement in an autocratic country. On the other hand, the eventual crackdown of the FIS by the military forces confirms my view that, in autocratic systems, military intervention is unpredictable in blocking opposition movements; thus, opposition leaders have to deal with a more volatile environment.

After the military crackdown, while many of the FIS's key leaders were put in jail, some remaining FIS leaders formed the underground Armed Islamic Movement. Soon afterwards, a more militant group, the Armed Islamic Group, was splintered from the Armed Islamic Movement. The Armed Islamic Group was led by Algerian fundamentalists who fought with the mujahedeen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.[110] The major recruits of these militant groups were unemployed young people and deserters from the army.[111] Using Islamic doctrine as a strong appeal to organize an army of fearless assassins, the Armed Islamic Group began a series of terrorist activities. Police, government officials, intellectuals, and writers who opposed the Islamic movement, and foreigners, were targets of assassinations.[112]

Although the FIS's previous network of mosques was dismantled by the military government, many FIS supporters still offered

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109. For instance, a few days before the December 1991 parliamentary election, one of the leaders of the FIS, Abdelkader Hachani, predicted that his party would get 70 percent of the votes despite the government's new redistricting law. See Hermida, *supra* note 103, p. 14. Many journalists did not believe his prediction, but it turned out to be true.

110. Alfred Hermida, "The Battle of Algiers," *Africa Report*, Vol. 39 (January/February 1994), p. 44.

111. According to one report, as many as 8,000 soldiers who deserted from the army took their weapons with them to join militant Islamic groups in the mountainous interior. See Chris Hedges, "Islamic Rebels Gain in Fight Against Army Rule in Algeria," *The New York Times*, January 24, 1994, p. A1.

112. By September 1994, the Armed Islamic group had claimed 59 foreign lives. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Under Pressure, Algeria Moves Militants from Jail to House Arrest," *The New York Times*, September 15, 1994, p. A12. Many foreigners play a critical role in Algeria's oil and gas industry which generates the government's major income. The Islamic militants' reason for killing foreigners was to scare them away in order to jeopardize the government's major source of income. See Hermida, *supra* note 110, p. 43.

hideouts for Islamic militants. In addition to the small enclaves which the Islamic militants controlled in the cities, the mountainous interior in Algeria also provided a safe haven for militant Islamic groups. These militant Islamic groups received money and weapons from Algerian expatriates in France.[113] With weapons in hand, many young Islamic militants roamed the country, destroyed and shut down hundreds of schools and factories, attacked civilians, and held up banks.[114] Although the military government relentlessly suppressed Islamic militants, it could not handle so many mobile attacks by these urban guerrillas.[115] Besides, the government lost its popular support by nullifying the election gains won by the FIS. Since neither the military government nor the Islamic militants could decisively defeat one another, Algeria has gradually disintegrated into chaos. Therefore, Islamic leaders of the outlawed FIS and its splintered militant groups could still secure their underground organizations and collect resources to finance their terrorist activities. Actually, many new insurgent leaders emerged to supplant the old leadership of the FIS because they believed that the military government was on the brink of collapse, their probability of winning the final political contest was high, and their goal of an Islamic state was reachable.[116]

The case of Algeria's opposition movement also indicates that the FLN government, because of its three decades of one-party rule, did not have experience in handling competitive elections and coping with the stunning election results.[117] The government realized that it would lose power to the FIS as indicated in the election outcome; it thus chose to nullify the election results and outlaw the FIS. When the FIS was stripped of its electoral victory and de-

113. Ibrahim, *supra* note 112.

114. *Ibid.*

115. Under the sponsorship of the military government, some anti-fundamentalist groups, such as the Association of Young Free Algerians, took terrorist action against the sympathizers and relatives of the Islamic militants. See Hedges, *supra* note 111.

116. Some FIS leaders indicated that they had lost control of the insurrection conducted by the new emerging militant groups. *Ibid.* Many Islamic moderates in the FIS became the victims of both the militant Islamic factions and anti-fundamentalist groups.

117. The FLN government not only underestimated the popular support of the FIS, but also overestimated its own ability to win the municipal elections in 1990. The government was so confident that it designed an electoral system which awarded 51 percent of the municipal council seats to whichever party received the largest number of votes. See Esposito and Piscatori, *supra* note 59, p. 432. When the FIS's electoral victory turned out to be a landslide, the FLN government panicked.

prived of a legal means of opposition, it was only natural for its leaders to resort to violent underground operations.

At this point, one may ask why a similar chaotic situation did not arise in Egypt, a country also troubled by terrorist attacks from the militant faction of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Egypt has been under military rule, it has held consecutive free elections since 1984.[118] Even though the Muslim Brotherhood was not allowed to participate in the elections, its members could run as independents or as candidates of other legal political parties.[119] When these Brotherhood members won electoral seats, the Egyptian government allowed them to take office. Therefore, there exists in Egypt a legal forum for opposition leaders to pursue their political ambitions. As a result, the militant faction of the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a similar mandate as did Algeria's militant Islamic groups. Obviously, regularly held elections in Egypt made a difference in lessening the impact of the militant faction of the Muslim Brotherhood on Egyptian society.

So far, I have discussed opposition leaders' opportunities in leading opposition movements, particularly through elections and underground operations, in autocratic political systems. Another important factor that may boost a "leader's surplus" is the ethnic or tribal factor, which opposition leaders can use as a target issue in manipulating and mobilizing an opposition movement.

When multi-party elections are open to opposition parties, ethnic or tribal identity can be a very effective means of garnering electoral support. Opposition leaders always fare well in their own ethnic or tribal constituencies. However, in a multi-ethnic or multi-tribal society, as found in many African countries, ethnic or tribal identity can obstruct opposition leaders' national appeal and localize their opposition movements. For instance, Kenya's major opposition leaders belong to different ethnic groups;[120] therefore, individually they could hardly develop a nationwide opposition movement.

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118. Since the Egyptian government carefully designed an electoral system which would not bring about dramatic outcomes as in Algeria, it was not afraid of holding competitive elections regularly.

119. Mona Makram-Ebeid, "Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality?" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 423-36; Kirk J. Beattie, "Prospects for Democratization in Egypt," *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 36 (Spring 1991), pp. 31-47.

120. Makau wa Mutua, "Young Turks vs. Old Guard," *Africa Report*, Vol. 39 (May/June 1994), pp. 34-36.

Ethnic or tribal identity is also a powerful tool to organize guerrilla organizations. For example, the Rwandan Patriotic Front was a guerrilla organization which consisted of the minority Tutsi. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka is another ethnic-based guerrilla organization. Curiously, since Sri Lanka held eight national elections during 1947-77,[121] why did regularly held elections fail to curtail ethnic conflicts and stabilize a democratic system? The ethnic conflicts occurred from the very beginning of Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, when most Indian Tamils were denied citizenship by the Sinhalese government. As a result, the Tamil electorate was reduced by half.[122] Later, the insistence on the dominance of the Sinhaleses language further alienated the Tamil minority, and violent communal conflicts raged.[123] The long-term, single-member plurality system made the situation worse because the system discriminated against the minority Talmis.[124] Furthermore, when ethnicity becomes a salient issue, "intense communal electorates invariably favor the extremist position in contrast to a more moderate or ambiguous one."[125] Eventually, the increasing polarization of the electorate and ethnic sectarianism jeopardized Sri Lanka's democratic system.

Although ethnic sentiment is a good means of garnering ethnic support, ethnic sentiment itself is not enough to consolidate an opposition movement. For example, in Burundi, the Hutu and the Tutsi constitute about 85 and 15 percent of the population, respectively.[126] However, the majority Hutu have been the victims of discrimination and slaughtering by the minority Tutsi. Obviously, grievances by the Hutu have existed, but the sheer number of Hutu

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121. Amita Shastri, "Electoral Competition and Minority Alienation in a Plurality System: Sri Lanka 1947-77," *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 10 (December 1991), p. 328.

122. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 133.

123. In the 1956 elections, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) singled out the Sinhalese-only issue and won the election. The SLFP leader, Bandaranaike, once in office, immediately announced an Official Language Act that declared Sinhalese the sole official language of Sri Lanka. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-36.

124. The single-member plurality system was changed to a proportional system of representation in 1978. See Shastri, *supra* note 121.

125. Rabushka and Shepsle, *supra* note 122, p. 139.

126. Filip Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: The June 1993 Elections in Burundi," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31 (December 1993), p. 563.

was not mobilized to fight back against the Tutsi.[127] Why is this the case? Coercive mechanisms, such as the armed forces and the security services, have been dominated by Tutsi. Without good leaders to do political organizing, the majority Hutu cannot have a successful opposition movement.

Finally, let us take a look at the consequences of the existence of opposition movements in autocratic political systems. Frohlich et al. indicate that societal members do not necessarily benefit from the appearance of an opposition.[128] Many actual cases support that statement. For instance, since the Shining Path started its insurgency in 1980, more than 23,000 people have died and more than US$20 billion worth of damage has been incurred in Peru.[129] Also, in Algeria, more than 10,000 people have been killed over two-and-a-half years of militant Islamic insurgency.[130]

In conclusion, the decision rule[131] in totalitarian and autocratic political systems is that political victory usually is not determined by a simple majority vote in a free election, but rather by gun and repressive power. The prevailing mode of competition[132] in these political systems is that the ruling regimes are ruthless and unwilling to share power with opposition leaders. Under this mode of competition, opposition leaders are either totally repressed or they are co-opted. For these opposition leaders, the values of several variables in Equation 1 are very unfavorable, namely: P(W) is near zero; C(O) and C(D) are very high; and, B(O) is almost non-existent. Therefore, the expected value of leading an opposition movement in these political systems is always negative, and thus unfavorable to the emergence of opposition leaders. However, when electoral opportunities and underground operations are avail-

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127. It was an initiative of President Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, that launched a series of reforms to accommodate the political participation of Hutu. *Ibid.*, p. 564. True ethnic voting in a competitive election did not materialize until 1993. However, the electoral victory of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was negated several months later by a military coup launched by Tutsi officers.

128. Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 114-15.

129. Smith, *supra* note 82, p. 16.

130. Ibrahim, *supra* note 112.

131. Frohlich et al. define a decision rule as "any agreed-upon mechanism that specifies the minimum conditions in terms of which competition for the leadership position is decided." See Frohlich et al., *supra* note 128, p. 78.

132. Frohlich et al. define a mode of competition as "the combination of tactics employed by all of the competitors in a competitive situation." *Ibid.*, p. 98.

able, the calculation of costs and benefits in Equation 1 may change to an opposition leader's favor.

III. QUASI-DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS

Unlike the least democratic systems (including totalitarian and autocratic systems), quasi-democratic systems[133] allow some basic political rights and civil liberties and hold elections regularly. Opposition leaders and their followers can voice their opinions and organize rallies and demonstrations under some constraints. For instance, when opposition publications are censored or banned by the ruling regimes, they can still be circulated and sold underground with relative ease. When legal rallies and demonstrations are not allowed, opposition leaders can take some risk by holding illegal ones. Usually, the mass media are controlled by the ruling regimes and opposition movements cannot receive fair and objective coverage. Also, the judicial systems are not impartial enough to guarantee opposition leaders or their adherents a fair trial when they are indicted for political reason. Even so, opposition leaders still can legally compete with the ruling regime. Thus, regularly held elections open to opposition candidates become the most important indicator in distinguishing quasi-democratic systems from totalitarian and autocratic ones.

According to my election criterion, quasi-democratic countries had at least four consecutive elections to national legislatures held between 1972 and 1992.[134] Uninterrupted electoral competitions enable opposition leaders to accumulate the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [B(O)]. First, through organizing electoral campaigns, opposition leaders can collect resources from donations and private goods exchanges. Second, by winning and holding elective offices, opposition leaders can further generate revenue from the direct and hidden benefits of the elective office itself. Direct benefits of elective office include salary, fringe benefits and prestige. Hidden benefits include all tangible and intangible benefits generated from the political clout of

133. "Soft authoritarian countries," "quasi-authoritarian countries," "semi-democratic countries," and "semi-competitive countries" probably share some common traits with the quasi-democratic countries discussed here. However, when scholars use those terms, they merely have a vague idea of the terms and do not have clear indicators to identify the countries they are discussing.

134. The two exceptions to this requirement are Senegal and Zimbabwe. The reason is included in the notes of Table 3.4.

holding elective office.[135] For example, legislators can enrich themselves or their relatives or cronies by changing zoning laws or by securing governmental contracts for their private companies. Moreover, former office-holders can use the network they built up while they were in office to assume lucrative jobs in the private sector. Finally, with all the resources amassed by participating in electoral competitions and holding elective offices, opposition leaders have plenty of patronage to distribute among their loyal followers and consequently can consolidate their opposition organizations.

Looking at the "List of Quasi-Democratic Countries" in Table 3.4, one sees that El Salvador, Guyana,[136] South Korea, and Thailand are not one-party dominant;[137] however, Malaysia, Mexico, Senegal, Singapore, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe are. By "one-party dominant," I mean that a ruling party has continued to win the majority of every election to national legislatures since it began governing the country and no change in central government has occurred. Among these quasi-democratic countries, El Salvador, South Korea, and Thailand have experienced many military coup d'états, and the military still plays an important role in some of these countries.[138] However, unlike other military-ruled countries, these three countries had successive elections. Thus, even when the military took over the government, opposition leaders still had a

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135. The so-called "honest graft" mentioned by George Washington Plunkitt perfectly illustrates my point of hidden benefits of holding elective offices. See William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963), *passim.*

136. In Guyana, the black and mixed groups comprise around 42 percent, and the East Indians slightly over 51 percent of the population. The former is represented by the long-time ruling People's National Congress (PNC), and the latter, by the opposition party People's Progressive Party (PPP). The People's National Congress dominated Guyana's politics from 1966 to 1992; however, it lost power to the PPP in the 1992 legislative election. PNC's long-time dominance was based on its manipulation of election outcomes. When the 1992 election allowed the outcome to prevail, East Indians matched their population majority to their electoral majority for the first time since the British government arbitrarily deprived them of their electoral victory in the early 1960s. See Robert H. Manley, *Guyana Emergent: The Post-Independence Struggle for Nondependent Development* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1979), *passim*; Percy C. Hintzen, *The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), *passim.*

137. As for Western Samoa, I do not have enough information to conduct a meaningful discussion on the country's opposition movement.

138. El Salvador, South Korea, and Thailand were previously under intermittent military control and the military still plays an important role in El Salvador and Thailand now.

legal forum in which to compete for electoral offices.[139] For instance, under the military government of Chun Doo Hwan, Korean opposition groups made significant gains in the 1985 legislative elections. In Thailand, several political parties, formed by different military factions, actively participated in elections. In other words, the practice of electoral politics became a norm even in military-dominant Thailand. Although political violence against opposition members takes place from time to time,[140] opposition leaders still have room to organize their movements.

One-party dominant quasi-democratic countries share several common characteristics. First, *the ruling party in each country has never lost power to any opposition party in national elections.* For instance: the ruling Socialist Party (PS)[141] has ruled the country since Senegal's independence in 1960; the Alliance Party (which later became the National Front) has won every parliamentary election since Malaysia's independence in 1957;[142] the People's Action

139. Left-wing opposition groups in El Salvador were forbidden to participate in electoral competition in the 1970s and most of the 1980s. See Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark Ruhl, *Party Politics and Elections in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 295-303. Therefore, deprived of a legal forum to compete for electoral seats, these opposition groups resorted to guerrilla warfare. Several guerrilla organizations formed the largest alliance, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), in 1980. See Cristina Eguizábal, "Parties, Programs, and Politics in El Salvador," in Louis W. Goodman, William M. LeoGrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Central America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 135-60. Although FMLN controlled four provinces in the north of the country, it was prevented from large-scale expansion by huge U.S. military and economic aid (about US$6 billion) to the ruling regime. The FMLN finally became a legalized political party after signing a U.N.-brokered peace agreement with the ruling regime in 1992. The FMLN candidates participated in presidential, legislative, and municipal elections in 1994. See Douglas Farah, "Salvadoran Rightists Take Election Lead," *The Washington Post*, March 21, 1994, pp. A1, A16.

140. For instance, in May 1980, Korea's leading opposition leaders were arrested and opposition demonstrations were suppressed with great violence. Similarly, Thailand's opposition demonstrations against the military coup was bloodily repressed by the military government in May 1992. In El Salvador, too, the right-wing government and private business tycoons sponsored death squads to terrorize left-wing opposition leaders and their followers and sympathizers.

141. The Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) was the predecessor of the Socialist Party.

142. The Alliance Party was formed before Malaysia's independence in 1957. It included the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO; founded in 1948), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA; founded in 1949), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC; founded in 1946). The UMNO and MCA formed an alliance in 1952, which the MIC joined in 1955. At the end of 1972, the Alliance Party expanded to a new National Front (Barisan Nasional) and included more political parties.

Party (PAP) has dominated Singapore since 1959; the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has won every national election since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980; the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has been the ruling party of Mexico since it took power in 1929;[143] and, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) has dominated Taiwan's politics since its retreat from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. All of these ruling parties are founding parties and have sophisticated grass-roots party organizations.

Second, *even though elections held in these countries were relatively free, it was a common practice for the ruling parties to manipulate voting and electoral campaign rules and methods of representation to their own advantage.* For example, in Malaysia, even though rural constituencies included only one-half the voters of urban districts, the Malay-dominant government designed an electoral system to make rural constituencies where most Malays resided receive the same representation as urban districts where Chinese were dominant.[144]

Third, *although the rules of the game in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries put opposition leaders at a disadvantage, such leaders can still form political parties or quasi-party organizations and participate in electoral competition.* Regularly held elections offer opposition leaders a relatively fair and steady battleground on which to win a certain percentage of votes and ally with elected candidates. Under these circumstances, for potential opposition leaders, C(O) is relatively low, B(O) is very high because of the rewards elective offices can deliver, and the probability of getting elected is also high. Even though P(W) is very low,[145] EV(O) can be attractive enough for potential opposition leaders to join the opposition camp. Although opposition leaders and their organizations are not real rivals to the ruling regimes, they can be quite strong in non-violent political competitions.

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143. The PRI's precursor, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), was formally formed in 1929. The PNR was renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1946. See McDonald and Ruhl, *supra* note 139, pp. 48-50.

144. Rabushka and Shepsle, *supra* note 122, p. 87; Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong, "Malaysia," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 117-25.

145. In non-one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries, P(W) is higher for opposition leaders than that in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries. The main reason is that ruling parties in the former, unlike those in the latter, do not have long-time hegemonic power.

Fourth, *opposition leaders tend to choose peaceful competitions instead of violent insurgencies.* Basically, opposition leaders in this type of political system seldom resort to violence to oppose the regimes.[146] The main reasons are that they can win a resource base by participating in elections and they calculate that it is too costly to use a revolutionary approach.

Fifth, *opposition leaders in these countries vigorously participate in regularly held elections and win enough seats for them to accumulate resources. Their resources mainly come from donations, private goods exchange and the rewards of elective office.* Since the dominant parties always have the advantage of using their monopolized resources to restrain the activities of opposition groups, opposition leaders can hardly build up a coercive organization to impose sanctions on members in society to garner resources. Since insurgency is out of their reach, opposition leaders amass resources mainly through donations and private goods exchanges. Also, the elective seats opposition parties won offer their leaders access to power, fame, and money. As a result, opposition parties have resources to support party workers and to pay for electoral campaigns. Therefore, more and more potential opposition leaders join the parties. In contrast to the early-generation opposition leaders who lived in a more dangerous and hostile environment when the ruling regimes were very repressive, those newcomers seldom go to jail and act more freely and live more comfortably. For many young graduates from colleges, it is much easier to climb the social ladder by joining opposition parties, running for an electoral seat, and then getting elected, than by following the official recruitment process the government offers.

Sixth, *opposition leaders establish a "professional" career path within the electoral system, so that their careers revolve around occupying elective offices for a long time. Thus, political opposition becomes institutionalized, and professionalism of opposition leaders*

146. Senegal has faced the secessionist movement in the southern province of Casamance, led by the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), for ten years. See Peter Da Costa, "Diouf's Tarnished Victory," *Africa Report*, Vol. 38 (May/June 1993), pp. 50-51. Mexico was also challenged by the Indian revolt in the southern state of Chiapas in January 1994. However, these skirmishes were small-scale and were not led by major opposition groups. Zimbabwe's former opposition leader Joshua Nkomo started a short period of guerrilla insurgency after he was ousted from the cabinet in 1982. However, his Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) merged with the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1987, and Nkomo became the Vice President of the State and the newly merged Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

emerge. Opposition leaders in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries concentrate their resources on electoral competition and behave much like politicians in democratic systems. While holding elective offices, opposition leaders will act in a way that best secures their position and that enhances their future success in re-elections. While running for elective office, they will act largely within the limits set by the government, as in campaign regulations. At this stage, therefore, most opposition leaders, despite their professed dissatisfaction with the government, tend to observe "some set or sets of values that are widely held and which define what it means to be a 'professional' within that field."[147] Thus, opposition leaders are largely incorporated into the political system and political opposition becomes institutionalized.

Finally, compared to many other developing countries, these one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries have enjoyed a long period of political stability. The dominant parties always effectively control the military; therefore, military coups are unheard of.

To develop a clearer picture of one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries, I will examine how they differ from one-party dominant democratic countries, such as Japan (1955-1993) and Sweden (1932-1976).[148]

First, one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries have a lesser degree of political rights and civil liberties than that in democratic countries.

Second, each ruling party in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries can trace its origin of dominance to its ruling legitimacy and coercive power derived from its role as the founding party in leading the individual country to independence (*e.g.*, Malaysia, Senegal, Singapore and Zimbabwe), or through successful nation-building after a revolution (*e.g.*, Mexico), or in recovery of the territory after World War II (*e.g.*, Taiwan). However, all dominant parties in one-party dominant democratic countries trace their origin of dominance to "a major reorientation of the political dispositions of key socioeconomic groups" that leads to their electoral

147. Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (September 1970), p. 865.

148. Other one-party dominant democratic countries are Israel (pre-independence until 1977) and Italy (1945-80). See T. J. Pempel, ed., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 333.

victories in the first place.[149] Therefore, the dominance of governing parties in one-party dominant democratic countries came *after* the parties' electoral victories, while in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries that dominance came *before* the parties' electoral victories.

Third, dominant parties in democratic countries usually received less than 50 percent of the votes cast,[150] while the dominant parties in quasi-democratic countries always received more than 50 percent of the votes cast. In other words, dominant parties in one-party dominant democratic countries maintained their governing status by winning a substantial plurality rather than majority votes. However, ruling parties in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries have always enjoyed a significant majority victory in every national election. Although the electoral systems in both political systems favor the governing parties, there exists a qualitative difference in practicing electoral politics in each political system. Elections are free and fair in democratic systems and opposition parties compete on relatively equal footing with the ruling parties.[151] In contrast, electoral fraud is practiced frequently by dominant parties to guarantee their overall electoral victories in quasi-democratic systems.[152] Also, opposition parties or groups have a significant disadvantage in running electoral campaigns as previously mentioned. Nevertheless, opposition candidates still have a chance of winning electoral seats in urban areas and in their own strongholds.

Despite fraudulent activities and the lack of "sportsmanship" on the part of some governments, electoral practice is the most important element that makes quasi-democratic countries unique, especially one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries. If we check the political rights index, however, such practices are nearly insignificant. Countries rated 5 are "political systems in which elections are either closely controlled or limited, or in which the results

149. *Ibid.*, p. 341. Economic crises, expanding franchises, and American occupation are some factors that cause these major shifts in voters' preferences and coalition power. *Ibid.*, pp. 341-44.

150. *Ibid.*, p. 339. Only Japan's Liberal Democratic Party received more than 50 percent of the votes cast during its political domination. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

151. However, T. J. Pempel indicates that the dominant parties in Japan and Italy used tactics to portray the left-wing opposition parties as illegitimate or irrelevant; thus, they reduced greatly the popular support of these opposition parties. *Ibid.*, pp. 346-47, 357.

152. Some of the countries experience more serious electoral fraud than others. For example, electoral fraud in Mexico is more common and widespread than in Taiwan.

have little significance."[153] Countries rated 4 are "political systems in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally or have little significance in determining power distributions."[154] In other words, according to Western democratic standards, elections held in quasi-democratic countries whose average political rights score lies between 3.5 and 5.5 have little significance or meaning.

Contrary to this assessment, I argue that elections *are* in fact meaningful and significant in quasi-democratic systems, especially one-party dominant countries, because such elections usually result in the emergence and development of opposition movements. Unlike the ruling regimes in totalitarian and autocratic systems, the ruling parties in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries are confident in holding elections regularly because they believe that they can control the election outcomes to a great extent.[155] They understand that they will not suddenly lose their dominant governing position in a single election. Theoretically, at worst, they may lose some governorships, mayorships, or even the presidency to opposition parties, but they will remain the majority or the largest party in parliament based on decades of consolidation of their electoral resource bases.[156] Besides, regularly held elections, whether they are fully fair and free, offer voters a chance of choosing public office-holders and expressing their grievances as a continuing right.

As a result, the ruling regimes more or less gain and renew their ruling legitimacy through this regular electoral practice. Moreover, opposition parties and their candidates continue to run in the subsequent elections even though they accuse the ruling parties of practicing electoral fraud in each election. The crucial element lies in the non-zero-sum electoral outcomes offered by the electoral systems to opposition candidates; that is, the electoral systems let opposition parties gain a certain number of seats in parliament.[157] As long as opposition parties and candidates can win some

153. Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3rd. ed., Vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 61.

154. *Ibid.*

155. This is also true in other quasi-democratic countries, but to a lesser extent.

156. So far, this worst scenario of losing the majority of governorships and mayorships, or even the presidency, for ruling parties in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries has not yet occurred.

157. Although the majority of opposition parties could not win any electoral seat in the single-member-district contests for the Chamber of Deputies, the Mexican electoral system reserved 100 seats for all opposition parties in the 1977 electoral reforms. See McDonald and Ruhl, *supra* note 139, pp. 57-59.

electoral seats and assume office, partially fair and free elections are enough to mitigate the opposition's protest against electoral fraud.

Continuing my analysis, I examine the relationship between elections and the average political rights index (PRIDX), as well as the relationship between elections and the average civil liberties index (CLIDX). I have two variables for elections: election number and consecutive election number. Election number is the sum of the number of presidential elections (in presidential systems) and elections to national legislatures. Consecutive election number is the sum of consecutive elections to national legislatures. The observed cases include the 54 countries on the "List of First-Round Quasi-Democratic Countries" in Table 3.2.[158] Both election number and consecutive election number are interval variables, but the PRIDX and CLIDX are ordinal. Therefore, I begin by assuming that all variables are ordinal-scaled, and I rank each variable from 1 to 54, where 1 is the smallest value and 54 is the largest, as shown in Appendix B. The matrix of Spearman rank correlation coefficients is shown in Table 4.1. From Table 4.1, we can tell that higher election numbers are associated with better performance in the political rights index ($r_s = 0.709$). Also, higher consecutive election numbers are associated with better performance in the political rights index ($r_s = 0.723$). The same positive relationship, to a lesser degree, also holds between the two election variables and the civil liberties index. From Appendix B and Table 4.1, I conclude that frequent regularly held elections indeed play a very important role in distinguishing quasi-democratic countries from the least democratic countries.

Compared to electoral practices, many other factors, such as socioeconomic indicators, are not of any significance in making quasi-democratic countries unique. The selective socioeconomic indicators for the eleven quasi-democratic countries are shown in Table 4.2. According to this table, the eleven countries differ drastically in area (ranging from 761,605 square miles to 239 square miles) and population (ranging from 85.7 million to 0.2 million). Most importantly, the records of their socioeconomic performance are mixed. Some of them had impressive GDP per capita (*e.g.*, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea) based on the standards of developing countries; others had poor GDP per capita (*e.g.*, Senegal,

158. South Africa, Lebanon, and Liberia are excluded from the list, as indicated in a Note in Table 3.3.

Western Samoa and Zimbabwe). In general, among one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries, only Senegal and Zimbabwe fared poorly in the selective socioeconomic indicators, while all others fared above the world average. Nevertheless, there is really no strong evidence to correlate socioeconomic performance with quasi-democratic (especially one-party dominant) countries either positively or negatively.

Finally, the question arises as to what major consequences of the appearance of active opposition movements in quasi-democratic countries are. Frequent electoral competitions between the ruling parties and opposition parties offer ordinary people channels to express their grievances and policy preferences. Also, the existence of active opposition parties fulfills the traditional checks and balances function to some extent. Usually opposition parties are very eager to reveal government corruption and abolish or amend bad laws and regulations. Moreover, in quasi-democratic countries, opposition leaders are more responsive to their "clients" than their counterparts in lesser democratic political systems because they are constantly being pressured by reelections. If they cannot deliver some collective goods or private goods, they will be voted out by their previous supporters in the next election. Meanwhile, since opposition leaders concentrate on increasing the probability of gaining and holding elective offices, they may use any means, including inciting ethnic conflicts, to justify their ends. Consequently, the pursuit of personal interests may become more important than the fulfillment of the collective goals originally set up by opposition movements.

In conclusion, opposition leaders need "forums" to lead an active opposition movement. Regularly held elections and prolonged underground operations are two major forums for opposition leaders to amass the resources they need for sustaining and expanding opposition movements. Totalitarian political systems do not offer these forums for opposition leaders. Most of the autocratic political systems are stuck in a cycle of military coup d'états and civilian dictatorship; therefore, opposition leaders are either severely repressed or co-opted by the ruling regimes. Elections are merely an expedient for the ruling regimes to alleviate international and domestic pressures for reform, and the unyielding regimes may easily nullify the electoral victories of opposition groups. As a result, opposition leaders can hardly lead an effective opposition movement. Occasionally, when underground operations become available, op-

position leaders can use coercive organizations to develop formidable guerrilla warfare activities.

In contrast to totalitarian and autocratic political systems, quasi-democratic political systems provide opposition leaders with a steady forum to participate in political life. Regularly held elections offer opposition leaders opportunities for consolidating opposition organizations and creating "leader's surplus." Some quasi-democratic countries are impressive in retaining one-party dominance for several decades and maintaining political stability without outright repression. Moreover, opposition movements in these one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries offer us a window to examine the entrepreneurial explanation for the emergence and development of opposition movements. I will, therefore, continue with a case study of Taiwan, one of the longest one-party dominant quasi-democratic regimes, in the next chapter.

TABLE 4.1 SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION FOR AVERAGE POLITICAL RIGHTS SCORE (PRAV), AVERAGE CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORE (CLAV), TOTAL ELECTION NUMBER (ELNU), AND CONSECUTIVE ELECTION NUMBER (CELE)

MATRIX OF SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

	PRAVRANK	CLAVRANK	ELNURANK	CELERANK
PRAVRANK	1.000			
CLAVRANK	0.799	1.000		
ELNURANK	0.709	0.585	1.000	
CELERANK	0.723	0.576	0.824	1.000

NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS: 54

TABLE 4.2 BASIC DATA OF QUASI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES

Country Name	Area (sq. mi.)	Pop. (mn) 1991	GDP ($BN) 1990	GDP per capita 1990	Literacy Rate (%) 1990	Foreign Debt ($BN) 1990
El Salvador	8,260	5.4	5.10	940	69.8	2.10
Guyana	83,000	0.8	0.29	380	85.0	1.70
Korea, South	38,221	43,2	238.00	5,600	96.0	31.70
Malaysia	127,317	18.3	43.10	2,460	69.6	20.00
Mexico	761,605	85.7	236.00	2,680	90.3	96.00
Senegal	75,750	7.5	4.60	615	28.0	4.10
Singapore	239	2.8	34.60	12,700	82.9	3.90
Taiwan	13,967	20.5	150.80	7,380	94.0	1.10
Thailand	198,500	58.8	79.00	1,400	88.0	26.90
Western Samoa	1,093	0.2	0.12	620	90.0	0.08
Zimbabwe	150,698	10.0	5.60	540	74.0	2.96

Source: *The Software Toolworks World Atlas* Version 3.2

CHAPTER 5

OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS IN ONE-PARTY DOMINANT QUASI-DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS: TAIWAN

> There are no other ways to take political power than "to rob" and "to cheat": "to rob" means armed revolutions; and "to cheat" is to elicit popular support through propaganda and persuasion.
>
> —Ju Gau-jeng[1]

According to my categorizations described in Chapter 3, Taiwan was a quasi-democratic country as of 1992. It has a 4.857 average in the political rights index and a 4.481 average in the civil liberties index. Also, it held 7 elections between 1972 and 1992 to the Legislative Yuan, the highest legislative body of Taiwan.[2] This chapter examines Taiwan's political traits in terms of its one-party dominant quasi-democracy system and then gives an entrepreneurial explanation to Taiwan's opposition movements.

I. ONE-PARTY DOMINANT QUASI-DEMOCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TAIWAN

A. Performance in Civil Liberties

A quasi-democratic system holds a 3-5 average in the civil liberties index. Taiwan exhibits the following characteristics within that range: it may often rely on "martial law, jailing for sedition, and suppression of publications"; "there are broad areas of freedom but also broad areas of illegality"; and, "the media are often weak,

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1. Gau-jeng Ju, *Ho-ping Ko-ming* (Peaceful Revolution), Vol. 4 (Taipei: Jiou-Bo Book Company, 1990), p. 64. Ju was a former leader of Taiwan's largest opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party. He formed his new political party, the Social Democratic Party, in 1990. He is currently the Legislator of the Legislative Yuan. In this book, I follow the Chinese naming system. All names begin with their family name, followed by their first name. Ju later dissolved the Social Democratic Party and joined the New Party.

2. Even though the reelection of all members of the Legislative Yuan occurred only in 1992, the elections of partial membership were competitive. Details of Taiwan's election will be discussed in the text.

controlled by the government, and censored."[3] In this section, I will elaborate on these civil liberty characteristics of Taiwan.

Historically, Taiwan has held a peculiar tie with mainland China. As a small island, Taiwan was one of the first pieces of land ceded to foreign countries when China was defeated in war. Also, as an island, Taiwan offered safe haven for the defeated regime to fight against the newly established opponent regime on the mainland. When the Ch'ing Dynasty replaced the Ming Dynasty on mainland China in the seventeenth century, a Ming general brought his troops to Taiwan, hoping to make a comeback. The Ch'ing Dynasty later took Taiwan, but had to cede it to Japan in the late nineteenth century upon its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95).

China took Taiwan back in 1945. Soon afterward, the Communist Party took the mainland, and the Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) central government retreated to Taiwan in 1949.[4] During the fifty years of Japanese colonization, some people in Taiwan wanted the island to become independent. Similarly, later, some people also regarded the KMT as an alien regime and asked for Taiwan's independence. Seeking independence, therefore, has been a festering political issue in Taiwan and has much to do with Taiwan's opposition movements.

As far as the KMT government is concerned, "Taiwan's nice, Taiwan's nice, Taiwan's really an island for a comeback," says one of its propaganda songs. These lyrics spell out the KMT's early attitude toward Taiwan; it treated Taiwan as a springboard to recover the mainland, not intending to stay in Taiwan for long.

However, the KMT also feared a possible invasion by the Chinese Communists, a fear which largely determined the KMT's politics in Taiwan. For instance, it declared martial law in 1949, the very year it moved to Taiwan. Also, it applied "Temporary Provisions"[5] to Taiwan (first issued in mainland China earlier in 1948),

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3. Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3rd. ed., Vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 65.

4. In addition to the coercive apparatus which Chiang Kai-shek brought with him, many well-educated technocrats also accompanied him to Taiwan. Moreover, Chiang also transported the government's valuable gold reserve and national treasures of the National Palace Museum in Beijing from the mainland to Taiwan.

5. The full name of this law is "The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion." It was abolished in 1991. See Jürgen Domes, "The Kuomintang and the Opposition," in Steve Tsang, ed., *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 129.

greatly restricting the basic constitutional rights of citizens and increasing presidential power.[6] Moreover, the KMT reorganized its party and used its party apparatus firmly and effectively to control government, intelligence, army, media, schools, and various kinds of civic organizations.[7]

For these reasons, many political observers call Taiwan a party-state.[8] Others consider it a typical authoritarian regime because of its coercive nature.[9] Taiwan's political complications, however, can-

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6. For example, the Temporary Provisions gave the President the power to declare martial law without the approval of, or the confirmation by, the Legislative Yuan. Also, the President was not subject to the two-term restriction prescribed in the original Constitution. As for the restrictions on citizens' basic political rights and civil liberties, see the discussion on the Kuomintang's coercive mechanism in the text.

7. Several scholars indicate the Leninist-style party organization of the Kuomintang. See Andrew J. Nathan and Yangsun Chou, "Democratizing Transition in Taiwan," in Andrew J. Nathan, *China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 129-31; J. Bruce Jacobs, "Paradoxes in the Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative Politics," *Politics*, Vol. 13 (November 1978), pp. 240-43; Hung-mao Tien, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), pp. 75-77; Hsiao-shih Cheng, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 6; Constance Squires Meaney, "Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT," in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., *Political Change in Taiwan* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 95. For instance, Bruce Jacobs compares the Kuomintang with communist parties of China and the former Soviet Union. He indicates that they are similar in party structure, membership recruitment and leadership controls. He also indicates that the Kuomintang differs from other communist parties in its practice of relatively free elections. See Jacobs, pp. 240-43. However, Ya-li Lu refutes the claim that the Kuomintang functions as a Leninist-type party. See Alexander Ya-li Lu, "Political Modernization in the ROC: The Kuomintang and the Inhibited Political Center," in Ramon H. Myers, ed., *Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), p. 111-14. This author tends to agree with Lu's observations and does not claim that the Kuomintang is a Leninist-style party. Moreover, many scholars have already examined the Kuomintang's organizations and strategies; therefore, this chapter will not focus on the Kuomintang.

8. See Peter R. Moody, Jr., *Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 13; Teh-fu Huang, "Electoral Competition and Democratic Transition in the Republic of China," *Issues & Studies*, October 1991, p. 98; Nathan and Chou, *supra* note 7, pp. 129-30; Cheng, *supra* note 7, p. 6.

9. See Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 99 (September 1984), p. 485; Liang-Shing Fan and Frank B. Feigert, "Independents and Independence: Challenges to One-Party Domination in Taiwan," in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 447-48; Marc J. Cohen, *Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development and Social Change on the Beautiful Island* (Washington, D.C.: Asia

not be covered by catchy phrases like "party-state" or "authoritarian." However, there are several elements to the KMT's coercive mechanism, some of which have faded while others still exist today.

(1) Banning the formation of new political parties and supervising all civic organizations. In the years 1949-1989, only two parties other than the KMT were allowed to exist legally. However, both parties were small and were allowed primarily because they had been founded earlier in mainland China. Both, moreover, were co-opted by the KMT.[10] Similarly, the KMT government allowed only one civic organization to exist in each category and strictly controlled organization personnel and activities. For instance, it initiated the Farmers' Association and forbade the formation of other farmers' associations. It restricted other civic associations in the same way, such as the Fishermen's Association, labor unions, and other professional and social groups.

Although the KMT government controlled all civic organizations, organization members could still provide important inputs into the related policy-making process.[11] Therefore, some independent expressions of interest were still possible[12] and some autonomy was also likely in many civic organizations.[13] Moreover, since 1989 when the KMT promulgated the Civic Organizations Law and lifted the ban on the formation of political parties, people can easily form interest groups and political parties.[14] Even before that, since 1977, quasi-party organizations had been tolerated to different degrees.

(2) Prohibiting strikes and strictly restricting demonstrations and rallies by non-KMT organizations. The government rarely approved applications for large-scale rallies or demonstrations by op-

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Resource Center, 1988), pp. 25-29; Tien, *supra* note 7, pp. 12-13; Domes, *supra* note 5, pp. 118-21.

10. Fan and Feigert, *supra* note 9, p. 450. These two parties are the Young China Party (YCP) and the China Democratic Socialist Party (CDSP). Their role was trivial in Taiwan's opposition movements because they lacked a local connection. Although some Taiwanese opposition leaders joined these two parties and ran for elections in the 1950s and 1960s, they never truly expanded their organizations. Since new political parties emerged in the late 1980s, these two parties have faded into a footnote in Taiwan's politics.

11. See Jacobs, *supra* note 7, p. 244; Tien, *supra* note 7, pp. 44-45, 54-63.

12. Jacobs, *supra* note 7, p. 244.

13. Tien, *supra* note 7, pp. 62-63; Lu, *supra* note 7, p. 121.

14. Since the termination of the ban on political parties, 42 political parties were formed by 1990. By 1992, there were 63 political parties. See Domes, *supra* note 5, p. 132.

position groups. In rallies and demonstrations, there were always police to photograph or videotape the speakers and participants.[15]

Despite the restrictions on opposition rallies and demonstrations, opposition leaders often held illegal ones.[16] Moreover, since the martial law decree was lifted in 1987, rallies and demonstrations have increased dramatically.[17] Similarly, although strikes were prohibited, workers could deliberately slow down their work[18] or could arrange to take leave on the same day in order to pressure their employers for a concession.[19]

(3) Censoring political publications and other mass media and restraining freedom of expression. The government suspended issuing licenses to new newspapers and tightly controlled existing newspapers.[20] It usually banned articles or essays criticizing President Chiang Kai-shek or Taiwan's political system;[21] it also suspended the newspapers carrying these articles or essays for days or months.[22] Sometimes, it went further by imposing varying degrees of punishment on writers of "offensive" articles or essays. A famous essayist, Po Yang, for instance, was put in prison for nine

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15. *Asia Watch, Human Rights in Taiwan 1986-1987* (Washington, D.C.: The Asia Watch Committee, 1987), p. 106.

16. Opposition leaders who held illegal rallies or demonstrations had different fates according to the timing, strategies, and the Kuomintang government's security level in each individual case. Some of them were sentenced to long prison terms, some to lighter prison terms, and many others were only harassed by prolonged judicial procedures and eventually were let go. More detail on opposition leaders' holding illegal opposition rallies or demonstrations will be given later in this chapter.

17. The number of demonstrations approached 2,900 from 1983 to 1988; there were 1,172 demonstrations in 1988 alone. See Thomas B. Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity," in Stevan Harrell and Chün-chieh Huang, eds., *Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 58.

18. *Asia Watch, supra* note 15, p. 144.

19. The Kuomintang government also played the role of mediator to help solve disputes between workers and their employers.

20. Up until 1989, the number of Taiwan's newspapers was limited to 31. The government also restricted the number of pages which each newspaper could publish every day. See Daniel K. Berman, *Words Like Colored Glass: The Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 129-30.

21. Marxist or communist publications were banned in Taiwan. Books written by famous Chinese liberal authors such as Lu Xun in the 1930s were also banned. When foreign magazines such as *Time* or *Newsweek* carried articles which included a picture of Mao Zedong or a picture of Communist China's flag, those pictures were blacked out.

22. See Berman, *supra* note 20, p. 126. As for magazines, they could be suspended for a year if they published censored articles or essays.

years because he translated a Popeye cartoon to mock Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo.[23]

Despite the KMT's censorship, opposition leaders found ways to express their political opinions and to criticize the regime. For example, an opposition publisher applied for five magazine licenses all at once. Therefore, when the KMT suspended one of them, the publisher still had four others at his disposal.[24] This "spare-tire" publication maneuver kept opposition publications alive and prosperous. Meanwhile, ironically, the banned magazine issues usually became hot items, which could be bought easily in the underground market. Moreover, since the KMT lifted the ban on new newspapers and magazines in 1989, censorship has largely faded. Also, although the government still controls the mass media, opposition parties have managed to set up their own "illegal" cable TV stations, underground radio stations, and computer bulletin board systems. Through these channels, they often promote their political ideals, criticize the government, and denigrate the KMT officials, without being censored or imprisoned.[25]

(4) Harassing political dissidents and opposition leaders.[26] The regime often had secret agents spy on political dissidents or opposition leaders. Once it deemed that they were "guilty" of something, it might arrest them, accuse them of treason or communist espionage, and sentence them to jail.[27]

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23. Peter R. Moody, Jr., *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 247-50; Berman, *supra* note 20, p. 126.

24. Berman, *supra* note 20, p. 193.

25. The Kuomintang government had difficulty in cracking down on all of these underground radio stations (the number reached 58 during the 1994 electoral campaign) and cable TV stations because these underground stations were mobile and had very flexible operating schedules. Many of them only operated during the election period and closed down after the election. Finally, twenty-four new regional radio stations (with a broadcast radius of 20 kilometers) were allowed to operate in January 1993. Forty-six new private community radio stations (with a broadcast radius of five kilometers) were also allowed to operate in December 1994. See Allen Pun and Susan Yu, "Approval Granted to Open 46 Private Radio Stations," *The Free China Journal*, December 30, 1994, p. 4.

26. The government also harassed and threatened certain opposition leaders' relatives and friends to keep them from helping opposition movements.

27. Between 1949 and 1955, more than a dozen people were executed for being communists. Many others were sentenced to different prison terms for promoting Taiwan's independence, reading communist publications, or forming quasi-political organizations. See Ming Shi, *Tai-wan-jen Shih-pai-nien Shih* (The Four-Hundred Year History of the Taiwanese) (San Jose: Paradise Culture Associates, 1980), pp. 1101-1125.

Such harassment, however, has been continually decreasing. For instance, political dissidents and opposition leaders rarely lost their lives after 1955, and fewer and fewer of them went to jail after 1979.[28] Like a banned magazine that becomes a best seller in Taiwan, a person going to jail for political reasons may attract immediate attention and might be elected to the legislature soon after release. Opposition leader Chen Shui-bian, for instance, went to jail for eight months in 1986. Soon afterward he was elected to the Legislative Yuan, and now he is the mayor of Taipei.

(5) Interfering with the judicial process and threatening civilians with court-martial. Taiwan's judicial system did not guarantee opposition leaders or their supporters a fair trial when they were indicted for political reasons. The selection of judges was not completely neutral; therefore, judges' decisions could be subject to influence from the KMT government. Also, in some cases, opposition leaders were court-martialed and were only allowed one appeal. Some defendants were tortured or coerced into making incriminating statements.[29] Since 1980, however, the use of military courts to try civilians has decreased and in 1987, it was finally abolished.

From the above observations, we find that the KMT regime adopted coercive means to consolidate its power but did not always practice it vigorously. Another good example is the KMT's implementation of the martial law decree in Taiwan between 1949 and 1987. There was neither a military government[30] nor a curfew;[31] and, as mentioned, the use of military courts gradually decreased.[32] Furthermore, the martial law decree was lifted in 1987.

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28. *Asia Watch*, *supra* note 15, p. 21. High-profile opposition leaders were less likely to be prosecuted for their political opinions than ordinary citizens. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

30. Although the Taiwan Garrison Command headquarters was created in 1950 to handle martial law matters such as authorizing citizens to travel abroad and censoring publications, it was under the control of the civilian government. See Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 110. The headquarters was soon dissolved after the lifting of the martial law decree in 1987.

31. The two offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, which are only a few miles from mainland China were subject to military control until the early 1990s.

32. One of Taiwan's famous Kuomintang officials, Lin Yang-Kang [whose membership was cancelled by the Kuomintang in 1995], once explained to his foreign guests that Taiwan had actually practiced only three percent of the martial law decree. His statement became an instant joke because no one could figure how the three percent was calculated. Nevertheless, one can safely state that the martial law was not fully enforced in Taiwan. Since the Kuomintang government only selectively enforced the martial law decree in some incidences, it was a puzzle why the government had kept the

As time passed, Taiwan became more democratic and many repressive measures were no longer exercised after 1988; it has also become progressively open to opposition. In the infamous February 28 Incident in 1947, for instance, the government ordered the military to fire at people gathering in public places. In contrast, since the late 1970s, in most opposition rallies and demonstrations, the KMT has authorized the anti-riot police only to quell the demonstrators with water cannons as necessary.

B. Electoral Practices and Performance in Political Rights

A quasi-democratic system holds a 3-5 average in the political rights index, as discussed in Chapter 3. Taiwan meets the following characteristics within that range: elections are often tinted with nondemocratic irregularity; and, elections "have little significance in determining power distributions."[33] There are, however, some traits within that range that do not apply to Taiwan. For instance, in Taiwan there were no coup d'états or "large-scale interference with election results,"[34] both of which are characterized for 3-point political performance. As the authors of the Index admit, this Index employs somewhat "traditional Western conception of political liberty"[35] and, as mentioned in Chapter 3, this Index is weak in differentiating the variations in grossly irregular elections.

To investigate the intricacies of elections, in Chapter 3, I proposed an "election criterion": meaningful elections are "regularly held" and "valid." In light of this criterion, I will examine Taiwan's political rights performance and its electoral practices.

Taiwan's electoral practices are a very complicated mixture of repressive and democratic elements. On the one hand, national elections were severely restricted; therefore, election outcomes did not change the government or important government policies.[36] First, the most important executive positions were not popularly

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martial law decree effective for thirty-eight years. It seemed that the government did not fully recognize the notorious reputation given by a long-time martial law decree in the eyes of an international audience.

33. Taylor and Jodice, *supra* note 3, p. 61.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. The restrictive nature of Taiwan's elections was the main reason why it still received relatively a bad score in the political rights index (it scored 4 in the 1994 index) even after considerable political reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is also the reason why Taiwan received 4's or 5's in the political rights index between 1972 and 1992, although it regularly held competitive elections.

elected, including the president and vice-president,[37] the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung (the two largest municipalities).[38] Second, the two major national representative bodies, the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly,[39] were not open to voters until 1969;[40] but then the KMT government limited the number of new representatives that Taiwan's electorate could elect, thereby the KMT managed to reinforce its advantage in the election results.[41] Moreover, the delegates elected earlier in mainland China to the two major bodies did not need to run for reelection and could keep their jobs indefinitely, thus creating an

37. The president and the vice-president of Taiwan have been elected by members of the National Assembly, although the first popular presidential election is scheduled to be held in March 1996. The premier of the Executive Yuan and cabinet members are appointed by the president and approved by the Legislative Yuan.

38. The governor of Taiwan's provincial government and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were appointed by the central government until December 1994. The mayor of Taipei City was popularly elected originally and was last elected by popular votes in 1964. In 1967, Taipei City became a special municipality which had the same administrative status as the Taiwan province and its mayor became an appointed position. The incumbent non-Kuomintang mayor, Kao Yu-shu, was appointed as the first mayor of the new municipality. After Kao became a cabinet member in 1972, there were eight appointed mayors, all of whom were Kuomintang members. The mayor of Kaohsiung City, the second largest city of Taiwan, was also popularly elected before the city became a special municipality in 1979. The last incumbent mayor, Wang Yu-yun, was also appointed as the first mayor of the new municipality. The positions of mayor of Taipei and Kaohsiung and the Taiwan Provincial governor were open to popular elections in December 1994.

39. The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ of Taiwan. The National Assembly is the representative body which has the rights to elect and recall the President and the Vice-President and to amend the Constitution. In 1991, the National Assembly amended the Constitution, requiring the President and the Vice-President be elected directly by the electorate of Taiwan effective from the 1996 presidential election.

40. Since 1969, the supplementary election of members of the Legislative Yuan was held every three years; the supplementary election of members of the National Assembly was held every six years.

41. Furthermore, among the limited number of representatives elected by Taiwan's electorate, there were reserved seats elected only by certain occupational constituencies, such as farmers' group, teachers' associations and trade unions. The reserved seats elected by occupational constituencies were abolished in 1991. Also, there were reserved seats elected by the aboriginal groups and appointed seats reserved for the overseas Chinese. Since the KMT government effectively controlled civil and occupational organizations and major overseas Chinese organizations, the party's candidates always won almost all the above-mentioned reserved seats. Therefore, these reserved seats elected by special constituencies gave the Kuomintang further advantage in winning the elections.

unfair election competition for decades.[42] Accordingly, the seats directly elected by Taiwan's electorate never surpassed 35% in each representative body.[43] To compete with the KMT in national elections, in a satirist's words, is to run for the KMT's leftovers. Even if the opposition groups had succeeded in winning a majority of the seats, they could not have become the ruling coalition.

On the other hand, in terms of democratic elements of electoral practice in Taiwan, the KMT government first held local elections in Taiwan in 1950, almost immediately after it moved to the island[44] and continued to hold local elections regularly, at every three or four year intervals. These local elections include the positions of almost all legislative representatives and executive heads.[45]

Despite the restriction in national elections, the "leftover" seats have been highly competitive. The candidates in each election have always exceeded the elective seats. There were, for instance,

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42. The KMT government kept these lifetime delegates to assume legitimacy of all of China. Also, they were well-paid and most would vote according to the KMT's wishes. In the late 1980s, they were offered US$134,000 to retire voluntarily. See James McGregor, "New Election Laws in Taiwan Squelch Opposition Efforts," *The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, February 20, 1989, p. 18. Those who had refused to retire were forced to do so in 1991.

43. For example, as of 1988, there were 316 legislators in the Legislative Yuan. See Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 146. Among these 316 legislators: 216 legislators were "lifetime" members who were elected in mainland China; 73 legislators were elected by Taiwan's electorate (55 by regular constituencies, 16 by occupational constituencies, and 2 by the aboriginal population); and, 27 were appointed overseas Chinese. See *Chung-hua-min-kuo Hsuan-chu Tung-Chi Ti-yao* (Summary of the Republic of China Elections Statistics) (1946-1987), (Taipei: Republic of China Central Election Commission, 1987), pp. 124-25. The combined seats of legislators elected by Taiwan's electorate and those of appointed overseas Chinese were 100 seats which only constituted 32% of the total 316 seats. This kind of electoral arrangement was mocked as "a parliament pickled in Formaldehyde" by one critic, and was assessed by others as "one of the most creative ways in which an authoritarian regimes in control while still allowing elections with choice." See Cohen, *supra* note 9, p. 17; Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 10.

44. These elections involved members of county and city councils. For reasons why the KMT held local elections immediately after it retreated to Taiwan, see Huang, *supra* note 8, pp. 102-103.

45. In addition to the elections of county magistrates, city mayors and executives of smaller administrative units, local elections also include elections of members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung Special Municipal City Councils, and county and city councils. Some scholars call this practice "democracy at the local level." See Arthur J. Lerman, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71 (December 1977), pp. 1406-22; Jacobs, *supra* note 7, p. 244.

25 candidates running for 11 elective seats in the 1969 legislative elections, a ratio of 2.27 to 1.[46] In the 1992 legislative elections, 330 candidates were competing for 119 elective seats, a ratio of 2.77 to 1.[47]

One of the reasons for such competitiveness is that opposition candidates are very optimistic regarding their chances of winning open seats in the Legislative Yuan. Actually, Taiwan's elections are valid because of its electoral systems.[48] The Legislative elections, for instance, used the single-nontransferable-vote, multi-seat constituency system.[49] Using this system strategically, opposition parties often win elective seats in their strongholds, and the largest opposition party may ensure at least one seat in each multi-seat constituency. For instance, there were 22 multi-seat constituencies in the 1992 Legislative elections, and in 20 of them the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, the largest opposition party in Taiwan)

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46. *Summary of the Republic of China Elections Statistics (1946-1987)*, *supra* note 43, p. 28.

47. *Shih-chie Jih-pao* (World Journal), December 20, 1992, p. 11. The number does not include the 18 aboriginal candidates and the 6 seats reserved for the aboriginal constituencies. Usually, elections were more competitive in cities than in counties. For instance, in the 1992 Legislative elections, there were 68 candidates versus 18 elective seats (a ratio of 3.78 to 1) in Taipei City, while there were 48 candidates versus 16 elective seats (a ratio of 3 to 1) in Taipei County. Similarly, there were 10 candidates versus 2 elective seats (a ratio of 5 to 1) in Hsinchu City, while there were 7 candidates versus 2 elective seats (a ratio of 3.5 to 1) in Hsinchu County. See *ibid.*

48. The single-nontransferable-vote, single-seat constituency system is used for the elections of county magistrates, mayors of municipal cities, and township and subcounty executives. The single-nontransferable-vote, multi-seat constituency system is used for the elections of members of the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung Special Municipal Councils, and county and municipal city councils.

49. Under the single-nontransferable-vote, multi-seat constituency system, each constituency has a different number of elective seats, "but voters vote for only one candidate on a categoric ballot." See Taagepera and Shugart, *supra* note 43, p. 28. Therefore, the winners in a nine-seat constituency are simply the nine candidates with the most votes, regardless of party affiliation. This kind of electoral system helped Taiwan's opposition leaders as independent candidates in early opposition movements to win elective seats and build up their resource bases. The system also benefitted the well-organized KMT when the party could efficiently distribute votes evenly among its candidates in each constituency and maximize the seats it won. One of the problems of this electoral system is the uneven number of votes received by the elected candidates in each constituency. For example, in the 1992 Legislative elections, in the Taipei County constituency, there were 48 candidates vying for 16 seats. The highest vote-getter received a whopping 235,887 votes, while the winner of the last available seat received only 36,845 votes.

won one or more seats. In one case, the DPP fielded 8 candidates in a 16-seat constituency and 4 of them were elected.[50]

Moreover, the election outcomes were honored and each winner really took office.[51] Voters were seldom harassed and serious violence was rare.[52] Despite the problems of occasional vote irregularity[53] and frequent vote-buying,[54] people in Taiwan are more enthusiastic than Americans about elections. Taiwan's voting rate has averaged about 70% of eligible voters for decades.

Therefore, while the political rights index (based on a Western standard) may deem the elections in Taiwan as insignificant, they are meaningful in many ways. For opposition leaders, such elections offer them opportunities to organize and collect resources. For instance, they can seek donations more easily while running electoral campaigns since many businessmen are willing to invest in future politicians. Also, there is a wide range of positions to run for almost annually (*e.g.*, each year during 1991-98 has certain elections). If a candidate loses an election, usually he can run for another position within two years. Meanwhile, he can do all this without much political risk. The entire election climate encourages opposition leaders to run for elective offices and triggers the development of opposition movements in Taiwan.

In terms of the government, elections give the KMT its ruling legitimacy in Taiwan. Setting election rules favorable to the incumbent government, the KMT has won every national election and most local elections for decades. Through elections, the KMT has made most dissidents and opposition leaders play its game without resorting to violence.

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50. *World Journal*, *supra* note 47, p. 11.

51. Holding a huge advantage in the electoral system, the KMT government has no reason to nullify election outcomes.

52. The only serious violence directly related to elections occurred in the 1977 election of Taoyuan County Magistrate. A riot erupted after a voting station in Chungli City was accused of having vote irregularity. One person was killed and a police station was burned down in the incident.

53. Taiwan's opposition leaders always claimed there was serious vote irregularity in each election. In general, vote irregularity was not a serious problem, but vote buying is still a problem.

54. The cost of one vote ranged from US$18 to US$74 in the 1992 legislative elections. See Andrew J. Nathan, "The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33 (April 1993), p. 429. Generally speaking, vote buying was more popular in rural areas than in the city. In the early 1990s, the Kuomintang government started seriously to prosecute those candidates who bought votes.

C. The Hegemony of the KMT[55]

The KMT has established its hegemony in many ways. In addition to the coercive measures and elections already mentioned, the KMT consolidates its ruling position in Taiwan by: (1) participating in grassroots services and coalitions with local factions in Taiwan; (2) delivering numerous positive collective goods; (3) running lucrative party enterprises; and, (4) effectively controlling the military.

The KMT has managed to recruit many Taiwanese and co-opt local leaders. By 1990, over 70% of KMT members were native born Taiwanese.[56] Meanwhile, the KMT's grassroots organizations have spread all over the island. The Department of Organizational Affairs alone consists of 378 field offices island-wide and employs nearly 7,200 full-time cadres.[57] These offices often supply small-scale social welfare and mediate personal and social conflicts. For instance, they help arrange funerals, fill out forms for the illiterate, and settle disputes among feuding parties. In time of elections, these local cadres, along with temporary workers and volunteers, become the foot soldiers for the KMT candidates and contribute to the KMT's election victories.

Meanwhile, the KMT has made coalitions with more than 40 local factions all over the island.[58] Local factions, relationship ties based on a shared identity, such as the same surname or birthplace,[59] exist in almost every county and city. Most faction leaders were also capable vote mobilizers. They often joined the KMT and were nominated for elective offices.[60] They won the majority of elective seats for the KMT and brought benefits to themselves and their local factions.[61] Because of the KMT, they gained innumerable benefits, such as favorable loans from banks or lucrative business contracts from the government. Through such "electoral

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55. Taiwan's government was an inclusive hegemony defined by Dahl from 1945 to the mid-1970s, and it gradually became a near polyarchy, or quasi-democratic system. See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), *passim*.

56. Lu, *supra* note 7, p. 123; Domes, *supra* note 5, p. 132.

57. McGregor, *supra* note 42, p. 18.

58. Tien, *supra* note 7, pp. 167-71.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

60. Lerman, *supra* note 45, p. 1419.

61. Arthur J. Lerman, *Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman's World* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1978), pp. 116-31; Lawrence W. Crissman, "The Structure of Local and Regional Systems," in Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 106-108.

clientelism," the KMT had little trouble in gaining and maintaining popular support.[62]

The continuing support for the KMT also came from the positive collective goods the KMT delivered. Among them, the most important ones included land reform, consistent high economic growth, and relatively fair income distribution.[63] With these collective goods already delivered, the KMT was considered superior to opposition parties on the whole. Most voters wanted at least to keep what they already had, which would more likely be achieved by supporting the KMT rather than opposition parties. For instance, although the 1994 election of the Taiwan governor had been generally predicted as close between the KMT's Soong Chu-yu and the DPP's Chen Ding-nan, Soong defeated Chen by over 1.47 million votes. This unexpected landslide might partly come from Chen's campaign slogan; he wanted to "change the weather" (*pian-tien*) in Taiwan, but most voters feared a change for the worse and, as they cast their vote, they might have recalled the collective goods already delivered in the past by the incumbent KMT government.

The KMT achieves hegemony also by running lucrative party enterprises. The KMT owns 12 party enterprises and invests in more than 70 other party-affiliated enterprises.[64] The KMT's total assets are estimated to be US$4-19 billion,[65] topping all other non-communist political parties in the world. With such a huge amount

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62. Nai-te Wu, "The Politics of a Regime Patronage System: Mobilization and Control within an Authoritarian Regime," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1987, *passim*.

63. The average growth rate of Taiwan's GNP was: 7.5 from 1953 to 1962; 10.8 from 1963 to 1972; and, 8.4 from 1973 to 1987. See Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 27. As for income distribution, Taiwan's GINI coefficient was 0.303 in 1980 and became 0.317 in 1985. See Thomas B. Gold, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1986), p. 112; Susan Greenhalgh, "Supranational Processes of Income Distribution," in Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh, eds., *Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988), p. 73. Both these two figures indicate that Taiwan had relatively equal income distribution. Also, Taiwan's ratio of income of top fifth of households to bottom fifth was 4.5 in 1985 and it was the third lowest among 45 countries in a survey. See Greenhalgh, p. 73. For the discussion on Taiwan's economic achievement, see Cal Clark, *Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigns* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), *passim*.

64. Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 86; Ching-shi Chang and Shih-meng Chen, "The Development of the KMT Party Enterprises and Its Political and Economic Implications" (in Chinese), *Tzu-li Chou-pao* (The Independence Weekly Post), October 4, 1991, p. 13.

65. Susan Yu, "Size of Campaign War Chests Varies with Age of Three Parties," *The Free China Journal*, November 25, 1994, p. 4.

of assets in its coffers, the KMT can easily help its candidates run expensive electoral campaigns and put them in advantageous positions.

One last measure the KMT takes to keep its hegemony is to control the military through a "political commissar system"—it uses party officers (political commissars) like watchdogs to ensure the military's loyalty.[66] High-ranking military officers are also some of the KMT's core members.[67] Since the military is well-controlled, there has been no coup d'états in Taiwan. Moreover, the KMT government can always deploy the military to suppress any potential insurgency.

II. OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS (MID-1970S TO 1994)

Although the opposition movements in Taiwan can be a very intriguing subject, most political scientists dismiss the opposition factors as part of Taiwan's democratization process. Those who investigate Taiwan's opposition movements often rely on historical description and give little further analysis. Many scholars attribute the rise of opposition movements in Taiwan to its successful economic development.[68] These scholars all concentrate on economic conditions (capitalist structure and socioeconomic development) and ignore opposition leaders' activities.

As indicated in Chapter 1, behind an opposition movement lies a mastermind and without this mastermind's assessing the political environment and taking action, there would be no opposition at all. As rational individuals, opposition leaders plan their moves carefully. Like economic entrepreneurs, they keep evaluating the external environment and calculating the costs and benefits of leading an opposition movement. They want to maximize their chances of success and minimize the risks and costs involved. They monitor all relevant elements carefully and adjust their moves according to changes in those elements.

I will, therefore, analyze the opposition leaders in Taiwan as political entrepreneurs working under a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system. In this part, I list the traits of a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system and measure the activities of Taiwan's opposition leaders against these traits one by one. In the

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66. Cheng, *supra* note 7, p. 4.

67. *Ibid.*

68. Yu-Shan Wu, "Marketization of Politics: The Taiwan Experience," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29 (April 1989), p. 385.

next part, I will further explore the vagaries of opposition leaders' behavior with regard to some prominent issues.

(1) Although the rules of the game put opposition leaders at a disadvantage, they can still form political parties or quasi-party organizations and participate in electoral competitions.

The opposition leaders in Taiwan made loose election coalitions first, then organized quasi-party organizations, and finally formed a political party. Each move was based on a careful assessment of the political environment.

In 1960, the KMT government arrested Lei Zhen and sentenced him to prison for ten years because he attempted to form a new political party.[69] Attempts to organize an opposition party in Taiwan, therefore, were non-existent until the mid-1970s, since opposition leaders did not want to follow Lei's steps. Instead, they ran for election as independent candidates and solicited individual resources while holding elective offices.

In the 1970s, several events gradually changed the political environment and induced opposition leaders to form loose election coalitions and sophisticated quasi-party organizations. In 1971, Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) was expelled from the United Nations and then was gradually isolated by international society.[70] Soon afterwards, then U.S. President Nixon sped up the U.S. normalization with China (the People's Republic of China, PRC) in 1972, which meant Taiwan was forsaken by its major supporter. These events caused a general unease in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek was ill[71] and his son Chiang Ching-kuo started to take political power. Chiang Ching-kuo, wanting to impress the people with reforms, for the first time opened a limited number of seats of

69. Lei Zhen was a mainlander and a KMT member. He and several other mainlander intellectuals wrote articles criticizing the hegemonic power of the Kuomintang and urging Chiang Kai-shek not to run for the third-term presidency in violation of the Chinese Constitution. They also requested the Kuomintang government to have political reform and adopt a democratic political system. Eventually he and several local Taiwanese politicians attempted to form the China Democratic Party.

70. From then on, the number of countries which still had diplomatic relationship with Taiwan decreased dramatically. For example, in 1971 Taiwan still retained official recognition from sixty-eight countries, but in 1973 that number dwindled to thirty-one. See Michael Y. M. Kau, "Taiwan and Beijing's Campaigns for Unification." in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), p. 188.

71. Chiang Kai-shek died in April 1975.

two national representative bodies for popular election.[72] Several opposition leaders saw the chance and participated in national elections and formed loose election coalitions. In 1973, four opposition candidates formed a loose local election coalition.[73] The result encouraged more coalitions in later elections. In 1977, an island-wide election campaign coalition was formed by opposition candidates who called themselves "*Dangwai* candidates." *Dangwai* literally means "outside of any political party" and is a sarcastic protest against the KMT's banning of political parties. From then on, since opposition leaders observed that the KMT government did not penalize their *Dangwai* election campaign organizations, they continued to use that banner for election purposes,[74] and waited for the right time to form a political party.

Since forming a political party was too risky, the opposition leaders tried a quasi-party organization first. In 1984, *Dangwai* elective officeholders formed the "*Dangwai* Public Policy Study As-

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72. For the first time, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed a Taiwanese, Hsieh Tung-min, as the governor of Taiwan Province in 1972. He also increased the recruitment of Taiwanese into high-ranking offices and encouraged policy suggestions from intellectuals. Accordingly, many KMT intellectuals started to ask the government to reform politics. They basically wrote articles to criticize the governmental policies and sponsored seminars to discuss alternatives. See Mab Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1976), *passim*. These intellectuals neither participated in any election, nor organized any opposition party. Their moderate requests were absorbed by Chiang Ching-kuo, who became the Premier of the Executive Yuan in 1972 and began to succeed his father's power. However, Chiang Ching-kuo also discouraged them from taking a further step to form any kind of long-term organization.

73. Hsiao-fong Lee, *Tai-wen Min-chu Yun-tung Si-shih-nien* (The Forty-Year Democratic Movement in Taiwan), 3rd ed. (Taipei: Independent Evening News Publishers, 1989), p. 114.

74. In the 1977 election coalition, several opposition officeholders helped to finance and make campaign speeches for the *Dangwai* candidates around the island. *Dangwai* candidates won 14.46% of total votes and 15.58% of total seats in the 1977 Taiwan Provincial Assembly elections (see Table 5.3). They also won 8.57% of total votes and 5% of total seats in the 1977 County Magistrate and City Mayor election (see Table 5.6). The 1977 election outcome encouraged *Dangwai* leaders to form a temporary "Dangwai Campaign Corps" in 1978 to provide *Dangwai* candidates with assistance and a common platform to present their ideology and policy positions for the upcoming election in that year. This campaign coalition had several functional departments in charge of different campaign affairs. It held fund-raising speeches and parties for its candidates. On the eve of the start of the 1978 formal election campaign, all *Dangwai* candidates held a quasi-party convention in Taipei City. This convention was the largest open meeting of opposition leaders in thirty years. See *ibid.*, p. 130. In 1982 and 1983, opposition leaders also formed a short-term "*Dangwai* Campaign Assistance Association" to coordinate election campaigns.

sociation." Although the KMT government threatened to dismiss the newly-formed organization, it did not repress it. Later that year, *Dangwai* candidates made a good showing in the elections and soon afterwards *Dangwai* leaders proposed to set up local branches of the "*Dangwai* Public Policy Study Association" around the island. They delayed carrying out the proposal because the KMT government seriously threatened to repress them. Then, in April 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo proposed several political reforms, including allowing the formation of political parties. Only a few days after that, the opposition leaders established nine local branches.[75] The KMT government again threatened to arrest them, but the opposition leaders asked some scholars to negotiate with the government since the President had often said, "We can negotiate." The government eventually did nothing about the local opposition branches.

Therefore, the opposition leaders, seeing a good chance of establishing a political party, made effective preparations. Between April and September 1986, the leaders held many rallies to promote their ideas of forming a new party, and obtained support from many people. Their decision to form the DPP in September was based on shrewd and correct calculations. If the KMT government were to repress them, then there could be two results. First, an election was only two months away. A possible repression might repeat the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979,[76] when the KMT imprisoned eight op-

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75. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.

76. On December 16, 1978, one week before the election, the United States announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979 and would sever diplomatic recognition of Taiwan (the Republic of China) on the same date. The newly elected President Chiang Ching-kuo immediately suspended the upcoming election indefinitely in response to this emergency. In 1979, *Dangwai* leaders held many meetings and rallies, and published many pamphlets and magazines to pressure the Kuomintang government to re-schedule the suspended election as soon as possible. The most provocative move of *Dangwai* leaders was to form a permanent quasi-party organization in the name of "*Formosa* Magazine Publishing House" with branch offices throughout the island. The key *Dangwai* leaders even hinted that if the Kuomintang government did not respond to the *Dangwai*'s requests, they would not rule out the possibility of using "radical" means. See *ibid.*, p. 147. The climax of the *Dangwai*-Kuomintang conflicts was the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979. In Kaohsiung City, a human rights rally sponsored by *Dangwai* leaders turned into violence between *Dangwai* supporters and the police. No one died in the incident, but many *Dangwai* leaders were arrested. Eight of them were accused of treason and sentenced to more than ten years in prison. The *Dangwai*'s quasi-party organization, "*Formosa* Magazine Publishing House", was dismissed by the government. After the incident, the Kuomintang government announced that the suspended election would be held at the end of 1980.

position core members. Second, as an opposition leader pointed out in the meeting that established the DPP, in response to the KMT's possible repression, all the DPP candidates could withdraw from the coming election and then the KMT government would have to face domestic and international pressures.[77] Moreover, immediately after that meeting, opposition leaders also "hastened to assure President Chiang through private channels" that the DPP would be a loyal opposition party.[78] In the end, the KMT government allowed the DPP to exist illegally.

(2) Opposition leaders vigorously participate in regularly held elections and win enough seats for them to accumulate resources. Their resources mainly come from donations, private goods exchange and the rewards of the elective offices.

I will discuss the opposition leaders' active participation in elections as career goals in the next section. Here I examine the opposition leaders' election results and the resources of leading opposition movements in Taiwan, with special attention to the rewards of holding elective office.

Dangwai/DPP candidates have increased their share of total votes since 1977 in six election categories, as seen in Tables 5.1-5.6.[79] Of all six categories, *Dangwai*/DPP candidates gained an average of 17.41% of the total votes between 1977 and 1992. In the early 1990s, their average vote percentage increased to 27.32%. As for the average seat percentage, they won 15.8% between 1977 and 1992; it increased to 24.91% in the early 1990s. Generally speaking, *Dangwai*/DPP was a little under-represented in Taiwan's elective offices, as shown in the *Dangwai*/DPP Seat/Vote Ratio in Tables 5.1-5.6. The election results gave the opposition leaders enough seats and incentives to run for election.

The resources that *Dangwai*/DPP leaders can collect by organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome, B(O), include the following: donations from overseas Taiwanese; donations from participants in the opposition rallies and demonstrations; electoral contributions from their supporters (mostly ordinary people and businessmen); proceeds from the sale of opposition books and

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-40.

78. Nathan and Chou, *supra* note 7, p. 141.

79. Among all six election categories, the Legislative Yuan election is the most important one in terms of power and prestige of all elective offices. In this category, for example, the vote percentages that *Dangwai*/DPP candidates received range from 13.45% to 31.6% (see Table 5.1).

magazines; and, material and non-material rewards of the elective offices.

Many overseas Taiwanese sympathize with the opposition causes and despise the KMT regime. They often donate generously to Taiwan's opposition movements. Soon after the DPP was formed, the party chairperson went overseas and raised over US$400,000. One-fourth of the DPP's budget, actually, comes from overseas donations.[80]

Opposition rallies and demonstrations also contributed donations. Usually, an opposition rally raised from US$250 to US$62,700. They raised more on special occasions. For instance, before three opposition leaders went to jail for political reasons, they held seven large-scale farewell rallies island-wide and raised more than US$100,000 in 1986.[81] The DPP's anniversary rally also raised more than US$40,000.

The opposition leaders also received donations from supporters during electoral campaigns.[82] Running for Taiwan Governor in 1994, for example, the DPP candidate Chen Ding-nan raised about US$3.8 million in ten days.[83] Similarly, in the same year, the DPP candidate for the mayor of Taipei City, Chen Shui-bian, raised US$1.4 million.[84]

Another monetary source is the proceeds from the sale of opposition publications. At its peak, for instance, the opposition magazine *Formosa* sold over 100,000 copies per issue.[85] Another opposition magazine, *Forward*, also sold well, and some free-lancers could make a living simply by writing for *Forward*.

All the above resources, in some way, contribute to the opposition leaders' participation in elections. Most opposition leaders won elections and held public offices, which gave them the biggest rewards. Such rewards can be material and non-material.

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80. *Tzu-lih Wan-pao* (Independence Evening News), January 31, 1989.

81. Tse Shiu, *Chiu-ling Nien-tai Tai-wan Chien-tu Chu-tao Jen-wu, Min-chin-tang Pien* (The Leaders of Taiwan's Future in the 1990s: The Leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party), Vol. 2 (Taipei: Tian Shiang Publishers, 1989), p. 63.

82. Since the chance for the opposition camp to become the ruling party was slim, but many opposition leaders could hold elective offices, the majority of donors bet on individual leaders rather than on the party. As a result, the opposition party was poor, but its leaders were fairly rich.

83. Yu, *supra* note 65, p. 4.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 96.

Material rewards include the salary and fringe benefits of elective office. Holding elective office may also gain other material rewards, like support from corporations. Elective offices are high-paying jobs compared to the average income of ordinary people. The annual income for the members of the Legislative Yuan in 1992-93, as shown in Table 5.7, was US$154,936, including the base salary, fringe benefits, and other incomes. Table 5.7 shows that their income far exceeds the income of ordinary people and average professors and equals the income of high-paying professionals like doctors and lawyers in Taiwan. Moreover, it is very close to the income of members of the U.S. Congress (US$168,202), although the GNP per capita of the U.S. is almost double that of Taiwan. In other words, the Legislative Yuan members in Taiwan have very high income. Other elective officeholders are paid equally well.[86] Furthermore, the elective officeholders can easily establish connections with corporations and get financial support. Several of Taiwan's largest corporations, such as Evergreen Group and Cathay Insurance Corporation, directly or indirectly donate money and staff to DPP Legislators, such as Hsieh Chang-ting and Chen Shui-bian.[87]

Non-material rewards involve primarily fame and power. Fame can be domestic and international. An officeholder may become known to everyone in Taiwan through the media because of his peculiar behavior in a legislature. Ju Gau-jeng, for instance, used obscene language and often engaged in a fistfight with the KMT legislators, and thus became the topic of headline news frequently. Accordingly, he received many interview opportunities, and thus was able to express his political ideas. Many other opposition officeholders obtained instant fame in Taiwan in similar ways. Internationally, too, some officeholders became quite famous. For instance, Kang Ning-shiang, soon after being elected to the Taipei City Council, was invited by the U.S. State Department for a visit in 1970. Foreign reporters interviewed him as soon as they came to Taiwan. Five years later, Kang was chosen as one of the brightest Asian politicians by *Time* magazine.

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86. For instance, the annual income for members of the Provincial Assembly in 1992-93 was US$94,635. The annual income for the members of the Taipei Special Municipal Council in 1992-93 was US$105,998.

87. See *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Central Daily News), July 9, 1992, p. 2. On average, a Legislator hires two assistants. However, Hsieh Chang-ting and Chen Shui-bian each had more than five assistants. Ju Gau-jeng had more than ten assistants. Most of these assistants were paid by business people who supported these opposition leaders.

An elective office also means power. An elective officeholder can do many things which otherwise cannot be achieved. They have special access to classified documents, such as those concerning national security, defense, and important economic policies. They can also pressure the government to release their political-prisoner relatives and friends. For instance, many opposition leaders were imprisoned after the Kaohsiung Incident. Later, their close relatives got elected and made the government release them prior to completion of their sentence.

In addition, elective offices can help opposition leaders to secure decision-making positions in their party (or quasi-party organizations). Their words carry weight when the party decides who will be nominated as candidates for election. Therefore, they often get themselves, their relatives or friends nominated. Many opposition leaders holding elective offices are related, such as husband and wife, parents and children, siblings, and distant relatives. They usually got nominated first through the influence of an elective officeholder from their family. The Yu family, for instance, has had seven members holding different elective offices at different times, and currently three of them are still officeholders.

Because of the various rewards[88] just mentioned, it is obvious that *Dangwai*/DPP members seeking public offices always have these benefits in the back of their minds. This partly explains why most of them, when holding office, want to keep it or run for a higher position, and those who do not have a position often try to win one.

(3) Opposition leaders establish a "professional" career path within the electoral system; their career revolves around occupying elective offices for a long time. Thus, political opposition becomes institutionalized, and professionalism of opposition leaders emerges.

To prove that opposition leaders in Taiwan center around occupying elective offices, we can check the career patterns of the DPP's core members. These core members have been elected to the party's two most important decision-making bodies, the Central Standing Committee and the Central Executive Committee, as shown in Appendix C.[89] The former has had 30 five-term members

88. In addition to the rewards discussed in the text, both "honest graft" and "dishonest graft" mentioned by George Washington Plunkitt are also potential rewards available to opposition leaders. See William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E. P. Dutton., 1963), pp. 3-6.

89. The Central Executive Committee consists of 31 members who are directly elected by the DPP National Congress. It meets every three months. During recess, its

and only two of them have never sought or held any elected office.[90] Similarly, the latter has had 79 five-term members, and only 8 members have never sought or held elected offices.[91] In other words, 93% of the members of the Central Standing Committee and 87% of the members of the Central Executive Committee actually held public offices or intended to pursue one. Therefore, for the majority of them, holding public office is more attractive than merely being core party members.

Moreover, Table 5.8 shows that a majority of them ran for elective offices over and over again. For instance, Tsai Jie-hsiung ran for Taiwan Provincial Assembly elections and was elected seven times consecutively (1968-94). Many others ran for different offices at different times. For instance, one of the Yu family members, Yu Chen Yueh-yin, ran for Taiwan Provincial Assembly four times (1963-77), and for Kaohsiung County Magistrate three times (1981-89). She lost only once in these seven elections.

Of all the 28 DPP Central Standing Committee members who have held or pursued elective offices, eighteen moved from a lower elective office to a higher one.[92] For example, six DPP members of the Taipei Special Municipal Council ran for the Legislative Yuan, a higher position, and five of them were elected. Again, of the 28 DPP members just mentioned, 19 have remained in the same elective office for at least one term and some of them held the same

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duties are performed by the Central Standing Committee. The Central Standing Committee consists of 11 members who are elected by 31 members of the Central Executive Committee. The Central Standing Committee meets once a week.

90. The Central Standing Committee consists of 11 members. According to the DPP Charter, the Committee members serve a term of two years and can be reelected. However, from 1986 to 1991, the Committee was re-organized four times. Through five terms of the Central Standing Committee, there have been 30 non-overlapping members.

91. The DPP Central Executive Committee consists of 31 members, of which 11 members are also the Central Standing Committee members. According to the DPP Charter, the Central Executive members shall serve a term of one year and can be reelected. However, from 1986 to 1991, the Committee was only re-organized four times. Through five terms of the Central Executive Committee, there were 79 non-overlapping members. Among the eight non-office seekers, two had close relatives who held elective offices then.

92. Among all elective offices, members of the Legislative Yuan have the most prestigious status and power; county magistrates and municipal mayors have similar power and status. Therefore, these two types of elective offices are the goals of many opposition leaders. Once they are elected into these two offices (especially the members of the Legislative Yuan), they seek to make a long-term career out of these offices. Many opposition leaders holding lesser offices usually run for higher offices later.

position for more than four terms. Moreover, none of the 28 DPP members had directly moved to a lower position.[93]

In 1990, I interviewed 20 DPP leaders.[94] I asked the fourteen elective officeholders if they were interested in reelections. Twelve of them said yes. Later, eleven of them actually did so and were elected, and the only one who failed to do so died before the election.[95] Of the two officeholders who did not say yes, one simply refused to answer my question, and the other was undecided at that time; both, however, later ran for reelection and won their seats.[96] As to the six non-officeholders, only one expressed interest in running for election, but later five did so and four of them were elected.[97] My interviews with these DPP leaders further confirm that opposition elective officeholders want to keep their jobs and non-officeholders want to pursue one.

Some opposition leaders were against elections at first, but later they also became very enthusiastic about elections. The radi-

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93. Hsu Jung-shu was a Legislator when she ran for the Mayor of Taichung City in 1989. She lost the election and later ran for the National Assembly in 1991 and got elected. Kang Ning-shiang had been a Legislator for a long time and decided not to run for reelection in 1989. However, in 1991 he became a member of the National Assembly as the DPP's nationwide deputy (he was not elected by popular votes but took one of the seats assigned to the DPP based on the DPP's vote percentage).

94. All the interviews were conducted between May 8 and May 28, 1990. At the time of the interviews, fourteen of the interviewees were holding elected offices. Nine were Legislators of the Legislative Yuan: Hong Chi-chang, Hsieh Chang-ting, Ju Gau-jeng, Chen Shui-bian, Lin Cheng-chieh, Liu Wen-hsiung, Lu Hsiu-yi, Pang Pai-shien, and Wei Yao-chien. Five were members of the Taipei Special Municipal Council: Chou Bo-luen, Li I-iang, Shie Ming-da, Chou Bo-ia, and Ben Shing-i. Among the six non-officeholders, Chang Chun-hong, Kang Ning-shiang, Jiang Peng-jian, held elective offices before. Tsai Shih-yen, Lin Juo-shui, and Chiou I-ren never held elective offices before. However, Tsai Shih-jian ran for election before and lost.

95. Legislator Liu Wen-hsiung died in 1990.

96. Legislator Wei Yao-chien was undecided when asked whether he would run for reelection. Taipei City Councilman Li I-iang did not answer the question whether he would run for reelection.

97. Among the six non-officeholders, Chang Chun-hong, Kang Ning-shiang and Jiang Peng-jian had held elective offices before. Chang and Kang did not answer the question whether they would run in future elections, but later did run for election and won their seats. Jiang mentioned he did not want to run for future election, but he ran for the 1992 Legislative election and lost. Among the three other non-officeholders, Tsai Shih-yen who ran for election before expressed his willingness to run for future election and did so later and won a seat. Lin Jou-shui and Chiou I-ren who had never ran for any election mentioned that they did not want to run for future election. However, Lin ran in the 1991 National Assembly elections and lost but won a seat in the 1992 Legislative elections.

cal wing of the DPP/*Dangwai*, the "New Tide" faction,[98] stressed street demonstrations and despised elections.[99] They thought that the opposition leaders holding elective offices were playing the KMT's game and seeking to further their selfish interests. Later, however, many of them participated in elections and became officeholders themselves. Their major magazine, *The Movement*, had a 25-member editing board in the beginning,[100] and yet twelve of them ran for election and ten were elected; later, almost all of them ran for reelection. In other words, these opposition leaders changed their original political ideas, ran for election and reelection, and made officeholding their careers.

According to these statistics and analysis, most opposition leaders treat holding elective office as a career. Once they were elected, they wanted to keep office or pursue a higher position, and their major concerns were to be elected and reelected.

(4) Opposition leaders choose peaceful competition instead of violent insurgencies.

Under the hegemonic power of the KMT government, opposition leaders are unable to develop a coercive organization to impose sanctions on people in Taiwan in order to garner resources. As a result, they seldom resort to violence in opposing the regimes. The main reasons are that they can win a resource base by participating in elections and they calculate that it is too costly and not worthwhile to use a revolutionary approach. Routine gains of a number of elective offices satisfied the modest needs of opposition leaders and deterred them from using violence, such as bombings and assassinations, in their power struggle with the KMT government.[101]

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98. The major members of the "New-Tide" faction came from "the *Dangwai* Association of Magazine Editors and Writers" which was formed on September 9, 1983. See Lee, *supra* note 73, p. 191. Some of them were campaign assistants of several opposition leaders. Others were editors and writers for the opposition magazines.

99. See I-iang Li, "Elective Offices—Only a Means for Serving Social Movements," (in Chinese), *Hsin-chao-liou* (The Movement), No. 1, February 20, 1989, pp. 18-25.

100. The list of the 25 members of the editing board is based on the first issue of *The Movement*, January 20, 1989, p. 3.

101. Violent methods were occasionally used by radical Taiwanese exiles in the United States. For instance, a mail bomb was sent to the Taiwanese Governor Hsieh Tung-min by a member of an overseas Taiwan Independence organization. Hsieh lost a hand in the incident. Chiang Ching-kuo himself escaped an assassination attempt by a Taiwanese during his visit to the United States in 1970.

III. FURTHER EXAMINATIONS OF TAIWAN'S OPPOSITION LEADERS

Since Taiwan's opposition leaders only adopt nonviolent tactics, they need a set of target issues with which to challenge the KMT regime.[102] In the past two decades, opposition leaders have centered on democratic reforms and the issue of "Taiwanese vs. mainlanders."[103] They raised these target issues to pressure the KMT government and to arouse popular support for electoral campaigns, "illegal" rallies and demonstrations, books and magazines, and parliamentary debates in the mid-1980s. To analyze the opposition leaders' behavior in greater depth, I will focus on the ways in which they manipulated the issue of "Taiwanese vs. mainlanders."

This issue can be traced back to the Incident of February 28, 1947,[104] in which thousands of Taiwanese were killed by soldiers

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102. As DeNardo points out, when a movement commits itself to nonviolent tactics, the problem of developing a strategy boils down to selecting governmental policies to oppose and proposing replacements to attract popular support to urge the change of the status quo. See James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 58. He defines the target set as "the set of policies that are targets for disruption." See *ibid.*, p. 41.

103. Although they have heterogeneous backgrounds, all the opposition leaders in Taiwan included in their target set of issues six specific governmental policies before 1987. Five issues were related to the KMT government's non-democratic policies: (1) martial law; (2) the prohibition of forming new political parties; (3) suspension of the total reelection of the delegates to the central parliamentary bodies; (4) restrictions on the free publication of journals and newspapers; and, (5) "three-no" policy, i.e., no negotiations, no compromise, and no contacts between Taiwan and the Chinese Communist government. The sixth issue was related to "Taiwanese vs. mainlanders" and opposition leaders chose to attack KMT's "one China" policy and the prohibition of the "Taiwan Independence Movement." To replace this target set, the opposition leaders advocated: (1) lifting of the martial law; (2) the freedom of forming political parties; (3) reelection of all the delegates in the central parliamentary bodies; (4) the freedom of publishing journals and newspapers; (5) transportational, commercial, postal, and other contacts with mainland China; and, (6) "self-determination" concerning the future status of Taiwan, which should be determined by ballots of all residents in Taiwan.

104. The major conflicts between mainlanders and Taiwanese could be attributed to their political power struggle. At the beginning, Chinese officials who were assigned to take over Taiwan by Chiang Kai-shek dominated the whole Taiwan provincial governmental structure. For example, the average replacement rates of Japanese by mainlanders in the Taiwan Administration Office (the predecessor of the Taiwan Provincial Government) in 1946 was 87.5 percent. See Nai-te Wu, *supra* note 62, p. 209. Similarly, the average replacement rate of Japanese by mainlanders in city and county governments in 1946 was 61.8 percent. See *ibid.*, p. 213. The great majority of all high-ranking positions in the administration, army, and police forces were occupied by mainlanders then. As a result, local Taiwanese felt they were betrayed and denied access to the decision-making process. They had been deprived of political rights by the Japanese

sent by the KMT government from mainland China.[105] There was, therefore, a certain level of hostility between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Mainlanders mainly include those who migrated to Taiwan from different Chinese provinces after 1945 and their offspring born in Taiwan.[106] After the KMT government moved to Taiwan in 1949, it favored mainlanders over Taiwanese in political power distribution.[107] It also restricted the use of the Taiwanese dialect.[108]

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earlier, and now they felt the same frustration and bitterness under the Kuomintang government. Many of them thought that there was no difference between the Japanese and the Kuomintang governments. Both of them were foreign and imposed their power on the Taiwanese. Some Taiwanese thought that the Kuomintang government was essentially an *emigré regime* and did not have a social and economic basis of ruling. See Tak-wing Ngo, "The Emergence of Political Opposition in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Taiwan," unpublished Master Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1989, p. 18. Furthermore, the rampant corruption of Kuomintang officials who were assigned to take over Taiwan in 1945 and the economic depression due to poor economic policies and the Chinese civil war increased Taiwanese hatred towards the Taiwan Administration Office which was dominated by mainlanders. See Guo-huei Dai and Iun-iun Ie, *Ai-tseng Erh-erh-pa* (Love and Hatred February 28) (Taipei: Iuan Liou Publishers, 1992), pp. 105-85. This bitter feeling escalated into a large riot on February 28, 1947, and violent confrontations in the months that followed. Throughout the whole incident, the Kuomintang government used force to repress both violent mobs and innocent people.

105. Estimates of the number of dead range from 1,000 to 100,000. A reasonable estimate sets the number on several thousand. Some of the victims were killed by the angry mobs. Among the dead, most of them were Taiwanese, including many renowned Taiwanese intellectuals; some of them were mainlanders. See Tse-Han Lai, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 158-59, 160-63.

106. In 1949, more than 600,000 soldiers and civilians from different provinces in China moved to Taiwan. In 1952, these so-called "mainlanders" constituted 8 percent of Taiwan's population. In 1964, the percentage increased to 12.9. See Tai, *supra* note 7, p. 416. Most of the mainlanders cannot speak southern Fukienese (Min-nan dialect) which is the major dialect Taiwanese speak. The ancestors of most local Taiwanese originally were also immigrants from the Fukien Province in mainland China, but they came to Taiwan one or two centuries earlier than mainlanders.

107. In the economic arena, however, Taiwanese had been dominant in the accumulation of wealth and economic influence. See Gail S. Bradley and Douglas P. Murray, "Introduction," in Jerome Alan Cohen, Edward Friedman, Harold C. Hinton, and Allen S. Whiting, eds., *Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S.-China Relations* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 16; Lucian W. Pye, "Taiwan's Development and Its Implications for Beijing and Washington," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 26 (June 1986), p. 622; Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 38; Moody, *supra* note 8, p. 59. As a whole, Taiwanese were not educationally, economically, or socially discriminated against and ordinary mainlanders did not enjoy any superior status or treatment in those aspects. Therefore, there was very little restriction on social mobility in Taiwan and ethnic problems, such as the one between the white and black South Africans, did not occur in Taiwan. See Charlotte Shiang-Yun Wang, "Social Mobility in Taiwan," in James C. Hsi-

Constituting the majority of Taiwan's population,[109] the Taiwanese were very unhappy about the élite mainlanders' regime, although Taiwanese and mainlanders are not ethnically different.[110]

The opposition leaders did not actively utilize this issue until the mid-1980s when they began to use it in conjunction with the

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ung et al., eds., *Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience 1950-1980* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 256.

108. In order to make mandarin Chinese an official language, the Kuomintang government restricted the hours of TV programs spoken in the Taiwanese dialect everyday and discouraged students and civil servants from speaking the Taiwanese dialect at schools and in offices. See Moody, *supra* note 8, p. 57. In addition to the asymmetric distribution of political power between Taiwanese and mainlanders and the tension generated by the incident of February 28, 1947, this limited restriction on the usage of Taiwanese gave opposition leaders an appealing target issue to attack the Kuomintang government, which was dominated by mainlanders. Interestingly, because of the successful promotion of speaking mandarin, almost every person who was born in Taiwan after 1945 can speak mandarin fluently. Therefore, when tens of thousands of Taiwanese business people invested in and travelled to mainland China in the past few years, they had no problem to communicate with their counterparts in China, which also uses mandarin as the official language.

109. The true native Taiwanese are the aborigines who do not belong to the Han ethnic group. The aborigines constitute 1.5 percent of Taiwan's population; while Taiwanese and mainlanders constitute 85 percent and 13.5 percent, respectively, as of 1990. See John F. Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 8. Taiwan's population was near 20 million in 1990.

110. Taiwanese are ethnically "Chinese" in the same sense as the Cantonese, Shanghaiese, or other Han people in China's different provinces (see Bradley and Murray, *supra* note 107, pp. 15-16; Ngo, *supra* note 104, p. 40). Basically people from different provinces speak different dialects. Some of the dialects are very different from the Chinese official spoken language, mandarin, but some are close to the mandarin. Therefore, there are different degrees of difficulty in oral communication between people from different provinces. However, all of the Han people share a common written language and many similar customs. Therefore, beyond dialectal differences, one can hardly distinguish Taiwanese from mainlanders from their appearance. It is misleading to say that mainlanders and Taiwanese are different ethnic groups and the problems between them are ethnic problems. For instance, Bruce Jacobs claims that the conflict between the Taiwanese and mainlanders is a conflict between two different ethnolinguistic groups. See Jacobs, *supra* note 7, p. 239. A reporter of a major U.S. newspaper even claims that Taiwanese are not ethnic Han but ethnic Taiwanese. See Steven Mufson, "Taiwan Elections Raise Questions of Ethnicity and Reunification," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1994, p. A21. Although some scholars indicate the common Chinese ancestry between Taiwanese and mainlanders, they still treat the problem between Taiwanese and mainlanders as an ethnic problem. See Tai, *supra* note 7, p. 424; Alexander Ya-li Lu, "Future Domestic Developments in the Republic of China on Taiwan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 25 (November 1985), p. 1085; Fan and Feigert, *supra* note 9, p. 459; Tien, *supra* note 7, p. 36; Copper, *supra* note 109, pp. 36-39; Huang, *supra* note 8, p. 123; Moody, *supra* note 8, p. 60; Simon Long, *Taiwan: China's Last Frontier* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 62.

problems of Taiwan's power structure and Taiwan's independence. In rallies, campaigns, and magazines, opposition leaders often cited statistical evidence showing how Taiwanese were being discriminated against politically. They enumerated how the KMT government assigned the most important positions, like police chiefs and generals, to mainlanders. Meanwhile, they stressed the difference between mainlanders and Taiwanese and urged that Taiwanese become their own masters instead of being ruled by the KMT government. Through such actions, opposition leaders reinforced Taiwanese hostility against the KMT government, and also gained the support of many Taiwanese.

Moreover, opposition leaders published sensational reports of the KMT senior officials, all mainlanders. They stressed the corrupt aspects of these officials' private lives, such as having concubines and making money illegally. They often fabricated behind-closed-door stories. Accordingly, they created the impression that the KMT government consisted only of such corrupt mainlander officials. They also realized lucrative revenues from such publications.

When delivering speeches in electoral campaigns, opposition leaders always spoke in Taiwanese to distinguish themselves from the ruling regime. They used slang deftly to ridicule the government and amuse the audience. Through manipulating the Taiwanese dialect, opposition leaders often could arouse the Taiwanese audience's emotions and prejudices.

When they saw the chance, opposition leaders brought these opposition tactics to the Legislative Yuan. During an interpellation session at a Legislative meeting in 1987, for instance, an opposition leader asserted that the twelve DPP legislators represented all the 1.8 million residents in Taiwan.[111] Another opposition leader, Ju Gau-jeng, accused the lifetime legislators, all mainlanders, of being parasites, living off Taiwan's tax-payers. He also stated that most Taiwanese could not understand the mandarin Chinese used on TV and in radio.[112] Although only the older generation of Taiwanese could not understand mandarin, Ju somehow twisted the fact to intensify the Taiwanese-mainlanders conflict. He also spoke in Taiwanese and, when some lifetime legislators scolded him with four-letter words in mandarin, he retorted with four-letter words in Taiwanese. Through similar manipulations of this issue, opposition

111. Mu-hsing Jeng, *Tai-wan I-hui Si-shih nien* (The Forty-Year Parliamentary Politics in Taiwan) (Taipei: Independent Evening News Publishers, 1987), p. 272.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

leaders succeeded in gaining sympathy from many Taiwanese through the media. Some lifetime delegates could not stand such insults and retired, and finally in 1991 the KMT government forced all lifetime delegates to retire.

Meanwhile, many new-generation opposition leaders (the precursor of the "New Tide" faction) turned the issue of "Taiwanese vs. mainlanders" into that of "Taiwan's independence vs. unification with mainland China." Actually, a significant number of Taiwanese supported the idea of Taiwan's independence; the percentage varied from 8.2% to 29% during 1989-95 and averaged 16.1%.[113] Many Taiwanese hated the KMT government and, by extension, its "One-China" policy, which claimed that it represented the whole China. Some Taiwan-born mainlanders also supported Taiwan's independence because, unlike their parents, they did not really feel an affinity with mainland China. Many overseas political exiles from Taiwan especially supported Taiwan's independence since they were the KMT regime's victims. Accordingly, they were usually big donors to the cause.

Since Taiwan's independence was a highly sensitive issue, the new-generation opposition leaders did not openly advocate Taiwan's independence at first. In 1983, they pushed the idea of "self-determination," *i.e.*, Taiwan's future ought to be determined by all the residents in Taiwan, and not by China which claimed Taiwan as its territory. The subtlety in this proposal was that the KMT government, like China, also considered the mainland and Taiwan as one entity. Like the Communist government on the mainland, the KMT government consisted primarily of mainlanders and did not truly represent the people in Taiwan.

The skillful phrasing of "self-determination" put the KMT government at an impasse. It condemned the implication of Taiwan's independence in the proposal but found it hard to repress it. Moreover, many people supported the idea of self-determination because they did not want China to take over Taiwan. They also agreed that the KMT's lifetime delegates could not represent them. The sense of Taiwan being a unique political entity kept growing. At one point, even the mainlander President Chiang Ching-kuo said, "I am also a Taiwanese."

To further promote the idea of Taiwan's independence, the new-generation opposition leaders worked on language and education. The Taiwanese dialect was a spoken and not a written lan-

113. *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Central Daily News), January 5, 1995, p. 1.

guage, but they used Chinese characters to give it a written form. They also established a private college specifically dedicated to Taiwanese studies. Opposing the official language, mandarin, the college used the Taiwanese dialect for education, and focused solely on Taiwan's history and culture. Meanwhile, opposition leaders recruited new members in student organizations in many universities.

While promoting Taiwan's independence, these leaders also used this issue to speed up their political careers. Before 1983, *Dangwai* as a whole did not have a counter-policy against the KMT's "One-China" policy. The promotion of "self-determination," therefore, made these new-generation leaders distinct from the old-generation elective officeholders, most of whom were unwilling to touch the sensitive issue but had to accept the resolution reluctantly.[114] In other words, through manipulating the issue of "self-determination," the new-generation leaders rose in stature in their quasi-party organization. They made "self-determination" one of the general planks for *Dangwai*'s election campaigns in 1983, despite the fact that some old-generation candidates did not follow. In 1986, they included it in the DPP's Charter.

Gradually, the "New-Tide" leaders increased their number of representatives in the DPP decision-making bodies. Their candidates won the DPP nomination for many elections. On the eve of the 1989 elections, forty-one "New-Tide" candidates founded "The New Country Alliance" proposing a new constitution and a new independent Taiwan. Nineteen of them won. From then on, the "New-Tide" leaders have established their own resource bases through occupying elective offices, and have become a dominant force in determining the policy orientation of the DPP. Finally, against the preference of the old-generation leaders, these leaders successfully pushed "the Taiwan-independence plank" into the amended DPP party charter in 1991. Since then, the issue of Taiwan's independence has become a salient issue in every election.

Despite the complexity of Taiwan's politics, elections make Taiwan unique as a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system. The KMT regime has used elections to give itself legitimacy and to

114. For the majority of *Dangwai* leaders who held elective offices, they supported the resolution of "self-determination," but they did not want to push the issue of Taiwan's independence to the extreme which would annoy both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist regime. In the past decades, the Kuomintang government had always severely punished those people who advocated Taiwan's independence. Also, the Chinese Communist government has proclaimed that if Taiwan announced independence, China will use force to intervene.

put forward a democratic facade; by manipulating the election rules, it can secure its ruling status. Elections also offer opposition leaders a good chance to promote their political ideas and to collect resources. Since the rewards of holding elective offices are large, most opposition leaders have made a career of running for elections and holding offices. They are political entrepreneurs calculating costs and benefits and maximizing the gains of their moves; their moves center on getting elected and reelected. Even most of the "New-Tide" leaders, who were against elections at first, have become enthusiastic about elections and made officeholding their careers.

Consequently, elections offered Taiwan a peaceful forum for political competition. Although the competition was not truly fair, opposition leaders performed monitoring functions to a certain extent. Therefore, on the whole, the people in Taiwan benefitted from opposition movements and were not victims of them, like many people in autocratic systems.

TABLE 5.1 LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTIONS, 1969-92*

	1969	1972	1975	1980	1983	1986	1989	1992
Popular Vote (%) KMT	72.67	64.31	76.22	70.03	69.16	65.30	57.29	59.11
YCP&CDSP	3.02	5.57	4.06	0.74	0.40	0.08	0.16	0.02
Independent	19.29	23.47	17.18	12.86	10.07	8.42	10.32	7.42
Dangwai/DPP	0	0	0	13.45	18.40	23.96	28.84	31.60
Invalid Vote	4.39	6.65	2.54	2.92	1.97	2.24	3.39	1.85
Dangwai/DPP Seat (%)	0	0	0	15.39	11.32	20.00	22.79	31.09
D./DPP Seat/Vote Ratio	.	.	.	1.14	0.62	0.84	0.79	0.98

Sources: For vote turnout, *Chung-hua-min-kuo Hsuen-chu Kai-kuan* (Summary of Elections in the Republic of China), Vol. 1 (Taipei: Republic of China Central Election Commission, 1984), and supplemented by updating reports from the ROC Central Election Commission and newspaper reports; for candidates' party affiliation, *ibid.*, and supplemented by Hsiao-fong Lee, *The Forty Year Democratic Movement in Taiwan* (in Chinese) (Taipei, Independent Evening News Publisher, 1989). All statistics have been computed by the author.
Notes: *All statistics do not include the votes of aborigine and occupational groups.
KMT = Kuomintang; YCP&CDSP = Young China Party & China Democratic Socialist Party; Independent = All candidates who have no party affiliation or belong to political parties other than KMT, YCP, CDSP and DPP; *Dangwai* = the predecessor of DPP, a collection of opposition leaders between 1977 to 1986; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, formed in 1986; *Dangwai*/DPP Seat (%) = the percentage of seats *Dangwai*/DPP won in the Legislative Yuan. The *Dangwai*/DPP seat/vote ratio is the percentage of *Dangwai* (later DPP) Legislative Yuan seats won, divided by the *Dangwai*/DPP percentage of the total votes received.

TABLE 5.2 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 1969-91*

	1969	1972	1980	1986	1991
Popular Vote (%) KMT	74.28	61.24	63.80	63.04	67.46
YCP&CDSP	2.89	0	0.11	0.19	0.03
Independent	17.84	31.95	22.20	14.32	7.44
Dangwai/DPP	0	0	10.70	19.43	23.04
Invalid Vote	4.99	6.81	3.19	3.02	2.03
Dangwai/DPP Seat (%)	0	0	7.84	15.25	18.72
D./DPP Seat/Vote Ratio	.	.	0.73	0.79	0.81

Sources: Same as Table 5.1.
Notes: *All statistics do not include the votes of aborigine and occupational groups.
KMT = Kuomintang; YCP&CDSP = Young China Party & China Democratic Socialist Party; Independent = All candidates who have no party affiliation or belong to political parties other than KMT, YCP, CDSP and DPP; *Dangwai* = the predecessor of DPP, a collection of opposition leaders between 1977 to 1986; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, formed in 1986; *Dangwai*/DPP Seat (%) = the percentage of seats *Dangwai*/DPP won in the National Assembly. The *Dangwai*/DPP seat/vote ratio is the percentage of *Dangwai*/DPP National Assembly seats won, divided by the *Dangwai*/DPP percentage of the total votes received.

TABLE 5.3 TAIWAN PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 1972-89*

	1972	1977	1981	1985	1989
Popular Vote (%) KMT	67.32	62.79	70.37	67.46	60.00
YCP&CDSP	0.32	0	0.12	0.71	0.09
Independent	26.86	18.51	19.01	13.93	11.75
Dangwai/DPP	0	14.46	7.83	15.16	24.71
Invalid Vote	5.5	4.24	2.67	2.74	3.45
Dangwai/DPP Seat (%)	0	15.58	10.39	14.29	20.78
D./DPP Seat/ Vote Ratio	.	1.08	1.33	0.94	0.84

Sources: For vote turnout, *Chung-hua-min-kuo Hsuen-chu Kai-kuang* (Summary of Elections in the Republic of China), Vol. 2 (Taipei: Republic of China Central Election Commission, 1984), and same as Table 5.1.

Notes: *Because of incomplete election data of 1957, 1960, 1963 and 1968, the statistics here omits those four years.

KMT = Kuomintang; YCP&CDSP = Young China Party & China Democratic Socialist Party; Independent = All candidates who have no party affiliation or belong to political parties other than KMT, YCP, CDSP and DPP; *Dangwai* = the predecessor of DPP, a collection of opposition leaders between 1977 to 1986; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, formed in 1986; *Dangwai*/DPP Seat (%) = the percentage of seats *Dangwai*/DPP won in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. The *Dangwai*/DPP seat/vote ratio is the percentage of *Dangwai* (later DPP) Taiwan Provincial Assembly seats won, divided by the *Dangwai*/DPP percentage of the total votes received.

TABLE 5.4 TAIPEI SPECIAL MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1969-89

	1969	1973	1977	1981	1985	1989
Popular Vote (%) KMT	83.89	82.06	77.45	67.47	70.55	67.25
YCP&CDSP	0.91	0	0	0.20	0	0.03
Independent	13.21	15.46	9.68	13.94	6.4	7.14
Dangwai/DPP	0	0	10.19	16.00	20.89	22.68
Invalid Vote	1.99	2.48	2.68	2.39	2.16	2.90
Dangwai/DPP Seat (%)	0	0	11.77	15.69	21.57	27.45
D./DPP Seat/Vote Ratio	.	.	1.16	0.98	1.03	1.21

Sources: Same as Table 5.3.
Notes: KMT = Kuomintang; YCP&CDSP = Young China Party & China Democratic Socialist Party; Independent = All candidates who have no party affiliation or belong to political parties other than KMT, YCP, CDSP and DPP; *Dangwai* = the predecessor of DPP, a collection of opposition leaders between 1977 to 1986; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, formed in 1986; *Dangwai*/DPP Seat (%) = the percentage of seats *Dangwai*/DPP won in the Taipei Special Municipal Council. The *Dangwai*/DPP seat/vote ratio is the percentage of *Dangwai* (later DPP) Taipei Special Municipal Council seats won, divided by the *Dangwai*/DPP percentage of the total votes received.

TABLE 5.5 KAOHSIUNG SPECIAL MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1981-89

	1981	1985	1989
Popular Vote (%) KMT	67.47	71.64	60.90
YCP&CDSP	0.10	0	0
Independent	28.81	18.66	15.96
Dangwai/DPP	2.14	7.47	20.40
Invalid Vote	1.48	2.23	2.74
Dangwai/DPP Seat (%)	0	7.14	18.61
D./DPP Seat/Vote Ratio	0	0.96	0.91

Sources: Same as Table 5.3.
Notes: KMT = Kuomintang; YCP&CDSP = Young China Party & China Democratic Socialist Party; Independent = All candidates who have no party affiliation or belong to political parties other than KMT, YCP, CDSP and DPP; *Dangwai* = the predecessor of DPP, a collection of opposition leaders between 1977 to 1986; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, formed in 1986; *Dangwai*/DPP Seat (%) = the percentage of seats *Dangwai*/DPP won in the Kaohsiung Special Municipal Council. The *Dangwai*/DPP seat/vote ratio is the percentage of *Dangwai* (later DPP) Kaohsiung Special Municipal Council seats won, divided by the *Dangwai*/DPP percentage of the total votes received.

TABLE 5.6 COUNTY MAGISTRATE AND CITY MAYOR ELECTIONS, 1957-89*

	1957	1960	1964	1968	1972	1977	1981	1985	1989
Popular Vote (%) KMT	64.35	68.17	73.94	69.65	74.33	66.93	57.66	59.74	51.01
YCP&CDSP	0	0	3.62	2.26	0	0	0.30	0.41	0
Independent	32.36	26.34	20.43	23.21	20.90	19.53	17.17	21.45	8.71
Dangwai/DPP	0	0	0	0	0	8.57	22.13	14.24	37.14
Invalid Vote	3.29	5.49	2.01	4.88	4.77	4.97	2.74	4.16	3.14
Dangwai/DPP Seat (%)	0	0	0	0	0	5.00	15.79	4.77	28.57
D./DPP Seat/Vote Ratio	.	.	.	.	.	0.58	0.71	0.33	0.77

Sources: Same as Table 5.3.
Notes: *Because of incomplete election data of 1951 and 1954, the statistics here does not include those two years.
KMT = Kuomintang; YCP&CDSP = Young China Party & China Democratic Socialist Party; Independent = All candidates who have no party affiliation or belong to political parties other than KMT, YCP, CDSP and DPP; *Dangwai* = the predecessor of DPP, a collection of opposition leaders between 1977 to 1986; DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, formed in 1986; *Dangwai*/DPP Seat (%) = the percentage of seats *Dangwai*/DPP won in County Magistrate and City Mayor elections. The *Dangwai*/DPP seat/vote ratio is the percentage of *Dangwai* (later DPP) County Magistrate and City Mayor seats won, divided by the *Dangwai* (DPP) percentage of the total votes received.

TABLE 5.7 1992 ANNUAL INCOME OF LEGISLATORS COMPARED TO OTHER PROFESSIONALS* (US$)**

	Salary	Fringe Benefits & Others	Total
Professionals			
Legislator of Legislative Yuan	59,818	95,118	154,936
Average Lawyer & Doctor	83,565	.	83,565
Top 1% Lawyer & Doctor	238,758	.	238,758
Associate Professor	31,038	.	31,038
GNP per capita	10,196	.	10,196
Member of US Congress	168,202	.	168,202

Sources: Data of annual income of Legislators of the Legislative Yuan are offered by Chiong-huei Peng, assistant of Legislator Jin-ping Wang. The income level of Taiwan's doctors and lawyers is according to Dr. Huang Fang-ian, Deputy Director of Taiwan's newly built Shin Guang Hospital. The annual income of U.S. Congressmen is estimated by Walter L. Updegrave, "What Congress Really Costs You: $2.8 Billion a Year," *Money*, August 1992, p. 132. Taiwan's GNP per capita is from *The Free China Journal* (February 26, 1993), p. 8.

Notes: *Except for members of the U.S. Congress, all professionals refer to Taiwan's professionals.

**As of August 1992, US$1 = NT$25.13

Fringe benefits include year-end bonus money, gasoline fee, meal fee, stamps and stationery fee, cellular phone expense, travelling fee and public relations fee. The total amount of fringe benefits is worth $31,942. Other incomes, including over-time pay and stipend for hiring legislative assistants, amount to $63,176. The total amount does not include health benefit and other non-monetary benefits.

TABLE 5.8 THIRTY DPP NON-OVERLAPPING MEMBERS OF FIVE CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEES (1986-1993): ELECTION CAREER HISTORIES

Chang Chun-hong:
1. running for 1973 Taipei Special Municipal Council; lost
2. running for 1977 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
3. running for aborted 1978 Legislative Yuan election
4. became a nationwide deputy in the Second National Assembly in 1991 election
5. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Chang Chun-hsiung:
1. running for 1983 Legislative Yuan; won
2. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; won
3. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
4. became a nationwide Legislator in 1992 election
5. running for 1994 Mayor of Kaohsiung Special Municipal City; lost

Chang Fu-chung:
1. running for 1989 Taipei Special Municipal Council; lost
2. became a nationwide deputy in the Second National Assembly in 1991 election

Chen Shui-bian:
1. running for 1981 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
2. running for 1985 Tainan County Magistrate; lost
3. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
4. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won
5. running for 1994 Mayor of Taipei Special Municipal City; won

Chen Yong-hsing:
1. became a nationwide deputy in the Second National Assembly in 1991 election
2. running for 1993 Hualien County Magistrate; lost

Chou Tsang-juan:
1. running for 1968 Keelung City Council; won
2. running for a vacant seat of Taiwan Provincial Assembly (Keelung City), (1969-1971)
3. running for 1972 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; lost
4. running for 1973 Keelung City Council; won
5. running for 1977 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
6. running for 1981 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
7. running for 1985 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
8. running for 1989 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
9. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; lost

Fei Shi-ping:
1. life-time Legislator; retired in 1990 and renounced DPP membership in 1988.

Hong Chi-chang:
1. running for 1986 National Assembly; won
2. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
3. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Hsieh Chang-ting:
1. running for 1981 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
2. running for 1985 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
3. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; lost
4. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
5. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Hsu Hsin-liang:
1. running for 1972 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won (as a KMT candidate)
2. running for 1977 Taoyuan County Magistrate; won (renounced the KMT membership during the election)
3. exiled to the United States because of a sedition charge (1978-1991)

Hsu Jung-shu:
1. running for 1980 Legislative Yuan; won
2. running for 1983 Legislative Yuan; won
3. running for 1985 Taichung City Mayor; lost
4. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; won
5. running for 1989 Taichung City Mayor; lost
6. running for 1991 the Second National Assembly; won
7. running for 1993 Nantou County Magistrate; lost

Hsu Kuo-tai:
1. running for 1983 Legislative Yuan; lost
2. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; won
3. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
4. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Huang Hsin-chieh:
1. running for 1961 Taipei City Council; won
2. running for 1964 Taipei City Council; won
3. running for 1969 Legislative Yuan; won; life-time job, but lost it because of a sedition charge
4. became a nationwide deputy in the Second National Assembly in 1991 election
5. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Jiang Peng-jian:
1. running for 1983 Legislative Yuan; won
2. nominated for the nationwide Legislator candidate, but did not become one

Ju Gau-jeng:
1. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; won
2. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
3. renounced DPP membership in 1990; became the chairman of the new Social Democratic Party
4. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won
5. running for 1994 Taiwan Provincial Governor; lost

Ju Shing-iu:
1. running for 1983 Legislative Yuan; lost
2. running for 1985 Kaohsiung Special Municipal Council; won
3. running for 1989 Kaohsiung Special Municipal Council; won
4. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Kang Ning-shiang:
1. running for 1969 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
2. running for 1972 Legislative Yuan; won
3. running for 1975 Legislative Yuan; won
4. running for 1980 Legislative Yuan; won
5. running for 1983 Legislative Yuan; lost
6. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; won
7. became a nationwide deputy in the Second National Assembly in 1991 election

Lin Cheng-chieh:
1. running for 1981 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
2. running for 1985 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
3. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan; won
4. renounced his DPP membership in 1991

5. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Lin Wen-lang:
1. running for 1973 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
2. running for 1977 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
3. running for 1980 Control Yuan, lost
4. running for 1981 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
5. running for 1985 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
6. running for 1987 Control Yuan, lost
7. running for 1989 Legislative Yuan, lost

Liou Shou-cheng:
1. running for 1989 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
2. running for 1994 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won

Shi Ming-de:
1. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Su Tseng-chang:
1. running for 1981 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
2. running for 1985 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
3. running for 1989 Pintung County Magistrate; won
4. running for 1993 Pintung County Magistrate; lost

Tsai Jie-hsiung:
1. running for 1968 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
2. running for 1972 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
3. running for 1977 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
4. running for 1981 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
5. running for 1985 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
6. running for 1989 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
7. running for 1993 Tainan City Mayor; lost
8. running for 1994 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won

Yao Chia-wen:
1. running for aborted 1978 Legislative Yuan election
2. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

Yen Jin-fu:
1. running for 1978 aborted Legislative Yuan election
2. running for 1981 Taipei Special Municipal Council; lost
3. running for 1985 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
4. running for 1989 Taipei Special Municipal Council; won
5. running for 1992 Legislative Yuan; won

You Ching:
1. running for 1980 Control Yuan; won
2. running for 1985 Taipei County Magistrate; lost
3. running for 1986 Legislative Yuan; won
4. running for 1989 Taipei County Magistrate; won
5. running for 1993 Taipei County Magistrate; won

You Shyi-kun:
1. running for 1981 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
2. running for 1985 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
3. running for 1989 I-Lan County Magistrate; won
4. running for 1993 I-Lan County Magistrate; won

Yu Chen Yueh-yin:
1. running for 1963 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
2. running for 1968 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
3. running for 1972 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won

4. running for 1977 Taiwan Provincial Assembly; won
5. running for 1981 Kaohsiung County Magistrate; lost
6. running for 1985 Kaohsiung County Magistrate; won
7. running for 1989 Kaohsiung County Magistrate; won

Chiou I-ren:
None

Wu Nai-jen:
None

Sources: Most of the career information of the DPP Central Standing Committee members is from the research data of Ming-tong Chen. Others were collected and organized by the author.
Notes: All names begin with their family name, followed by their first name. The Chinese always pronounce their family name first.
When the romanization of the Chinese names of some DPP leaders is given, this thesis just adopts them. When they are not available, this thesis uses the method of Kwoyeu Romatzyh to romanize their names.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Without opposition leaders, there would be no opposition movements at all. Most scholars, however, regard opposition movements as a by-product of other factors, such as the emergence of the middle-class, the rise of a civil society, and the democratic transformation of an authoritarian regime; these scholars thereby largely ignore the leaders who evaluate conditions relevant to organizing and leading an opposition movement. This book, therefore, focuses attention on opposition leaders as the critical element in its examination of opposition movements.

An opposition movement, in the sense of a highly desirable activity, is not merely a pursuit of moral ideals or democracy; it is also an enterprise involving costs and benefits. Like successful enterprises, opposition organizations have to survive and expand. Like economic entrepreneurs, opposition leaders have to assess the costs of running opposition organizations, the potential resources for sustaining and expanding the organizations, and the potential profits for the leaders themselves.

Opposition leaders would not emerge without prospective gains in the offing—the value of leading an opposition movement, EV(O), must be positive. In their calculations, the most crucial variables are: the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [C(O)], the costs of the opposition losing the political contest [C(D)], and the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of outcome [B(O)]. Based on these variables, potential opposition leaders would remain quiescent under highly repressive regimes that eliminate the opposition mercilessly and efficiently. In many developing countries, however, opposition leaders may deem it worthwhile to take risks and emerge as guerrilla organizers or elective officeholders, depending on how they assess these variables.

These variables have much to do with governmental coercion and the opportunity for political opposition in a given country. One would assume that different political systems have different degrees of regime coercion and opportunity for opposition movements. However, the existing typologies of political systems classify most

developing countries as "authoritarian," which presumably means they have a high concentration of power and leave little room for opposition activities. This notion of authoritarian systems cannot stand testing in the real world since opposition movements do take place in some of these countries. Therefore, to differentiate countries in regard to their opposition movements, I have resorted to a new typology of political systems: democratic, quasi-democratic, and the least democratic (including totalitarian and autocratic). In my typology, democracy is least repressive and most favorable to opposition movements. By degrees, quasi-democratic and the least democratic systems are more repressive and less likely to permit opposition activities.

The failure of opposition movements in the majority of the least democratic countries indicates the difficulty of organizing collective actions under such systems. Common grievances certainly exist in these countries. Massive corruption at all levels of government (*e.g.*, Nigeria), long-term ethnic discrimination against the majority group (*e.g.*, Burundi) or the minority group (*e.g.*, Iraq), and omnipresent control of the daily lives of ordinary people (*e.g.*, North Korea) seem to easily create a large segment of disgruntled natives. However, organized opposition movements can hardly emerge or develop, partly because the ruling regimes exert harsh repressive measures on political opposition, and partly because opposition leaders lack incentives to play the role of the mobilizing agents. On the one hand, the costs of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [C(O)] and the costs of losing the political contest [C(D)] are tremendously high in many of the least democratic countries. On the other, the benefits of organizing an opposition movement regardless of its outcome [B(O)] are almost non-existent because there are no regularly held elections or permanent organizations providing opportunities for opposition leaders to amass resources and create "leader's surplus." Therefore, under these circumstances, opposition leaders as calculating political entrepreneurs have little incentive to organize a risky and non-rewarding opposition movement.

Occasionally, when the external environment changes in the opposition's favor and the values of C(O), C(D), and B(O) also change accordingly, opposition leaders may seize the moment to carefully plan their strategies and lead successful opposition movements. The Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) and the Solidarity movement in Poland, the guerrilla operation led by the Shining Path in Peru, and the underground operation masterminded by the

Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and its splintered militant factions in Algeria amply testify to the entrepreneurial leadership played by opposition leaders in leading successful opposition movements, as discussed in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, opposition leaders do not have regularly available legal forums to compete with the ruling regimes in the least democratic systems.

One major factor that distinguishes quasi-democratic systems from the least democratic systems is that the former hold elections regularly. Such elections offer a regular legal forum for political competition. Through these elections, opposition leaders amass resources, hold elective offices, and develop organizations. In quasi-democratic systems, I single out the one-party dominant quasi-democratic system as an important sub-category. In this ideal type of political system, the ruling parties have never been unseated by any opposition party in national elections and have enjoyed a long period of political stability. The ruling parties are not afraid of practicing electoral politics as a norm mainly because they can manipulate voting and electoral campaign rules and design an electoral system to their advantage. Nonetheless, opposition leaders can still form political parties or quasi-party organizations and participate in electoral competition and win elective seats. Although their chances of taking political power are slim, opposition leaders vigorously participate in elections to garner resources for their movements and themselves. Therefore, electoral politics becomes crucial for the emergence of opposition movements and their leaders, disregarding the normative meanings of elections.

Many scholarly studies which focus on the democratization of "authoritarian" regimes usually treat non-democratic systems as a transitional stage to democracy. Transition implies that the current stage is temporary and "abnormal."[1] Once they pass some kind of threshold, non-democratic countries can move, step by step, to real democracy.[2] In reality, in most autocratic countries, there seems to be no way to predict in which direction each country will head, as discussed in Chapter 4.

In the case of one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries, however, the systems seem to function amazingly stable for decades. They seem to be self-contained and do not necessarily move

1. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), Part IV, p. 65.

2. Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 16-7.

toward full democracy despite many democratic features in their governments. Most important of all, opposition movements and their leaders have room to maneuver, which is not the case in most autocratic and totalitarian countries. Therefore, part of this book concentrates on the internal operational elements in the one-party dominant political system itself and analyzes opposition movements and leaders for what they are, instead of focusing on the democratization process or how opposition factors contribute to democratic transitions.

Using the idea of opposition leaders as political entrepreneurs and that of Taiwan as a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system, I examine the opposition movements in Taiwan. First, I inspect the quasi-democratic characteristics of Taiwan in terms of its performance in civil liberties, political rights, and electoral practices. Then I measure the activities of Taiwan's opposition leaders against the traits of a one-party dominant quasi-democratic system one by one. I draw a list of the core opposition leaders, check their career histories, and measure the rewards of holding elective offices. I find that the emergence of opposition movements and their leaders in Taiwan revolves around elections, and that most opposition leaders in Taiwan treat leading opposition movements as an enterprise and make a career of holding elective offices.

The case study of Taiwan's opposition movements confirms the inadequacy of classifying Taiwan as an "authoritarian" regime. Despite many coercive characteristics of the KMT regime, opposition leaders have opportunities of participating in various elections regularly. By participating in elections, on the one hand, opposition leaders first were able to form loose coalitions and quasi-party organizations and then a formal political party. They also amassed valuable resources to cover the costs of running for election, organizing demonstrations and rallies, and maintaining permanent organizations. Moreover, the rewards of the elective offices gave opposition leaders power, fame, and money. The case of Taiwan, therefore, illustrates that opposition leaders have many incentives to play the role of mobilizing agents in organizing collective actions in one-party dominant quasi-democratic systems. As a result, once political entrepreneurs are willing to assume the job of opposition leader, coordinated and organized opposition movements become a reality.

The major hypothesis of this book is that opposition leaders are entrepreneurial and profit-seeking individuals who weigh the costs and benefits of leading opposition movements under different

circumstances. Potential opposition leaders will emerge only when the expected value of leading an opposition movement [EV(O)] is greater than zero. However, in Equation 1, profits and gains are not necessarily derived from taking power through a political contest. They also come from legitimate participation in elections and even from illegal underground operations.

In the case of one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries, even though opposition leaders have not had the opportunity of winning political power by general election, they have accumulated valuable resources merely by being allowed to participate in regularly held elections and to organize opposition activities. The incentives (the rewards of running for and holding elective offices) generated by the one-party dominant quasi-democratic system gradually change the values of some variables in Equation 1 and make it more profitable for other potential opposition leaders to join in the power struggle. Thus, there is an internal dynamic in Equation 1 as time passes.

In this book, a general observation of opposition movements in most autocratic and totalitarian countries testifies to the entrepreneurial explanation of the emergence (or non-emergence) of organized opposition movements and their leaders. Also, the case of Taiwan confirms my basic hypothesis that opposition leaders are calculating and profit-seeking entrepreneurs. Future studies can compare the behavior and inner motivation of opposition leaders in one-party dominant quasi-democratic countries with that of opposition leaders of long-time minority parties in democratic countries. In addition, further case studies of opposition movements in quasi-democratic and "near-quasi-democratic" countries may serve to further bolster the theoretical arguments presented in this study.

APPENDIX A. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES INDICES OF 147 COUNTRIES FROM 1973 TO 1993* AND THE AVERAGE SCORE OF EACH INDEX FOR 147 COUNTRIES

(The first row of each country are political rights scores; the second row of each country are civil liberties scores)

Country	Indices Year 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	Average
Afghanistan	4,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,6	6.762
	5,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,6	6.571
Albania	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,4,4	6.714
	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,4,3	6.619
Algeria	6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,4,4,7	5.905
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,4,4,4,6	5.714
Angola	.,.,.,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6	6.778
	.,.,.,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,4,5	6.611
Argentina	6,2,2,2,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,3,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,2	3.429
	3,2,4,4,5,6,5,5,5,5,5,3,2,2,1,1,1,2,3,3,3	3.333
Australia	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Austria	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1.1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Bahamas	2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1	1.524
	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,2	2.238
Bahrain	6,6,4,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6	5.429
	5,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5	4.714
Bangladesh	2,4,4,7,7,6,4,3,3,5,5,6,6,5,4,4,4,4,5,2,2	4.381
	4,4,4,5,4,4,4,3,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,5,3,3	4.333
Barbados	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.095
Belgium	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Benin	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,2,2	6.476
	5,5,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,4,3,3	6
Bhutan	4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,7	4.905
	4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6	4.714
Bolivia	5,5,6,6,6,6,5,3,7,7,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	3.714
	4,4,5,5,4,4,3,3,5,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3	3.524
Botswana	3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1	1.857
	4,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,2	2.810
Brazil	5,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	3.238
	5,5,4,5,5,5,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,3,2,3,3,3	3.381
Bulgaria	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,3,2,2	6.333
	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,4,3,3	6.476

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7777777888888888889999 3456789012345678901 23	Average
Burma	7,7,7,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	6.905
	5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,7	6.286
Burundi	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6	6.857
	7,7,7,6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5	6.143
Cameroon	6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.048
	4,4,4,4,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,5	5.524
Canada	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Cape Verde	.,.,.,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,6,5,2,1	5.278
	.,.,.,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,6,6,6,5,5,3,2	5.556
Central	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.714
African Rep.	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5	6.000
Chad	6,6,6,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,6,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,6,6	6.524
	7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,6,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6	6.429
Chile	1,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,4,2,2,2	5.286
	2,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,3,2,2,2	4.286
China	7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.429
	7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.429
Colombia	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,2,2	2.095
	2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4	3.048
Comoros	.,.,.,5,5,4,5,4,4,4,4,4,5,6,6,6,6,6,5,4,4	4.833
	.,.,.,2,3,3,4,5,5,5,5,4,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,3,2	4.444
Congo	7,5,5,5,5,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,3	6.333
	7,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,4,3	5.857
Costa Rica	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Cuba	7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7	6.524
	7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.381
Czechoslovakia	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,2,2,2	6.238
	7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,2,2,2	5.571
Denmark	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Dominican	3,3,4,4,4,4,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2	2.048
Republic	2,2,2,2,3,2,2,3,3,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3	2.571
Ecuador	7,7,7,7,6,6,5,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	3.476
	3,4,4,4,4,4,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,2,2,2,3,3	2.810
Egypt	6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5	5.095
	6,6,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,6	4.619
El Salvador	2,2,2,2,3,3,4,5,5,4,4,4,3,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3	3.143
	3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,3,4,4,4,3	3.857

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7777778888888888999 3456789012345678901 23	Average
Equatorial	6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	6.714
Guinea	6,6,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6	6.524
Ethiopia	5,5,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,6,6	6.571
	6,6,5,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,5,4	6.476
Fiji	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,6,5,6,6,6,4	3.000
	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,5,4,4,4,4,3	2.571
Finland	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.714
	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1	1.810
France	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	2,2,2,2,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	1.905
Gabon	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,4,4,4	5.714
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,4,3,4	5.619
Gambia	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,1	2.333
	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,4,3,4,4,4,4,3,3,2,2,2,2	2.667
Germany	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2	1.667
Ghana	6,7,7,7,7,6,6,4,2,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,5	6.048
	6,6,5,5,5,5,4,4,3,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,6,5	5.190
Greece	6,7,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1	2.000
	6,5,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	2.333
Grenada	.,.,2,2,2,2,2,5,6,6,6,7,5,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1	3.105
	.,.,4,4,4,3,3,5,5,5,5,6,3,3,2,1,1,2,2,2,2	3.263
Guatemala	2,2,4,4,4,4,3,4,6,6,6,6,5,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,4	3.905
	3,2,3,3,3,4,4,5,6,6,6,6,6,4,3,3,3,3,4,5,5	4.143
Guinea	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6	6.857
	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,5,5,5,6,6,6,5,5,5	6.286
Guinea-Bissau	.,.,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.053
	.,.,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,6,5,5,5	6
Guyana	2,4,4,4,3,3,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,3	4.333
	2,2,2,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,3	3.762
Haiti	7,6,6,6,6,7,7,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,5,6,7,7,4,7,7	6.476
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,4,5,5,5,4,7,7	5.714
Honduras	7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,4,2,2,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	3.714
	3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3	3
Hungary	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,4,2,2,2	5.143
	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,3,2,2,2	4.619
Iceland	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
India	2,2,2,2,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3	2.143
	3,3,3,5,5,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4	3.143

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	Average
Indonesia	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6	5.143
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5	5.190
Iran	5,5,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6	5.524
	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,6	5.667
Iraq	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	6.810
	7,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7	6.905
Ireland	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.190
Israel	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	2
	3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	2.286
Italy	1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.190
	2,2,2,2,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2	1.524
Ivory Coast	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	5.810
	6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,5,4,4,4	5.048
Jamaica	1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	1.762
	2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,2,2,2	2.524
Japan	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.381
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2	1.095
Jordan	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,6,5,5,4,3	5.476
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,3	5.429
Kampuchea	6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6	6.762
(Cambodia)	5,5,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6	6.667
Kenya	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	5.429
	4,4,4,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,5	5
Korea, North	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	7
	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	7
Korea, South	5,4,5,5,5,5,5,4,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,2,2,2,2,2	4.048
	6,6,6,5,6,5,5,5,6,5,6,6,5,5,5,4,3,3,3,3,3	4.810
Kuwait	4,4,4,4,6,6,6,6,6,4,4,4,4,4,6,6,6,6,.,6,5	5.050
	4,3,3,3,5,4,3,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,4,.,5,5	4.100
Laos	5,5,5,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,7	6.476
	5,5,5,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,6	6.571
Lebanon	2,2,2,4,4,4,4,4,5,4,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,5	4.476
	2,2,2,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,4,4	3.905
Lesotho	7,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6	5.333
	4,3,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,5,5,4,4	4.619
Liberia	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,6,5,5,5,5,6,7,7,7	5.905
	6,5,3,4,4,4,4,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,7,6,6	5.095
Libya	7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.476
	6,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.333

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7777777888888888899999 3456789012345678901234	Average
Luxembourg	2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.238
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Madagascar	5,5,5,5,6,5,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4	5.048
	3,4,4,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,4,4,4,4	4.905
Malawi	7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,6	6.429
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,7	6.524
Malaysia	2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,5,5,5,5,5	3.333
	3,3,3,4,4,4,3,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,4	4.048
Maldives	3,3,3,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6	4.762
	2,2,2,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,5	4.571
Mali	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,2	6.571
	6,6,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,4,3	5.905
Malta	1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.476
	2,1,1,1,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,2,2,1,1,1,1	2.238
Mauritania	6,6,5,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.524
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6
Mauritius	3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,2	2.238
	2,2,2,2,2,2,4,4,3,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	2.286
Mexico	5,4,4,4,4,4,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,3,4,4,4,4	3.714
	3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,3,4,4,3	3.714
Mongolia	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,4,2,3	6.429
	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,4,3,2	6.429
Morocco	5,5,5,5,5,4,3,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,6	4.333
	4,5,5,5,5,3,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,5	4.619
Mozambique	.,.,.,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.444
	.,.,.,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,4,4	6.500
Nepal	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,2,2	4.095
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,4,3,3	4.286
Netherlands	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
New Zealand	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Nicaragua	4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,3,3,4	4.857
	3,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,5,4,5,3,3,3	4.476
Niger	6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,5	6.714
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,4	5.810
Nigeria	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,2,2,2,2,2,7,7,7,6,5,6,5,5,5	4.905
	4,4,4,5,4,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,5,5,5,5,4,5,5,4,4	4.048
Norway	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7777778888888888999 3456789012345678901233	Average
Oman	7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.190
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5	5.952
Pakistan	3,3,3,5,4,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,4,4,4,3,3,4,4,4	4.810
	5,5,5,5,5,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,3,3,4,5,5	4.714
Panama	7,7,7,7,7,6,5,5,4,5,5,5,4,6,6,5,6,7,4,4,4	5.524
	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,4,5,5,4,3,3,3,5,5,6,2,2,3	4.524
Papua New	.,.,.,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	2.056
Guinea	.,.,.,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3	2.167
Paraguay	4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,4,4,3,3	4.714
	6,5,5,5,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,3,3,3,3	4.905
Peru	7,7,6,6,6,6,5,5,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,6	3.810
	5,5,6,4,4,4,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,5,5	3.857
Philippines	4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,2,2,2,3,3,3	4.095
	6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,4,3,2,2,3,3,3,3	4.048
Poland	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,4,2,2,2	5.286
	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,3,2,2,2	4.667
Portugal	5,5,5,5,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	2.048
	6,6,3,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1	2.381
Qatar	6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,7,7,7,7	5.571
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6	5.048
Romania	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,5,4	6.714
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,5,5,4	6.095
Rwanda	7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.286
	6,6,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5	5.714
Sao Tome &	.,.,.,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,5,2,2	5.667
Principe	.,.,.,.,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,5,5,3,3	5.667
Saudi Arabia	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.190
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,7	6.333
Senegal	6,6,6,6,6,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4	4.286
	6,6,5,4,4,3,3,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,3,3,3,3	3.952
Seychelles	.,.,.,.,.,1,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	5.706
	.,.,.,.,.,2,3,4,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,4	5.353
Sierra Leone	4,6,6,6,6,5,6,5,5,5,5,5,4,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,7	5.381
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6	5.048
Singapore	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4	4.429
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,5	4.857
Somalia	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	7
	6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	6.810
South Africa	4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,5,5,5	4.810
	5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,4,4,4	5.429

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	Average
Soviet Union	6,6,6,7, 7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,5,4,.	6.250
	6,6,6,6, 6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,5,5,4,4,.	6.050
Spain	5,5,5,5,5,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	2.190
	6,6,5,5,3,2,3,2,3,3,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1	2.667
Sri Lanka	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4	2.667
	3,3,3,4,3,2,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5	3.667
Sudan	6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,4,4,4,7,7,7,7	5.619
	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,5,5,5,7,7,7,7	5.714
Suriname	.,.,.,2,2,2,2,2,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,4,3,3,4,4,3	4.333
	.,.,.,2,2,2,2,2,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,4,2,3,3,4,3	3.833
Swaziland	4,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6	5.429
	2,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5	4.857
Sweden	1,1,1,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.048
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Switzerland	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
Syria	7,7,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7	6
	7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	6.810
Taiwan	6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,3,3,3	4.857
	5,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,3,3,3,3,3	4.381
Tanzania	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6
	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5	5.857
Thailand	7,6,5,2,6,6,6,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,6,3	3.905
	5,3,3,3,6,5,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,3,3,3,3,3,4,4	3.810
Togo	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6	6.571
	5,5,6,6,6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5	5.857
Trinidad &	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.429
Tobago	3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1	1.762
Tunisia	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,5,5,5,6	5.619
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,3,4,5,5	4.810
Turkey	3,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,5,5,4,4,3,3,3,2,2,3,2,2,2	2.714
	4,4,3,3,3,3,3,3,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,3,4,4,4	3.952
Uganda	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,4,5,5,4,4,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6	5.762
	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,4,5,5,5,5,4,4,4,4,4,5,6,5	5.476
United Arab	7,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6	5.429
Emirates	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5	5
United Kingdom	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2	1.143
United States	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1
	1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1	1

Appendix A (Continued)

Country	Indices Year 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	Average
Upper Volta	3,3,6,6,5,5,2,2,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,5	5.429
	4,4,4,4,5,4,3,3,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5	4.762
Uruguay	3,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1	3.762
	4,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,4,4,4,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2	3.857
Venezuela	2,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,3	1.286
	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3	2.190
Vietnam	.,.,.,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,7,7	6.889
	.,.,.,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7	6.778
Western Samoa	4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4,2,2,2,2	3.619
	2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,2,2,2,2	2.429
Yugoslavia	6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,5,5,6,6	5.905
	6,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,5	5.143
Zaire	7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,6,6,7,6,6,6	6.476
	6,6,6,7,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,6,6,5,5	6.286
Zambia	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,2,2	4.857
	5,5,4,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,3,3	4.952
Zimbabwe	6,6,6,6,6,6,5,4,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,5,6,6,6,5,5	4.905
	5,5,5,5,5,5,5,5,4,4,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,4,4,4,4	4.905

Sources: The annual ratings of countries from 1972 to 1978 are from the data of *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), by Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice. The annual ratings of countries from 1979 to 1981 are from Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1980* (New York: Freedom House, 1980), *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1981* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), and *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1982* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). From 1982 to 1992, the annual ratings of countries were collected from January/February issues of *Freedom at Issue* (the journal name was changed to *Freedom Review* in 1990).
Note: *Actual scores are from 1972 to 1992.

APPENDIX B. RANK-ORDER FOR 54 FIRST-ROUND QUASI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ON CLAV, PRAV, ELECNO, AND CELECN

Country	CLAV	Rank cl	PRAV	Rank pr	ELECNO	Rank el	CELECN	Rank ce
BHTN	4.71	22.00	4.91	25.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
LSTO	4.62	26.50	5.33	15.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
SRLE	5.05	8.00	5.38	14.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
SWAZ	4.86	16.50	5.43	11.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
UAE	5.00	10.50	5.43	11.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
QTAR	5.05	8.00	5.57	6.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
SYCH	5.35	4.00	5.71	4.00	0	4.00	0	13.00
MLDV	4.57	29.00	4.76	32.00	1	11.00	0	13.00
NGRA	4.05	40.00	4.91	25.00	1	11.00	0	13.00
KWAT	4.10	38.00	5.05	22.00	1	11.00	0	13.00
HNGR	4.62	26.50	5.14	19.50	1	11.00	0	13.00
BHRN	4.71	22.00	5.43	11.00	1	11.00	0	13.00
TNSA	4.81	18.50	5.62	5.00	1	11.00	0	13.00
UGND	5.48	2.00	5.76	3.00	1	11.00	0	13.00
CMRS	4.44	32.00	4.83	30.00	2	18.50	0	13.00
ZMBA	4.95	12.00	4.86	28.00	2	18.50	0	13.00
CVRD	5.56	1.00	5.28	18.00	2	18.50	0	13.00
KNYA	5.00	10.50	5.43	11.00	2	18.50	0	13.00
IVCT	5.05	8.00	5.81	2.00	2	18.50	0	13.00
PRGY	4.91	14.00	4.71	33.00	3	26.50	0	13.00
CHLE	4.29	35.50	5.29	16.50	3	26.50	0	13.00
PLND	4.67	24.00	5.29	16.50	3	26.50	0	13.00
UPVL	4.76	20.00	5.43	11.00	3	26.50	0	13.00
MDGS	4.91	14.00	5.05	23.00	4	34.00	0	13.00
GHNA	5.19	5.50	6.05	1.00	4	34.00	0	13.00
SRNM	3.83	47.00	4.33	37.00	2	18.50	2	30.50
MRCO	4.62	26.50	4.33	37.00	2	18.50	2	30.50
JRDN	5.43	3.00	5.48	8.00	2	18.50	2	30.50
PKST	4.71	22.00	4.81	31.00	3	26.50	2	30.50
PNMA	4.52	30.00	5.52	7.00	3	26.50	2	30.50
SRLK	3.67	51.00	2.67	54.00	4	34.00	2	30.50
GTML	4.14	37.00	3.91	43.50	4	34.00	2	30.50
BNGL	4.33	34.00	4.38	35.00	5	39.00	2	30.50
NCRG	4.48	31.00	4.86	28.00	5	39.00	2	30.50
URGY	3.86	45.00	3.76	46.00	6	43.50	2	30.50
NPAL	4.29	35.50	4.10	40.50	3	26.50	3	40.00
INDS	5.19	5.50	5.14	19.50	3	26.50	3	40.00
ZIMB	4.91	14.00	4.91	25.00	4	34.00	3	40.00
EGPT	4.62	26.50	5.10	21.00	4	34.00	3	40.00
HNDS	3.00	53.00	3.71	48.00	6	43.50	3	40.00
SNGL	3.95	42.50	4.29	39.00	6	43.50	3	40.00
PHLP	4.05	40.00	4.10	40.50	8	50.00	3	40.00
PERU	3.86	45.00	3.81	45.00	9	51.00	3	40.00
BOLV	3.52	52.00	3.71	48.00	10	52.00	3	40.00
GYNA	3.76	49.00	4.33	37.00	4	34.00	4	45.50
ELSL	3.86	45.00	3.14	52.00	7	48.00	4	45.50
MLYS	4.05	40.00	3.33	51.00	5	39.00	5	47.50
KORS	4.81	18.50	4.05	42.00	7	48.00	5	47.50
TRKY	3.95	42.50	2.71	53.00	6	43.50	6	50.50

Appendix B (Continued)

Country	CLAV	Rank cl	PRAV	Rank pr	ELECNO	Rank el	CELECN	Rank ce
WSMA	2.43	54.00	3.62	50.00	6	43.50	6	50.50
SNGP	4.86	16.50	4.43	34.00	6	43.50	6	50.50
TLND	3.81	48.00	3.91	43.50	7	48.00	6	50.50
TWAN	4.38	33.00	4.86	28.00	11	53.00	7	53.50
MXCO	3.71	50.00	3.71	48.00	14	54.00	7	53.50

Notes:
CLAV: Average Civil Liberties Score
Rank cl: Rank Value of Average Civil Liberties Score
PRAV: Average Political Rights Score
Rank pr: Rank Value of Average Political Rights Score
ELECNO: Total Election Number
Rank el: Rank Value of Total Election Number
CELECN: Consecutive Election Number
Rank ce: Rank Value of Consecutive Election Number

APPENDIX C. LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEE AND THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN FIVE DPP NATIONAL CONVENTIONS (1986-1993)

I. 11/10/1986 - 11/8/1987

11 Central Standing Committee Members:
Jiang Peng-jian (Chairman)
Fei Shi-ping
Chou Tsang-juan
You Shyi-kun
Kang Ning-shiang
Hong Chi-chang
Wu Nai-jen
You Ching
Hsieh Chang-ting
Su Tseng-chang
Yao Chia-wen (substituting for Pan Li-fu whose membership rights were suspended)

20 Central Executive Committee Members:
Iang Ia-iun
Tai Chen-yao
Chen U-jin
Huang Jau-kai
Yen Jin-fu
Huang El-shiuan
Hsu Jung-shu
Fu Jeng
Chang Chun-hsiung
Chou Ching-yu
Chen Shui-bian (substituting for Lin Wen-lang)
Ju Gau-jeng (substituting for He Uen-chi)
Tsai Ren-jian
Tsai Jie-hsiung
Shi Shing-ping
Chou Bo-luen
Chang Fu-chung
Iang Tzu-jiun
Jang De-ming
Yu Ling-ia

II. 11/9/1987 - 10/28/1988

11 Central Standing Committee Members:
Yao Chia-wen (Chairman)
Ju Gau-jeng
Hsu Jung-shu
Chang Fu-chung
Fei Shi-ping
Kang Ning-shiang
You Ching
Hsieh Chang-ting
You Shyi-kun
Chen Shui-bian

Appendix C (Continued)

Yu Chen Yueh-yin

20 Central Executive Committee Members:

Fu Jeng	Huang El-shiuan
Chang Chun-hsiung	Chou Tsang-iuan
Chou Ching-yu	Su Tseng-chang
Tsai Jie-hsiung	Hsu Kuo-tai
Shi Shing-ping	Chiu Lien-hui
Chou Bo-luen	Lan Mei-jin
Tsai Ren-jian	Huang Huang-hsiung
Iang Tzu-jiun	Huang Jau-huei
Jang De-ming	Liou Feng-song
Yu Ling-ia	Lin Guo-hua

III. 10/29/1988 - 10/27/1989

11 Central Standing Committee Members:
Huang Hsin-chieh (Chairman)
You Shyi-kun
Hong Chi-chang
Hsu Jung-shu
Hsieh Chang-ting
Chen Shui-bian
Yu Chen Yueh-yin
Tsai Jie-hsiung
Chang Chun-hsiung
Lin Cheng-chieh
Yao Chia-wen

20 Central Executive Committee Members:

Chiu Lien-hui	Luo Long-jeng
Chou Bo-luen	Hou Hai-shiong
Huang Jau-huei	Liau Iun-i
Huang El-shiuan	Wu Chiou-gu
Fu Uen-jeng	Jang Uen-ing
Su Tseng-chang	Huang Jau-kai
Lin Tzong-nan	Chiou I-ren
Tang Jin-chiuan	Yen Jin-fu
Wang Jau-chuan	Li Uen-ping
Yu Cheng-hsien	Li I-iang

IV. 10/28/1989 - 10/11/1991

11 Central Standing Committee Members:
Huang Hsin-chieh (Chairman)
You Shyi-kun
Chang Chun-hong

Appendix C (Continued)

Hong Chi-chang
Wu Nai-jen
Yu Chen Yueh-yin
Yao Chia-wen
Lin Wen-lang
Hsu Kuo-tai
You Ching
Chen Yong-shing

20 Central Standing Committee Members:

Tang Jin-chiuan	Su Gia-chiuan
Wu Chiou-gu	Du Uen-ching
Huang Jau-huei	Shiu Ming-de
Li I-iang	Liou Feng-song
Wang Jau-chuan	Chen Jong-he
Hsieh Chang-ting	Liau Iong-lai
Hsu Jung-shu	Jang De-ming
Lin Cheng-chieh	Wu Je-lang
Kang Shuei-mu	Yu Ling-ia
Chen Guang-fu	Jian Shi-jie

V. 10/12/1991 - 5/1/1993

11 Central Standing Committee Members:
Hsu Hsin-liang (Chairman; resigned in 1993)
Shi Ming-de (Acting Chairman)
Ju Shing-iu
Yu Chen Yueh-yin
Lin Wen-lang
Yen Jin-fu
Chiou I-ren
Liou Shou-cheng
Yao Chia-wen
Hong Chi-chang
Hsieh Chang-ting

20 Central Executive Committee Members:

Du Uen-ching	Lin Ruei-ching
Yu Ling-ia	Shiu Neng-tong
Shiu Ming-de	Chen Shui-bian
Su Gia-chiuan	Jang Guo-tang
Chang Chun-hong	Jang Guei-mu
Hsu Jung-shu	Fu Uen-jeng
You Ching	Tsai Ren-jian
Fang Lai-jin	Tsai Iou-chiuan
Jiang Peng-jian	Shiau Iu-jeng

Appendix C (Continued)

Li Mau-chiuan Shiau Iu-jen

Sources: 1) The list of the DPP Central Standing Committee members from the first DPP National Convention to the fourth National Convention is from the DPP party headquarters. This author visited the DPP party headquarters in June 1990. Mr. Chou Shuen-ji, who worked in the Secretariat, offered the list to the author.
2) The list of the DPP Central Standing Committee members in the fifth DPP National Convention is from *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), October 13, 1991, p. 2.
3) The list of the DPP Central Executive Committee members of the first National Convention is from *The Independence Evening Post* (in Chinese), November 11, 1986, p. 2.
4) The list of the DPP Central Executive Committee members of the Second National Convention is from *The Independence Evening Post* (in Chinese), November 11, 1987, p. 2.
5) The list of the DPP Central Executive Committee members of the third and the fourth National Conventions is offered by Chou Shuen-ji.
6) The list of the DPP Central Executive Committee members of the fifth National Convention is from *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), October 13, 1991, p. 2.
Notes: 1) All names begin with their family name, followed by their first name. The Chinese always pronounce their family name first.
2) When the romanization of the Chinese names of some DPP leaders is given, this thesis just adopts them. When they are not available, this thesis uses the method of Kwoyeu Romatzyh to romanize their names.
3) The DPP Central Standing Committee consists of 11 members.
4) The DPP Central Executive Committee consists of 31 members. Eleven of them are also Central Standing Committee members.

APPENDIX D. ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE NAMES

Ben, Shing-i	賁馨儀
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Chang, Chun-hsiung	張俊雄
Chang, Fu-chung	張富忠
Chen, Ding-nan	陳定南
Chen, Shui-bian	陳水扁
Chen, Yong-hsing	陳永興
Chiou, I-ren	邱義仁
Chou, Bo-ia	周柏雅
Chou, Bo-luen	周伯倫
Chou, Tsang-juan	周滄淵
Fei, Shi-ping	費希平
Hong, Chi-chang	洪奇昌
Hsieh, Chang-ting	謝長廷
Hsieh, Tung-min	謝東閔
Hsu, Hsin-liang	許信良
Hsu, Jung-shu	許榮淑
Hsu, Kuo-tai	許國泰
Huang, Hsin-chieh	黃信介
Jiang, Peng-jian	江鵬堅

Ju, Gau-jeng	朱高正
Ju, Shing-iu	朱星羽
Kang, Ning-shiang	康寧祥
Kao, Yu-shu	高玉樹
Lei, Zhen	雷震
Li, I-iang	李逸洋
Lin, Cheng-chieh	林正杰
Lin, Juo-shui	林濁水
Lin, Wen-lang	林文郎
Lin, Yang-kang	林洋港
Liou, Shou-cheng	劉守成
Liu, Wen-hsiung	劉文雄
Lu, Hsiu-yi	盧修一
Pang, Pai-shien	彭百顯
Shi, Ming-de	施明德
Shie, Ming-da	謝明達
Soong, Chu-yu	宋楚瑜
Su, Tseng-chang	蘇貞昌
Tsai, Jie-hsiung	蔡介雄
Tsai, Shih-yen	蔡式淵
Wang, Yu-yun	王玉雲
Wei, Jing-sheng	魏京生

Wei, Yao-chien	魏耀乾
Wu, Nai-jen	吳乃仁
Yao, Chia-wen	姚嘉文
Yen, Jin-fu	顏錦福
You, Ching	尤清
You, Shyi-kun	游錫堃
Yu Chen, Yueh-yin	余陳月瑛

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